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KANT'S  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK   •   BOSTON  •   CHICAGO    •   DALLAS 
ATLANTA    •    SAN   FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON   •   BOMBAY    •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA.  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


AN  INTRODUCTION 


TO 


KANT'S  CRITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 


BY 
GEORGE  TAPLEY  WHITNEY 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 

AND 
PHILIP  HOWARD  FOGEL 

ASSISTANT  PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 


N^m  fork 

THE  MACMILLAN"    COMPANY 

1914 

All  rights  reserved 


(X^/^O-C-uvv^    T'^  1.3  0  0 

Copyright,  1914, 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Set  up  and  electrotyped.    Published  May,  1914. 


PREFACE 

This  little  volume  has  arisen  from  a  need  felt  in  con- 
nection with  undergraduate  instruction  on  Kant.  Too 
often  Kant  has  been  taught  as  merely  a  part  in  a  scheme 
of  philosophy,  or  as  having  significance  only  as  a  stage 
in  that  development  of  thought  which  the  History  of 
Philosophy  presents.  The  consequence  of  this  treatment 
has  been  the  warping  of  his  views  to  suit  the  general 
scheme.  In  opposition  to  this,  we  have  attempted  in  this 
statement  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  to  bring  out 
the  many-sidedness  of  his  system  in  itself,  and  for  itself, 
and  to  show  its  significance  as  more  than  merely  a  pro- 
paedeutic for  further  reflections. 

We  have  been  painfully  conscious  of  the  divergent  and 
even  sometimes  conflicting  tendencies  of  Kant's  thought, 
and  in  the  opportunities  which  it  thus  offers  for  different 
interpretations.  We  have  not  ignored  these  conflicting 
tendencies  in  his  thought  for  the  sake  of  a  unified  inter- 
pretation, but  since  we  wanted  to  present  what  Kant 
said,  rather  than  what  we  think  Kant  ought  to  have  said 
in  order  to  be  consistent,  we  have  thought  it  better  to 
present  them  as  we  found  them. 

In  the  observations  that  we  have  made  from  time  to 
time,  we  have  taken  those  aspects  of  the  diverging  tend- 
encies which  seemed  to  us  to  have  been  involved  in  his 
fundamental  position,  and  upon  which  he  seemed  to  in- 
sist with  emphasis. 


VI  PREFACE 

The  selections  from  Kant  and  the  observations  that 
have  been  made,  we  believe,  give  a  true  statement  of 
Kant.  We  make  no  pretense  of  giving  a  complete  inter- 
pretation of  him.  We  have  tried  merely  to  give  a  state- 
ment of  him  which  would  bring  out  the  continuity  of  the 
thought,  which  would  emphasize  the  problems  he  con- 
sidered and  how  they  arise, — in  short,  a  statement  which 
ought  in  some  degree  to  meet  the  needs  of  the  ordinary 
student. 

In  the  treatment  itself,  Kant's  own  language  is  very 
largely  taken.  The  translation  used  principally  is  that 
by  Max  Mueller,  though  at  times  we  have  made  use  of 
the  Meiklejohn  translation,  or  have  made  our  own  trans- 
lation. 

Glossaries  of  technical  terms  as  used  by  Kant  are  fre- 
quently unsatisfactory,  and  so  in  the  index  we  mention 
the  principal  terms  and  refer  to  Kant's  own  definition 
of  them  in  the  text. 

Princeton,  N.  J.,  1914. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Historical  Development  of  Kant's  Problem i 

Introduction i8 

Transcendental  ^Esthetic 26 

Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Space 27 

Transcendental  Exposition  of  Space 29 

Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Time 31 

Transcendental  Exposition  of  Time 32 

General  Observations  on  Transcendental  ^Esthetic ...  :^;^ 

Conclusion  of  the  Transcendental  ^Esthetic 37 

Transcendental  Logic 43 

Transcendental  Analytic 46 

Book  I.  Analytic  of  Concepts 47 

Discovery  of  the  Categories 48 

Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories 54 

Subjective  Deduction 56 

Of  the  Synthesis  of  Apprehension  in  Intuition. ...  57 

Of  the  Synthesis  of  Reproduction  in  Imagination .  .  58 

Of  the  Synthesis  of  Recognition  in  Concepts 60 

Objection  Deduction 63 

Book  II.  Analytic  of  Principles 100 

Schematism  of  the  Pure  Concepts  of  the  Understanding  100 

Principles  of  the  Pure  Understanding loi 

Axioms  of  Intuition 103 

Anticipations  of  Perception 104 

Analogies  of  Experience 106 

Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought  in  General 127 

Refutation  of  Idealism 131 

Transition  to  the  Transcendental  Dialectic 139 

Transcendental  Dialectic 141 

The  Paralogisms  of  Pure  Reason 150 

vii 


Vm  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Refutation  of  IMendelssohn's  Proof  of  the  Perma- 
nence of  the  Soul i6o 

Conclusion  of  the   Solution  of   the  Psychological 
Paralogism 170 

General  Note  on  the  Transition  from  Rational  Psy- 
chology to  Cosmology 172 

The  Antinomy  of  Pure  Reason 177 

The  Ideal  of  Pure  Reason 196 

Criticism  of  the  Ontological  Proof  for  the  Existence 
of  God 201 

Criticism  of  the  Cosmological  Proof  for  the  Existence 
of  God 205 

Criticism  of  the  Physico-Theological  Proof  for  the 
Existence  of  God 208 

The  Regulative  Use  of  the  Ideas 212 


KANT'S  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  KANT'S 

PROBLEM 

Modern  philosophy  may  be  divided  into  two  great 
periods:  before,  and  after  Kant. 

In  the  Pre-Kantian  period  there  are  two  opposed  lines 
of  development,  English  empiricism  and  Continental 
rationalism.  Continental  rationalism  is  based  on  the 
principle  that  all  true  knowledge  is  derived  from  reason 
and  not  from  experience.  More  precisely  stated,  the 
Continental  school  maintained  that  there  are  in  the 
mind,  prior  to  all  experience,  innate  ideas  and  principles 
as  self-evident  as  the  axioms  of  mathematics.  From 
these  ideas  and  principles,  they  held,  it  is  possible  to  de- 
duce a  secure  metaphysic  just  as  Euclid  deduced  his 
system  of  geometry. 

To  understand  the  reason  for  this  position,  one  must 
remember  that  mathematics  was  the  dominant  science 
of  the  time,  and  that  Descartes  and  Leibniz  were  mathe- 
maticians of  note  who  had  made  important  contributions 
to  the  science.  Under  such  conditions  it  was  natural 
for  them  to  look  upon  the  mathematical  method  as  the 
only  method  of  attaining  true  knowledge.  True  knowl- 
edge is  universal  and  necessary;  and  mathematics  fur- 
nishes such  knowledge.  The  mathematician  does  not 
have  to  prove  in  the  case  of  each  particular  triangle  that 
the  three  angles  are  equal  to  two  right  angles.    He  proves 

I 


2       INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

its  truth  from  the  very  nature  of  the  triangle  and  hence 
his  proof  has  universal  vahdity.  Therefore  the  rationalist 
concludes  that  experience  is  not  the  basis  of  the  proofs 
by  means  of  which  we  arrive  at  necessary  conclusions; 
and  yet  necessary  conclusions  alone  deserve  the  name  of 
knowledge.  The  rationahst  does  not  deny  that  we  get 
valuable  information  from  experience;  but  he  denies  that 
such  information  is  knowledge  in  the  strict  sense  of  the 
term.  It  lacks  universaHty  and  necessity  and,  in  so  far, 
lacks  the  characteristics  of  true  knowledge. 

RationaHsm,  therefore,  implies  the  appHcation  of  the 
mathematical  method  to  philosophy.  The  scholastic 
doctrine  of  essence  seems  to  make  this  method  feasible. 
The  scholastic  doctrine  of  essence  holds  that  in  addition 
to  the  qualities  of  a  thing,  there  exists  a  substance  or 
essence  from  which  the  quaHties  necessarily  arise.  The 
existence  of  a  certain  essence  involves  the  existence  of 
certain  quaHties.  Therefore  a  knowledge  of  the  essences 
of  things  would  make  it  possible  to  deduce  their  proper- 
ties with  strict  universaHty  and  necessity  without  any 
reference  to  experience.  This  knowledge  the  rationalists 
seek  to  validate  by  a  general  doctrine  of  innate  ideas. 
On  the  basis  of  this  doctrine  and  in  this  way  all  true 
knowledge  may  be  derived. 

The  truth  or  falsity  of  the  rationalistic  doctrine  is  a 
question  of  fact.  Locke  insists  that  we  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  the  essences  of  real  things.  We  know  the  es- 
sences in  the  case  of  mathematics  because  we  are  dealing 
with  objects  of  our  own  creation.  When  we  are  con- 
cerned with  real  objects,  we  are  entirely  dependent  upon 
experience.     Obviously  we  have  no  innate  ideas,  for 


HISTORICAL   DEVELOPMENT   OF   KANT's    PROBLEM        3 

were  such  ideas  in  the  mind  from  birth,  it  would  be  pos- 
sible for  us  to  deduce  everything  with  certainty  and 
ease  without  any  reference  to  experience.  Knowledge, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  is  gained  slowly  and  laboriously  by 
means  of  experience;  whereas  it  would  be  apparent 
almost  at  once  were  such  ideas  a  part  of  our  mental 
equipment.  The  slow  growth,  the  imperfections,  and 
the  Hmited  extent  of  our  knowledge  show  the  falsity  of 
the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas. 

In  the  light  of  his  criticism  of  innate  ideas,  Locke, 
in  the  first  book  of  the  Essay,  says  that  knowledge  arises 
when  the  faculties  of  mind  act  on  the  materials  fur- 
nished by  sense.  Unfortunately  Locke  later  interprets 
this  to  mean  that  all  knowledge  is  furnished  by  sense 
experience.  Sense  experience,  as  given,  now  becomes 
everything  and  synthetic  activity  is  ignored.  The  em- 
pirical doctrine,  therefore,  makes  its  appearance  not  as 
the  logical  result  of  sound  criticism  of  rationahsm  but 
as  a  reaction  against  it. 

The  empirical  doctrine,  in  the  form  now  being  con- 
sidered, looks  upon  the  mind  as  passive.  It  has  no  knowl- 
edge until  something  happens  to  it.  It  is  empty  until 
experience  comes,  and  after  experience  has  made  its 
contribution,  mind  can  add  nothing.  At  most  it  can 
only  order  the  sense-given  material.  Kant  points  out 
the  fundamental  defect  in  this  view  when  he  proves  that 
without  some  activity,  no  experience  is  possible.  We 
may  be  unconscious  of  the  basal  activities  underlying 
consciousness,  but  the  results  prove  their  presence. 

Locke  compares  the  mind  to  a  chamber  with  windows, 
the  windows  are  the  senses  and  through  them  knowledge 


4       INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

comes  into  the  mind.  External  objects,  as  it  were,  im- 
press themselves  on  mind  as  a  seal  impresses  wax.  Up 
to  this  point  mind  is  passive,  but  after  sensations  are 
aroused,  it  remembers,  compares,  desires,  and  wills. 
In  a  word,  all  knowledge  depends  upon  experience  either 
inner  or  outer. 

All  ideas  originally  given  by  sensation  and  reflection 
are  simple  and  unrelated.  From  these  simple  ideas  com- 
plex ideas  are  formed.  In  the  second  book  of  the  Essay, 
Locke  applies  this  doctrine  to  the  various  facts  of  ex- 
perience to  see  if  it  will  stand  the  test.  On  the  whole,  he 
seems  to  be  satisfied  with  the  result.  We  must  now  ask 
if  he  is  as  successful  as  he  thinks. 

In  the  phenomenal  world  as  known  by  us,  there  are 
objects  which  we  look  upon  as  causing  sensations  in  us 
and  to  which  we  refer  those  sensations  as  qualities.  We 
never  think  in  terms  of  subjective  sensations,  but  in 
terms  of  objects  and  the  laws  of  objects.  The  senses 
might  give  us  information  concerning  the  qualities  of 
objects,  but  there  is  no  sense  by  which  we  can  perceive 
the  thing  that  has  the  qualities.  Locke  admits  that  here 
is  an  element  that  does  not  come  from  experience.  The 
idea  of  substance,  he  says,  is  the  idea  of  an  unknown 
something  which  supports  the  qualities,  in  which  the 
quahties  inhere,  and  in  which  they  are  united.  We  can 
not  think  of  qualities  as  existing  by  themselves,  we  are 
forced  to  think  of  them  as  relating  to  and  supported  by 
some  thing.  This  is  what  the  idea  of  substance  means 
according  to  Locke. 

The  significance  of  Locke's  admission  becomes  appar- 
ent when  we  consider  the  part  which  things  play  in  our 


HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT   OF   KANT  S   PROBLEM        5 

world.  The  order  of  sensations  is  changed  by  many 
accidental  circumstances  and  all  would  be  chaos  if  we 
had  no  objective  principles  of  order.  We  have  an  ordered 
world  because  we  refer  sensations  to  things  which  are 
supposed  to  have  objective  relations  with  one  another. 
Without  such  an  objective  order  no  experience  would  be 
possible. 

Locke  assumes  the  existence  of  a  real  material  world, 
and  he  often  takes  the  position  that  this  world  is  correctly 
represented  by  the  primary  qualities.  It  is  a  world  of 
solid  objects,  extended  in  space  and  capable  of  motion. 
At  other  times  he  says  that  the  real  essences  of  things 
are  unknown.  His  reason  for  asserting  the  existence  of  a 
material  world  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  sensations 
are  forced  upon  us  and  he  assumes  that  they  must  be 
caused  by  material  things. 

The  preceding  argument  is  based  on  the  assumption 
that  we  know  causality  as  an  ontological  principle.  If 
that  principle  can  not  be  derived  from  experience,  in  his 
sense  of  the  term,  Locke  so  far  as  he  is  an  empiricist, 
has  no  right  to  employ  it.  Now  the  principle  of  causahty 
asserts  that  everything  which  comes  into  existence  must 
have  a  cause.  Hume  and  Kant  will  show  that  this  prin- 
ciple can  not  be  derived  from  sense  experience.*    Fur- 

*  This  statement  must  not  be  interpreted  to  assert  that  Hume 
and  Kant  hold  identical  positions,  nor  does  it  assert  that  sense 
experience  is  in  no  wise  involved  in  causality.  The  consideration 
of  this  text  as  a  whole  will  tend  to  indicate  that  Kant  actually 
derives  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  causality  from  a  thorough 
analysis  of  the  world  of  objective  experience,  even  though  experi- 
ence docs  not  show  the  real  nature  of  causality  as  an  ontological 
principle. 


6       INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT  S    CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

thermore,  even  if  we  were  to  grant  that  the  principle  could 
be  derived  from  experience,  we  could  still  assert  that  it 
gives  us  no  information  concerning  the  nature  of  a  cause 
outside  the  field  of  experience.  The  cause  may  be  God 
as  Berkeley  maintains,  and  even  if  it  is  some  physical 
existence,  the  theory  of  representative  perception  gives 
us  no  right  to  say  that  some  of  our  ideas  are  like  the  cause 
while  others  are  not. 

The  empirical  doctrine  does  not  warrant  the  assertion 
of  the  existence  of  God.  Locke  recognizes  that  this  is  so, 
and  proceeds  to  prove  God's  existence  in  a  rationalistic 
manner  as  follows.  From  eternity  there  must  have  been 
something;  else  nothing  could  now  exist.  Suppose  there 
is  no  eternal  being,  then  by  hypothesis  at  one  time  there 
would  have  been  nothing,  but  out  of  nothing  comes 
nothing.  Hence  nothing  could  have  existed  at  any  time 
if  at  one  time  there  had  been  nothing.  Therefore  God 
exists. 

From  the  preceding  discussion  it  will  be  apparent  that 
Locke's  philosophy  contains  many  diverse  elements. 
He  assumes  the  existence  of  a  material  world  on  the  one 
hand  and  a  number  of  isolated  selves  on  the  other.  Then 
he  adopts  the  physiological  method  to  get  some  connec- 
tion between  these  separate  elements.  Whenever  nec- 
essary, rational  principles  are  called  in  to  aid  experience. 
Material  things  act  upon  the  organs  of  sense  and  pro- 
duce atomic  sensations.  The  self,  observing  and  com- 
paring these  sensations  furnishes  all  knowledge  of  rela- 
tions including  those  of  space  and  time. 

It  is  possible  to  explain  the  presence  of  contradictory 
elements  in  Locke's   philosophy   as  follows.     Locke's 


HISTORICAL   DEVELOPMENT   OF   KANT  S   PROBLEM        7 

ideal  of  knowledge  was  rationalistic.  Like  the  rational- 
ists, he  takes  mathematics  as  an  example  of  what  knowl- 
edge should  be.  But  he  differs  from  the  rationalists  in 
holding  this  ideal  to  be  unrealizable  except  in  math- 
ematics and  morals.  He  holds  that  in  mathematics  and 
morals  we  make  our  objects,  and  so  have  a  complete 
knowledge  of  them.  Hence  in  respect  to  them  we  can 
deduce  the  properties  with  strict  necessity.  In  all  other 
branches  of  knowledge,  on  the  contrary,  we  are  dealing 
with  objects  independent  of  mind.  In  the  case  of  real 
objects,  we  do  not  know  the  essences  because  our  facul- 
ties have  serious  limitations.  Therefore,  when  dealing 
with  matters  of  fact,  it  becomes  necessary  to  give  up 
deduction  in  favor  of  experience.  Experience  does  not 
enable  us  to  make  universal  statements,  but  it  is  our 
only  substitute  for  the  more  satisfactory  rational  knowl- 
edge. Thus,  though  Locke  is  rationalistic  in  so  far  as 
his  ideal  of  knowledge  is  concerned,  he  is  forced  reluc- 
tantly to  admit  that  this  ideal  can  be  realized  only  in 
cases  where  we  make  our  own  objects.  '  As  no  other 
course  is  possible,  he  takes  experience  as  a  last  resort. 

Before  considering  Hume,  who  exerted  a  profound 
influence  on  Kant,  we  must  notice  some  of  Berkeley's 
conclusions,  as  they  throw  considerable  light  on  Hume's 
general  position. 

Berkeley  reduces  matter  to  simple  ideas  plus  the  notion 
of  some  cause.  This  was  not  very  difficult  after  Locke's 
discussion  of  essences.  Locke  there  took  the  position 
that  all  qualities  depend  upon  unknown  essences.  It  was 
an  easy  step  from  this  view  to  Berkeley's  position  that 
matter  does  not  exist.     Since  spirit  is  the  only  cause 


8       INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

known  by  us,  Berkeley  affirms  that  all  ideas  not  produced 
by  finite  spirits  are  caused  by  God.  These  ideas  and 
their  order  constitute  what  we  call  nature. 

The  general  view  held  by  Berkeley  is  a  result  of  three 
main  assumptions.  If  one  adopts  the  standpoint  of 
representative  perception,  ideas  coming  into  mind,  by  the 
way  of  the  sense  organs,  are  connected  with  external 
reality  by  a  very  slender  thread.  All  that  we  require  is 
soyne  cause  capable  of  producing  these  sensations.  On 
this  point  of  view,  as  Descartes  admits,  the  material 
world  might  be  annihilated  and  make  no  difference  in 
our  knowledge  unless  our  subjective  experience  were 
changed.  Berkeley  discards  matter  because  it  is  un- 
known and  its  causal  activity  inconceivable.  But  al- 
though he  holds  material  causality  to  be  inconceivable, 
Berkeley  assumes  the  principle  of  causality  as  a  self- 
evident  truth.  It  becomes  one  of  his  most  useful  instru- 
ments. Spirits  cause  all  ideas.  God  produces  our  sensa- 
tions, the  atomic  material  of  our  world.  Spirits  are 
assumed  as  abstract  substances  capable  of  producing 
and  receiving  ideas.  Finite  spirits  add  external  relations 
to  the  given  atomic  and  relationless  materials  of  sense. 
Sensations  are  neither  causes  nor  effects  of  other  sensa- 
tions, but  they  come  with  a  degree  of  uniformity  which 
we  can  make  use  of  in  our  conduct.  They  are  signs  or 
indications  of  what  may  be  expected  to  come.* 

The  main  points  of  the  preceding  discussion  may  be 
summarized  as  follows.  After  denying  the  existence  of 
matter,  Berkeley  retains  the  physiological  method  and 

*  This  view  is  very  much  like  one  phase  of  Hume's  doctrine  of 
causality. 


HISTORICAL   DEVELOPMENT   OF   KANT  S   PROBLEM        9 

with  it  all  the  machinery  of  representative  perception. 
Causality  is  accepted  as  a  self-evident  principle  in  spite 
of  our  inabihty  to  understand  how  physical  tilings  could 
produce  any  effect.  And  finally,  Berkeley  assumes  the 
existence  of  selves  as  abstract  substances  despite  the 
fact  that  such  substantial  spirits  are  open  to  all  the 
criticisms  which  he  makes  against  material  substances. 

Hume  is  inclined  to  take  a  position  contradictorily 
opposed  to  the  subjective  ideahsm  of  Berkeley.  We 
venture  this  assertion  in  face  of  the  fact  that  his  outcome 
is  unsatisfactory,  mainly  because  he  falls  back  upon  the 
untenable  principles  of  his  predecessors.  The  general 
tone  of  Hume's  doctrine  tends  toward  phenomenaKsm. 
In  accordance  with  this  tendency,  he  attempts  to  over- 
come the  false  duahty  of  ideas  and  objects.  He  would 
take  concrete  experience  for  his  point  of  departure.  It 
is  apparent  that  he  has  no  desire  to  adopt  the  theory  of 
representative  perception.  We  see  this  side  of  Hume 
in  his  early  statements  concerning  impressions  and  ideas. 
Here  we  do  not  seem  to  start  from  the  assumption  that 
ideas  are  subjective  states  of  mind.  We  start  from  a 
concrete  experience  in  which  subjective  and  objective 
are  not  arbitrarily  sundered  and  set  over  against  each 
other.  This  tendency  is  to  the  fore  in  the  more  valuable 
portions  of  Hume's  discussions  concerning  causality, 
self,  and  physical  substance.  Here  he  emphasizes  the 
fact  that  we  should  study  concrete  experience  and  not 
use  false  abstractions  as  principles  of  explanation.  We 
can  not  get  back  of  experience,  all  our  knowledge  is  con- 
fined to  the  sphere  of  possible  experience.  This  point  of 
view  is  quite  in  line  with  the  spirit  of  Kant's  philosophy. 


lO      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Unfortunately,  however,  Hume  is  never  able  to  free 
himself  from  the  subjective  view  of  knowledge  and  the 
physiological  method.  If  our  impressions  depend  upon 
the  sense  organs,  they  are  separate  subjective  elements 
and  imply  an  external  cause.  It  now  becomes  necessary 
to  adopt  the  doctrine  of  representative  perception.  Pro- 
ceeding in  accordance  with  this  general  view,  Hume  bases 
his  analysis  of  experience  on  the  sense  organs,  and  any 
idea  not  derived  from  sensation  is  pronounced  false. 
Thus,  Hume  impelled  by  this  point  of  view,  adopts  most 
of  the  erroneous  assumptions  of  his  predecessors. 

Armed  with  the  doctrine  that  experiences  are  separate, 
and  though  associated  are  not  essentially  related,  Hume 
proceeds  to  examine  those  principles  which  imply  a  real 
connection.  In  other  words,  he  proceeds  to  examine 
the  notion  that  experiences  belong  to  a  self,  are  related 
to  a  world  of  objects,  and  are  necessarily  connected  with 
each  other. 

In  this  examination  Hume  has  two  ends  in  view.  First, 
he  rules  out  everything  not  derived  from  separate  ex- 
periences. Secondly,  he  attempts  to  show  how  the  false 
ideas,  thus  ruled  out,  come  into  existence. 

Hume  holds  that  all  false  ideas  arise  from  the  associa- 
tion of  separate  experiences.  The  physiological  point 
of  view  led  him,  as  we  have  seen,  to  assert  the  atomic 
nature  of  experiences.  If  he  had  not,  however,  in  con- 
tradiction to  the  atomic  view,  held  that  separate  ex- 
periences are  related  and  thus  associated,  he  could  not 
have  explained  why  things  appear  to  us  as  they  do. 
Without  the  principles  of  association,  his  philosophy 
can  give  no  plausible  account  of  human  experience. 


HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT   OF   KANT's   PROBLEM      II 

Kant,  as  we  shall  see,  seizes  upon  this  truth  and  em- 
phasizes both  the  subjective  and  the  objective  principles 
of  synthesis. 

If  the  laws  of  association  are  supposed  to  relate 
arbitrarily  the  unrelated  atoms  of  experience,  they  do  not 
enable  Hume  to  account  for  our  space  and  time  expe- 
rience. In  the  end  he  is  forced  reluctantly  to  admit  that 
these  ideas  refer  to  the  manner  in  which  objects  appear 
to  us.  He  is  driven  to  this  conclusion  by  the  following 
considerations.  Each  impression  is  a  separate  fact  re- 
sulting from  a  particular  sense  and  there  is  no  special 
sense  to  give  space  and  time.*  As  all  our  experiences 
are  in  time,  and  all  our  impressions  of  outer  sense  are 
referred  to  space,  or  to  things  in  space,  these  ideas  can 
not  be  explained  away.  Of  the  idea  of  substance  it  is 
possible  to  say  that  it  is  an  idea  produced  by  a  false 
association  of  ideas.  Obviously,  however,  space  and 
time  resist  this  method  of  explanation.  No  grouping  of 
non-spatial  and  non-temporal  units  can  produce  space 
and  time.f 

Hume's  final  position  concerning  space  and  time  is  an 
inconsistent  compromise.  It  is,  in  substance,  as  follows. 
Nothing  but  impressions  disposed  in  a  certain  manner 
exist.    As  the  ideas  of  space  and  time  are  not  ideas 

*  Space  and  time  are  indivisible  wholes  and  can  not  come  from 
separate  experiences.  They  are  not  made  up  of  parts,  conse- 
quently, if  given  by  separate  impressions,  each  impression  would 
have  to  give  the  whole  of  space  or  time;  but  this  is  impossible. 

t  The  idea  of  substance  may  be  the  idea  of  something  behind 
the  world  of  perception  and  gives  little  trouble,  but  in  space  and 
time,  we  arc  dealing  with  factors  involved  in  the  world  of  percep- 
tion. 


12      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

of  separate  impressions,  they  must  be  ideas  of  the  manner 
or  order  in  which  impressions  are  arranged.  But  the 
manner  in  which  impressions  are  arranged  is  obviously 
not  a  separate  impression.  Hume's  view  here  is  incon- 
sistent with  his  conception  of  experience  as  atomic;  it, 
however,  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  phenomenalistic 
tendency  in  his  thought.  Kant's  solution  of  these  prob- 
I  lems  is  more  satisfactory. 

When  we  turn  to  Hume's  penetrating  examination  of 
the  causal  principle,  several  points  should  be  emphasized. 
Among  the  most  important  of  these  is  his  insistence  that 
temporal  conjunction  is  a  necessary  part  of  the  idea. 
This  in  itself  would  make  him  deny  the  possibility  of 
reducing  causality  to  logical  explanation — a  reduction 
that  had  been  attempted  by  the  rationahsts.  After  an 
examination  of  several  arguments  concerning  the  nature 
of  causality  which  the  rationalists  had  put  forward, 
Hume  concludes  that  they  are  all  fallacious.  The  prin- 
ciple of  causaHty  can  not  be  demonstrated  by  reason; 
nor  is  it  intuitively  certain.  It  is  impossible  to  prove 
its  necessity  either  as  a  general  principle  or  in  particular 
cases.  The  knowledge  of  this  relation  is  not,  in  any  in- 
stance, attained  by  reasonings  a  priori*  Let  an  object 
be  presented  to  a  man  of  ever  so  strong  natural  reason 
and  abilities;  if  that  object  be  entirely  new  to  him,  he 
will  not  be  able,  by  the  most  accurate  examination  of 
its  sensible  quahties,  to  discover  any  of  its  causes  or 
effects.  Adam,  though  his  rational  faculties  be  sup- 
posed,  at   the   very   first,   entirely  perfect,    could   not 

*  Philosophical  Works  of  David  Hume.  4  vols.  Boston,  Little, 
Brown  &  Co.    Edinburgh,  A.  &  C.  Black.    1854,  vol.  4,  pp.  30-32. 


HISTORICAL   DEVELOPMENT   OF   KANT  S   PROBLEM      13 

have  inferred  from  the  fluidity  and  transparency  of 
water,  that  it  would  suffocate  him;  or  from  the  hght  and 
warmth  of  fire  that  it  would  consume  him.  Furthermore, 
every  effect  is  a  distinct  event  from  its  cause.  In  vain, 
therefore,  should,  we  pretend  to  determine  any  single 
event,  or  infer  any  cause  or  effect,  without  the  assistance 
of  observation  and  experience.*  Reason,  therefore,  is 
unable  to  discover  any  causal  connection. 

Experience,  just  as  little  as  reason,  enables  us  to  dis- 
cover any  necessary  connection  between  events.  From 
experience  we  never  learn  anything  more  than  that,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  events  follow  each  other  in  a  certain 
order.  Against  the  contention  that  we  are  at  least 
conscious  of  an  internal  power  whereby  the  will  is  able 
to  produce  bodily  movements  or  call  up  ideas,  Hume 
retorts  that  these  instances  of  connection  are  quite  as 
baffling  as  any  others.  We  do  not  in  the  least  under- 
stand the  means  whereby  the  mind  exerts  an  influence 
on  the  body,  and  we  are  just  as  little  acquainted  with 
any  power  in  the  soul  which  would  enable  it  to  produce 
ideas  voluntarily.  In  tliis  connection  Hume  asks,  Is 
there  not  here,  either  in  a  spiritual  or  material  substance, 
or  both,  some  secret  mechanism  or  structure  of  parts, 
upon  which  the  effect  depends,  and  which  being  entirely 
unknown  to  us,  renders  the  power  or  energy  of  the  will 
equally  unknown  and  incomprehensible?  f 

As  none  of  our  faculties  furnish  the  idea  of  necessary 

connection,  how  are  we  to  explain  the  fact  of  its  presence? 

Hume  answers  that  it  comes  from  custom  or  habit.    In 

single  instances  of  causality  we  discover  only  that  one 

*  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  32-37.  t  Loc.  ciL,  pp.  74-79. 


14      INTRODUCTION    TO   KANT's    CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

event  follows  another.  Such  events  seem  conjoined,  but 
never  necessarily  connected.  If,  however,  one  particular 
species  of  events  has  always  been  conjoined  with  another, 
when  one  appears  we  predict  the  existence  of  the  other. 
We  now  assume  a  connection  between  them;  some  power 
in  the  one  which  necessarily  produces  the  other.  Thus 
the  idea  of  necessary  connection  arises  from  several 
instances  of  conjunction  but  never  from  a  single  case. 
But  as  we  suppose  all  instances  exactly  alike  we  must 
conclude  that  after  the  repetition  of  similar  instances, 
the  mind  is  carried  by  habit,  upon  the  appearance  of 
one  event,  to  expect  its  usual  attendant.  We  then  feel  a 
new  impression,  to  wit,  a  customary  connection  in  the 
thought  or  imagination  between  one  object  and  its  usual 
attendant;  and  this  sentiment  is  the  original  of  that  idea 
for  which  we  seek.  When  we  say,  therefore,  that  one 
object  is  connected  with  another,  we  mean  only  that 
these  objects  have  acquired  a  connection  in  our  thought, 
by  means  of  which  they  become  proofs  of  each  other's 
existence. 

In  Kght  of  the  preceding  discussion,  Hume  now  defines 
cause  to  be  an  object  followed  by  another,  and  where  all 
the  objects,  similar  to  the  first,  are  followed  by  objects 
similar  to  the  second.  Or,  in  other  words,  where,  if  the 
first  object  had  not  been,  the  second  never  had  existed. 
The  appearance  of  a  cause  always  conveys  the  mind,  by 
a  customary  transition,  to  the  idea  of  the  effect.  We 
may,  therefore,  give  another  definition  of  cause;  and 
call  it,  an  object  followed  by  another,  and  whose  appear- 
ance always  conveys  the  thought  to  that  other.  Hume 
points  out  that  both  these  definitions  are  drawn  from 


HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT   OF   KANT'S   PROBLEM      1 5 

circumstances  foreign  to  the  cause  and  that  we  are  un- 
able to  indicate  anything  in  the  cause  which  gives  it  a 
connection  with  the  effect.  We  have  no  idea  of  this 
connection;  nor  even  any  distinct  notion  what  it  is  we 
desire  to  know,  when  we  endeavor  at  a  conception  of  it. 
We  say,  for  instance,  that  the  vibration  of  this  string  is 
the  cause  of  this  particular  sound.  But  what  do  we  mean 
by  that  afhrmation?  We  either  mean,  that  this  vibra- 
tion is  followed  by  this  sound,  and  that  all  similar  vibra- 
tions have  been  followed  by  similar  sounds:  or,  that  this 
vibration  is  followed  by  this  sound,  and  that,  upon  the 
appearance  of  one,  the  mind  anticipates  the  senses,  and 
forms  immediately  an  idea  of  the  other.  We  may  con- 
sider the  relation  of  cause  and  effect  in  either  of  these 
two  lights;  but  beyond  these  we  have  no  idea  of  it.* 

It  was  Hume's  destructive  criticism  of  the  causal  idea 
which  led  Kant  to  a  new  and  more  searching  analysis  of 
experience.  As  an  outcome  of  his  investigation,  Kant 
maintains  our  right  to  employ  causality  as  an  objective 
principle.  It  would  be  a  grave  error,  however,  to  suppose 
that  Kant  either  refutes  or  attempts  to  refute  most  of 
Hume's  contentions.  Kant  agrees  with  Hume  in  holding 
that  the  principle  is  not  intuitively  certain  and  that  it 
can  not  be  demonstrated  by  abstract  logical  reasoning. 
Furthermore,  no  analysis  of  particular  events  is  able  to 
show  why  they  must  be  connected  as  they  are.  There- 
fore, Hume  and  Kant  are  in  agreement  in  the  contention 
that  although  mind  instinctively  connects  things  as 
causally  related,  we  have  no  way  of  knowing  the  real 
nature  of  this  connection.     The  nature  of  real  causal 

*  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  84-89. 


1 6      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

activity  appears  to  both  to  be  incomprehensible.  Hume, 
however,  'just  because  he  adopted  the  physiological 
point  of  view,  had  to  deny  that  causality  is  a  true  con- 
stitutive principle  in  the  phenomenal  world.  Because 
he  looks  upon  knowledge  as  a  subjective  process,  Hume 
is  unable  to  take  advantage  of  the  deeper  implications 
of  his  own  critical  work.  Kant,  benefiting  by  Hume's 
mistake,  gave  the  causal  principle  full  significance  and 
necessity  as  a  constitutive  principle  within  the  world 
of  experience.  He  saw,  as  against  Hume,  that  the  prin- 
ciple is  necessarily  involved  in  all  our  objective  expe- 
rience. 

Hume  is  commonly  supposed  to  have  denied  the  ex- 
istence of  the  self;  and  indeed  such  denial  would  be  the 
necessary  outcome  of  an  insistence  that  ideas  and  im- 
pressions are  unrelated.  But  when  Hume's  argument 
is  interpreted  more  sympathetically,  we  find  in  it  an 
attempt  to  refute  the  substance  idea  of  mind.  In  opposi- 
tion to  the  substance  view,  Hume  justly  holds  that 
mind  or  self  is  to  be  found  only  in  the  unity  of  experience, 
and  not  as  a  substance  back  of  such  experiences.  If  we 
look  upon  Hume  from  this  point  of  view,  it  becomes  evi- 
dent that  he  marks  a  great  advance  over  his  predecessors, 
and  had  it  not  been  for  his  physiological  method,  he 
would  have  reached  a  position  similar  to  the  one  finally 
worked  out  by  Kant. 

Hume's  criticism  of  material  substances  is  similar  to 
his  criticism  of  mental  substances.  It  should  have  led 
him  to  deny  the  existence  of  any  abstract  separation 
between  ideas  and  things.  But  instead  of  appreciating 
the  true  outcome  of  his  argument,  he  is  again  misled  by 


HISTORICAL   DEVELOPMENT   OF   KANT  S   PROBLEM      1 7 

his  physiological  method  and  denies  that  perceptions 
have  any  continuous  existence. 

On  the  whole,  Hume's  conclusions  are  sceptical.  He 
holds  that  it  is  impossible  for  us  to  solve  the  ultimate 
questions  of  metaphysics;  it  is  not  given  us  to  know 
essences  and  ultimate  causes.  But  if  Hume's  philosophy 
is  called  sceptical,  one  must  after  all  remember  that  it 
was  the  kind  of  scepticism  capable  of  being  developed 
into  the  critical  philosophy  of  Kant.  Most  of  Hume's 
difficulties  can  be  traced  back  to  the  position  that  knowl- 
edge is  subjective.  Furthermore,  we  must  not  forget 
that  this  position  is  in  direct  contradiction  with  much 
of  his  own  work.  Unfortunately,  Hume  could  not  free 
himself  from  the  dogmatic  assumptions  of  his  predeces- 
sors. A  Kant  is  necessary  to  achieve  what  had  been  a 
task  too  difficult  for  Hume. 

The  English  and  Continental  fines  of  development 
meet  in  Kant.    He  had  been  trained  in  the  rationalism 
of  Leibniz.    But  Hume's  conclusions  started  him  from 
his  dogmatic  slumbers  and  led  him  to  attempt  a  recon-^ 
ciliation  of  empiricism  and  rationalism.    To  this  recon- 1 
ciliation  we  now  proceed.* 

*  In  connection  with  this  introduction,  Cf.  Leslie  Stephen, 
English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century.  Vol.  I.  Andrew 
Seth,  Scottish  Philosophy.  Norman  Smith,  Studies  in  the  Car- 
tesian Philosophy. 


INTRODUCTION 

The  methods  which  metaphysic  has  hitherto  employed 
have  repeatedly  brought  it  to  a  standstill  because  they 
have  been  inadequate  to  lead  it  to  a  real  solution  of  its 
problems.  Hitherto  it  has  been  supposed  that  all  our 
knowledge  must  conform  to  the  objects.  This  procedure 
has  been  inadequate,  for  it  has  always  resulted  in  the 
impossibility  of  estabhshing  any  necessary  certitude  in 
knowledge.  The  experiment  therefore  ought  to  be  made, 
whether  we  should  not  succeed  better  with  the  problems 
of  metaphysic,  by  assuming  that  the  objects  must  con- 
form to  our  mode  of  cognition,  for  this  would  better  agree 
with  the  demanded  possibiHty  of  an  a  priori  knowledge  of 
them,  which  is  to  settle  something  about  objects,  before 
they  are  given  us.  Just  as  with  Copernicus,  so  here. 
Copernicus  found  himself  unable  to  get  on  in  the  explana- 
tion of  the  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  so  long 
as  he  assumed  that  all  the  stars  turned  round  the  specta- 
tor, And  then  tried  whether  he  could  not  succeed  better 
by  assuming  the  spectator  to  be  turning  round  and  the 
stars  to  be  at  rest.  In  the  same  way,  Kant  proposes  to 
change  the  point  of  view  and  make  the  intelHgibility  of 
objects  dependent  not  upon  the  objects  themselves,  but 
upon  activities  manifesting  themselves  through  the 
medium  of  the  conscious  subject.  When  Kant  speaks 
of  the  Copernican  revolution  which  he  brings  about  in 
thought,  he  does  not  intend  to  rule  out  experience  as  a 

i8 


INTRODUCTION  1 9 

factor  in  knowledge.  It  is  against  the  old  dogmatism 
which  asserted  that  objects  are  known  to  us  as  they  are, 
that  Kant's  revolution  is  directed.  Just  as  the  Coper- 
nican  assumption  of  the  movement  of  the  spectator 
instead  of  that  of  the  objects  perceived,  was  revolution- 
ary, so  Kant's  introduction  into  phenomenal  knowledge 
of  the  factors  which  come  through  the  medium  of  the 
conscious  subject,  is  a  protest  against  the  old  doctrine 
that  knowledge  represents  things  as  they  really  are.  But 
the  analogy  does  not  end  here.  While  the  assumption 
of  the  motion  of  the  spectator  does  not  change  the  ap- 
pearance of  motion  of  the  fixed  stars,  it  changed  the 
explanation  of  the  apparent  motion  by  the  assertion  that 
the  fixed  stars  are  at  rest.  Just  so,  Kant's  view  is  that 
not  the  objects  in  themselves  but  rather  the  noumenal 
conditions  of  consciousness  contribute  the  general  struc- 
ture of  our  experience,  and  hence  that  this  structure 
does  not  represent  the  real  nature  of  things  in  them- 
selves. Science  is  no  longer  in  danger  of  being  found 
illusory  because  our  impressions  may  not  correspond  to 
reality.  Science  may  now  be  considered  to  be  an  exact 
interpretation  of  phenomena,  which  are  what  we  know, 
and  which  are  all  that  we  can  really  know.  That  is, 
Kant's  Copernican  revolution  consists  in  the  replacing 
of  the  dogmatical  by  the  critical  method.* 

That  all  our  knowledge  begins  with  experience  is  cer- 
tain. If  this  were  not  so,  how  should  the  faculty  of  knowl- 
edge be  roused  into  activity  so  that  we  may  compare, 

*  Cf.  J.  E.  Creighton,  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  xxii,  March, 
1913,  pp.  133-50.  Norman  Kemp  Smith,  Mind,  New  Series, 
Vol.  xxii,  October,  1913,  pp.  549-51. 


20      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

connect  or  separate  objects,  and  thus  make  them  intelli- 
gible. In  respect  to  time,  therefore,  no  knowledge 
within  us  is  antecedent  to  experience,  but  all  knowledge 
begins  with  it.  But  although  all  our  knowledge  begins  ) 
with  experience,  it  does  not  follow  that  it  all  arises  from 
experience.  It  is  quite  possible  that  even  oyr  empirical  j 
experience  is  a  compound  of  that  whicV  wb-^receive 
through  impressions,  and  of  that  which  our  own  faqulty 
of  knowledge  (incited  only  by  sensuous  impressidjis), 
supplies  from  itself.* 

This  gives  rise  to  another  question,  whether  there 
exists  a  knowledge  independent  of  experience,  and  even 
of  all  impressions  of  the  senses.  Such  knowledge  would 
be  called  a  priori  and  distinguished  from  empirical 
knowledge,  which  has  its  sources  a  posteriori,  that  is, 
in  experience.  The  term  a  priori  is  still  open  to  am- 
biguity, for  it  might  mean  the  inference  from  a  general 
rule — such  general  rule,  however,  being  after  all  derived 
from  experience.  Kant's  meaning  of  a  priori  which  he""] 
sometimes  calls  the  pure  a  priori  is  that  knowledge  which  I 
is  absolutely  independent  of  all  experience. 

How  do  we  recognize  a  priori  knowledge?  Any  prop- 
osition which  is  thought  together  with  its  necessity,  is 
a  priori.  Furthermore,  any  judgment  which  is  thought 
with  strict  universality,  so  that  no  exception  is  admitted 
as  possible,  is  also  a  priori.  Experience  can  give  only 
future  probability  and  never  necessity  or  universaHty, 
that  is,  a  priority.    They  are  inseparable  from  each  other, 

*This  statement  should  be  compared  with,  and  read  in  the 
light  of  Kant's  later  criticism  of  the  existence  of  a  substantial  self 
apart  from  experience.    Vide  note,  p.  30. 


[TR9BUCnON       V_/  21 

/^ 

for  that  whicli  is  necessary  must  be  uhivefsaD  Necessity, 
therefore^,  and  strict  universality  are  safe  criteria  of 
knowledge  a  priori.  / 

That  there  really  exist  in  j6ut  knowledge  such  neces- 
sary, and  in  the  strictest  Sighse  universal,  and  therefore 
pure  judgments  a  ,priorij^s.!^sily  shown.  A  proposition 
froi)i{  georQ^tryjaymldrDe  a  c^&e  in  question N(or  example, 
the  three  angles  ok ja  triangle  are  equal  to^wo  right 
angles. 

In  order  to  make  significant  the  statement  thsrl^spure 
judgl\\ents  a  priori  exist,  and  that  ihey^rb  the  foi 
by  whfelKjiecessary  knowl^ge  hecpm€s  possible,  a  fur- 
ther considerMea^hecoBies-irecessary.  Thip  consider- 
ation isjv.  What  sort  of^ judgment  is  it  that  is  bith  a  priori 
and  of  significaaed^for  necessary  knowledge?    \ 

Kant  points  out  that  in  all  judgments  a  twoAfold  rela- 
tion is  possible  between  subject  and  predicateX  Either 
the  predicate  B  belongs  to  the  subject  A  as  something 
contained  (though  covertly)  in  the  concept  A;  or,\E  Hes 
outside  the  sphere  of  the  concept  A,  though  sornfehow 
connected  with  it.  In  the  former  case  the  judgment 
is  called  analytical,  and  in  the  latter  synthetical.  Analyt- 
ical judgments  are  therefore  those  in  which^e  connection 
of  the  predicate  with  the  subject  is  conceived  through 
identity,  while  others  in  which  that  connection  is  con- 
ceived without  identity,  may  be  called  synthetical.  The 
former  might  be  called  illustrating,  the  latter  expanding 
judgments,  because  in  the  former  nothing  is  added  by  the 
predicate  to  the  concept  of  the  subject,  but  the  concept 
is  only  divided  into  its  constituent  concepts  which  were 
always  conceived  as  existing  in  it,  though  confusedly; 


22      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

while  the  latter  add  to  the  concept  of  the  subject  a 
predicate  not  conceived  as  existing  within  it,  and  not  to 
be  extracted  from  it  by  any  process  of  mere  analyst. 
For  instance,  all  bodies  are  extended,  is  an  analytical 
judgment.  The  concept,  body,  imphes  extension  and  it 
need  only  be  analyzed  for  one  to  become  conscious  of  the 
elements  contained  in  it,  in  order  to  find  that  predicate. 
In  the  judgment,  all  bodies  are  heavy,  the  predicate  is 
not  contained  in  the  concept  which  forms  the  subject, 
but  is  synthetically  added  to  it. 

All  mathematical  judgments  are  synthetical  and  are 
also  judgments  a  priori,  and  not  empirical,  because  they 
carry  along  with  them  necessity,  which  can  never  be 
deduced  from  experience.  Natural  science  contains 
^nthetic  judgments  a  priori  as  principles.  For  example, 
yin  all  changes  of  the  material  world,  the  quantity  of 
matter  remains  constant;  or,  in  all  communication  of 
motion,  action  and  reaction  are  equal.  It  is  clear  not 
only  that  both  convey  necessity,  and  that,  therefore, 
their  origin  is  a  priori,  but  also  that  they  are  synthetical 
propositions.  For  the  concept  of  matter  does  not  nec- 
essarily involve  its  permanency,  but  only  its  presence 
in  the  space  which  it  fills.  We,  therefore,  go  beyond  the 
concept  of  matter  in  order  to  join  something  to  it  a 
priori,  which  was  not  before  conceived  in  it.  The  prop- 
osition is,  therefore,  not  analytical  but  synthetical  and 
yet  a  priori,  and  the  same  appHes  to  the  other  proposi- 
tions of  the  pure  part  of  natural  science.  Metaphysic  by 
its  very  nature  is  meant  to  contain  synthetical  knowledge 
a  priori.  Its  object  is  to  expand  our  knowledge  a  priori. 
This  has  led  to  the  practice  in  metaphysic  of  going  so 


INTRODUCTION  23 

far  beyond  a  given  concept  that/experience  itself  can  not 
follow  us:  as,  for  instance,  4jv  the  proposition  that  the 
world  must  have  a  first  beginning.  Thus,  according  at 
least  to  its  intentions,  metaphysic  consists  merely  of 
synthetical  propositions  a  priori,      . 

Kant  believes  that  much  is  gained  if  we  can  bring  a 
number  of  questions  under  one  general  problem.  This 
problem  would  be.  How  are  synthetical  judgments  a 
priori  possible?  It  would  involve  three  subsidiary  ques- 
tions. Is  pure  mathematical  science  possible?  Is  pure 
natural  science  possible?  and.  Is  metaphysical  science 
possible?  The  foregoing  paragraph  points  out  how  he 
held  mathematical  and  natural  science  not  only  to  be 
possible  but  also  to  be  actual  since  each  contains  fun- 
damental principles  which  are  universal  and  necessary, 
and,  therefore,  a  priori.  But  with  metaphysical  science 
the  case  has  been  different.  Investigations  in  this  field 
have  hitherto  led  to  conclusions  which  have  lacked 
universality  and  necessity,  for  it  has  been  possible, 
with  equal  vaHdity  to  reach  directly  contradictory  con- 
clusions. The  reason  for  this  plight  of  metaphysic  has* 
been  that  the  attempt  has  always  been  made  to  deter- 
mine the  nature  and  constitution  of  reality  through  the 
pure  activity  of  the  understanding,  independently  of 
experience.  It  has  been  supposed  that  propositions  suchy 
as  that  matter  neither  comes  into  nor  goes  out  of  exist- 
ence, can  be  determined  by  mere  thinking.  The  result 
was  that  they  have  remained  nothing  but  propositions, 
without  a  necessary  basis  of  certitude. 

These  unsatisfactory  results  of  metaphysical  specula- 
tions will  be  found  to  arise  out  of  a  misconception  of  the 


24      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

real  problem.  The  real  problem  is,  How  are  synthetic 
judgments  a  priori  possible?  which  means,  By  what  ^ 
method,  and  how  far  is  it  possible  through  pure  reason 
{a  priori)  to  attain  to  a  knowledge  of  objects?  For, 
synthetic  judgments,  as  over  against  analytical  judg- 
ments— which  have  only  logical  validity — ,  are  judgments 
which  have  objective  vaHdity.  In  other  words,  the  real 
problem  is,  In  what  way  is  it  possible  that  what  is 
considered  self-evident  on  the  basis  of  pure  thought  is 
also  vahd  for  objective  phenomenal  reahty?  That  is,  \ 
can  the  propositions  of  pure  understanding  be  found 
to  have  objective,  as  weU  as  merely  logical  vaHd- 
ity? 

The  solution  of  the  problem  as  thus  stated  involves 
transcendental  philosophy.     Transcendental  philosophy  T 
deals  with  that  aspect  of  knowledge  which  can  not  he  given 
by  experience  hut  must  come  from  the  side  of  the  suhject,   j 
and  it  is  this  aspect  of  knowledge  also  which  is  taken  up 
in  a  critique  of  pure  reason. 

A  critique  of  pure  reason,  in  order  to  be  systematically 
complete,  must  contain,  first,  a  doctrine  of  the  elements, 
and  then,  a  doctrine  of  the  method  of  pure  reason.  In  the 
doctrine  of  the  elements  we  will  find  that  there  are  two 
stems  of  human  knowledge,  wliich  perhaps  may  spring 
from  a  common  root,  unknown  to  us,  namely  sensibility 
and  understanding,  objects  being  given  by  the  former 
and  thought  by  the  latter.  If  our  sensibility  should  con- 
tain a  priori  representations,  constituting  conditions 
under  which  alone  objects  can  be  given,  it  would  belong 
to  transcendental  philosophy,  and  the  doctrine  of  this 
transcendental  sense-perception  would  necessarily  form 


INTRODUCTION  25 

the  first  part  of  the  doctrine  of  elements,  because  the 
conditions  under  which  alone  objects  of  human  knowledge 
can  be  given  must  precede  those  under  which  they  are 
thought.    To  this  we  now  proceed. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  .ESTHETIC 

Entirely  apart  from  the  process  by  which  knowledge 
reaches  its  objects,  there  is  one  way  by  which  they  are 
reached  directly,  namely,  intuition.*  Without  intuition, 
knowledge  of  objects  can  never  be  reached  by  the  human 
mind  because  the  given  (in  sensibility)  is  a  necessary  ele- 
ment in  that  knowledge.  That  which  is  given  in  sensi- 
bihty  and  is  a  posteriori,  must  be  arranged  and  placed 
in  certain  forms  in  order  to  be  intelhgible.  These  forms 
are  a  priori  and  different  in  kind  from  sensations. 

If  we  deduct  from  the  perception  of  objects  that  which 
belongs  to  the  thinking  of  the  understanding,  namely, 
substance,  force,  divisibihty,  etc.,  and  if  we  deduc .  like- 
wise that  which  belongs  to  sensation,  namely,  iiiper- 
meabihty,  hardness,  color,  etc.,  there  still  remains  s:>me- 
thing  of  that  perception — extension  and  form.  These 
belong  to  pure  intuition,  which  a  priori,  and  even  witnout 
a  real  object  of  the  senses  or  of  sensation,  exists  in  the 
mind  as  a  mere  form  of  sensibility. 

The  science  of  all  the  principles  of  sensibility  a  priori 
is  called  Transcendental  Msthetic.  This  is  contrasted 
with  that  science  which  treats  of  the  principles  of  pure 
thought  and  which  is  called  Transcendental  Logic. 

*  Intuition  as  here  used,  is  not  to  be  confused  with  ethical  in- 
tuition, for  it  here  means  almost  what  is  usually  meant  by  the 
term  perception.  Some  translators  of  Kant  use  the  term  per- 
ception for  Kant's  word  Anschauung,  which  is  usually  translated 
intuition. 

26 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ESTHETIC  27 

In  the  Transcendental  Msthetic,  Kant  first  isolates 
sensibility  by  separating  everything  which  the  under- 
standing adds  by  means  of  its  concepts,  so  that  nothing 
remains  but  empirical  intuition.  Secondly,  he  separates 
from  sensibility .  all  that  belongs  to  sensation,  so  that 
nothing  remains  but  pure  intuition,  which  is  the  meve 
form  of  the  phenomena  and  which  is  all  that  sensibility 
a  priori  can  supply.  In  the  course  of  this  investigation 
he  finds  that  there  are  two  pure  forms  of  sensuous  intui- 
tion,— Space  and  Time. 

What  then  are  space  and  time?  Are  they  real  things? 
Or,  are  they  determinations  or  relations  between  things, 
but  such  as  would  belong  to  them  even  if  they  were  not 
perceived?  Or,  are  they  determinations  which  inhere 
only  in  the  form  of  intuition,  and  consequently,  in  the 
constitution  of  our  mind,  without  w^hich  these  predicates 
of  space  and  time  can  not  be  attributed  to  any  thing? 

In  order  to  answer  these  questions,  Kant  proceeds  to 
an  exposition  of  space.  By  exposition,  he  means  the 
clear  (though  not  exhaustive)  presentation  of  that 
which  pertains  to  a  concept.  An  exposition  is  meta- 
physical when  it  contains  that  which  presents  the  con- 
cept as  given  a  priori. 

Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Space 

I.  Space  is  not  an  empirical  concept  which  has  been 
derived  from  external  experience.  For  in  order  that 
certain  sensations  should  be  referred  to  something  out- 
side myself,  that  is,  to  something  in  a  different  part  of 
space  from  that  where  I  am;  again,  in  order  that  I  may 


28      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

be  able  to  represent  them  as  side  by  side,  that  is,  not 
only  as  different,  but  as  in  different  places,  the  representa- 
tion of  space  must  already  be  there.  Therefore,  the 
representation  of  space  can  not  be  borrowed  through 
experience  from  relations  of  external  phenomena,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  this  external  experience  becomes  pos- 
sible only  by  means  of  the  representation  of  space. 

2.  Space  forms  the  very  foundation  of  all  external 
intuitions,  and  so  is  a  necessary  representation  a  priori. 
It  is  possible  to  think  away  objects  which  are  contained 
in  space,  but  it  is  impossible  to  think  away  the  space 
which  contains  them.  Space  must  therefore  be  regarded 
as  a  condition  of  the  possibihty  of  phenomena,  not  as  a 
determination  produced  by  them;  it  is  a  representation 
a  priori  which  necessarily  lies  at  the  basis  of  all  external 
phenomena. 

3.  Space  is  not  a  concept  derived  from  a  generalization 
of  the  relations  of  things,  but  is  a  pure  intuition.  In  the 
first  place,  one  can  represent  to  himself  space  only  as 
single  and  unitary.  To  speak  of  many  spaces  is  to  speak 
merely  of  parts  of  one  and  the  same  unitary  space.  These 
parts  can  not  precede  the  one  all-embracing  space  as  its 
component  parts,  and  of  which  it  may  be  considered  to 
be  the  aggregate.  It  is  only  through  the  all-embracing 
space  that  the  parts  can  be  thought.  Hence  it  follows 
that  an  intuition  a  priori  which  is  not  empirical  must 
form  the  foundation  of  all  conceptions  of  space. 

4.  Space  is  represented  as  an  infinite  given  magnitude. 
No  concept  as  such  can  be  thought  as  containing  an 
infinite  number  01  representations.  Nevertheless,  space 
is  so  thought  (for  all  parts  of  infinite  space  exist  simul- 


TRANSCENDENTAL   .ESTHETIC  29 

taneously).     Consequently,  the  original  representation 
of  space  is  slb.  intuition  a  priori,  and  not  a  concept. 

Transcendental  Exposition  of  Space 

Kant  means  by  a  transcendental  exposition,  the 
establishment  of  a  concept  as  a  principle  through  which 
the  possibility  of  further  synthetic  cognitions  a  priori 
may  be  understood.  To  achieve  this  aim  two  tilings  are 
necessary:  i,  that  such  cognitions  actually  proceed  from 
the  given  concepts,  and  2,  that  they  are  possible  only 
under  the  presupposition  of  a  gi\  e.i  mode  of  explanation 
of  such  concept. 

Geometry  determines  the  properties  of  space  synthet- 
ically, and  yet  a  priori.  What  then  must  be  the  rep- 
resentation of  space  that  such  cognition  may  arise  from 
it?  It  must  be  originally  an  intuition,  for  from  mere 
concepts  no  propositions  can  be  derived  which  go  beyond 
the  concepts  themselves,  yet  this  is  actually  done  in 
geometry.  That  intuition,  however,  must  be  a  priori, 
that  is,  it  must  exist  within  us  before  any  perception  of 
the  object,  for  geometrical  propositions  are  apodictic, 
that  is,  necessary,  and  as  such  can  not  be  empirical  but 
must  be  a  priori.  Ho\v  chen  is  it  possible  for  an  external 
intuition  to  dwell  in  the  mind  prior  to  the  objects  them- 
selves, anr'  through  which  the  concept  of  objects  can 
be  determined  a  priori.  Evidently  not  otherwise  than 
so  far  as  it  has  its  seat  in  the  subject  only,  as  the  formal 
condition  under  which  the  subject  is  affected  by  the  ob- 
jects and  thereby  is  recei\dng  an  immediate  representation^ 
that  is,  intuition  of  them;  therefore,  as  a  form  of  the 


30      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

external  sense  in  general.*  It  is,  therefore,  by  our  ex- 
planation only  that  the  possibility  of  geometry  as  a 
synthetical  science  a  priori  becomes  intelligible.  As  a 
result  of  the  foregoing,  Kant  asserts  that  it  is  only  from 
the  human  standpoint  that  we  can  speak  of  space,  ex- 
ternal objects,  etc.  By  this  he  means  that  space  condi- 
tions have  no  significance  for  objects  in  themselves. 
Nevertheless,  under  the  conditions  of  human  experience 
all  objects  must  be  space  conditioned.  Therefore  not 
only  can  objects  be  perceived,  but  through  space,  apodic- 
tic  conclusions  can  also  be  drawn  concerning  them.  The 
apodictic  character  oi  Ihe  conclusions  comes  from  the 
a  priority  of  space,  and  since  this  is  only  ihe  form  through 
which  the  objects  are  perceived,  it  follows  that  apodictic 
conclusions  can  be  drawn  only  concerning  objects  as 
they  appear  to  us,  that  is,  external  phenomena,  and  never 
concerning  objects  in  themselves. 

*  Here  Kant  seems  to  be  employing  a  conception  of  the  con- 
scious self  as  a  substantial  entity  which  precedes  and  makes  pos- 
sible the  concrete  experience  of  a  world  of  objects.  That  Kant 
does  not  consistently  adhere  to  this  view  of  the  conscious  self, 
is  indicated  by  the  general  development  of  his  doctrine,  and  in 
particular  in  his  objective  deduction  of  the  categories,  in  his 
refutation  of  idealism  as  well  as  in  his  criticism  of  the  rational 
psyc  hologists.  Instead  of  maintaining  that  the  self  is  a  substantial 
entity,  his  dominant  position  seems  to  be  that  since  the  self  is 
conscious,  and  since  our  consciousness  is  always  of  objects,  then 
these  two  phases  stand  in  inner  mutual  relation  to  each  other. 
That  is,  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  attribute  temporal  priority  to  either 
the  self  or  the  world  in  space  and  time  which  we  call  its  objects. 
This  consideration,  however,  must  not  be  thought  to  carry  with 
it  the  denial  that  the  noumenal  conditions  of  the  self  may  precede 
concrete  experience. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ESTHETIC  3 1 


Metaphysical  Exposition  of  Time 


/ 


1.  Time  is  not  an  empirical  concept  deduced  from  any 
experience,  for  neither  co-existence  nor  succession  would 
enter  into  our  perception,  if  the  representation  of  time 
were  not  given  a  priori.  Only  when  this  representation 
a  priori  is  given,  can  we  imagine  that  certain  things 
happen  at  the  same  time  (simultaneously)  or  at  different 
times  (successively). 

2.  Time  is  a  necessary  representation  on  which  all 
intuitions  depend.  We  can  think  away  particular  phe- 
nomena out  of  time,  but  we  can  not  think  away  time 
itself  (as  the  general  condition  of  their  possibihty). 
Therefore  time  is  given  a  priori. 

3.  Time  is  not  a  general  concept,  but  a  pure  form  of 
sensuous  intuition.  Different  times  are  parts  only  of 
one  and  the  same  time.  The  proposition  that  different 
times  can  not  exist  at  the  same  time  can  not  be  deduced 
from  any  general  concept.  Such  a  proposition  is  synthet- 
ical, and  can  not  be  deduced  from  mere  concepts.  It  is 
contained  immediately  in  the  intuition  and  representa- 
tion of  time. 

4.  To  say  that  time  is  infinite  means  only  that  every 
definite  quantity  of  time  is  possible  only  by  limitations 
of  one  time  which  one  time  forms  the  foundation  of  all 
times.  The  original  representation  of  time  must  there- 
fore be  given  as  unHmited.  But  when  the  parts  them- 
selves and  every  quantity  of  an  object  can  be  represented 
as  determined  by  limitation  only,  the  whole  representa- 
tion can  not  be  given  by  concepts  (for  in  that  case  the 


32      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's    CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

partial  representations  come  first),  but  it  must  be  founded 
on  immediate  intuition. 


Transcendental  Exposition  of  Time 

On  time  and  its  a  priori  necessity  depends  also  the 
possibility  of  apodictic  principles  of  the  relations  of 
time.  Among  such  principles  are  the  concept  of  change 
and  with  it  the  concept  of  motion  (as  change  of  place). 
These  are  possible  only  through  and  in  the  representa- 
tion of  time.  If  time  were  not  intuitive  a  priori^  no 
concept,  whatever  it  be,  could  make  us  understand  the 
possibiHty  of  change,  that  is,  a  connection  of  contradic- 
torily opposed  predicates.  Time  in  the  form  of  change 
makes  intelHgible  the  possibiHty  of  two  objects  occupying 
one  and  the  same  place.  In  the  same  way,  it  is  possible 
to  conceive  the  same  object  as  having  now  one,  and  then 
the  other  of  two  contradictorily  opposed  quahties.  Our 
concept  of  time,  therefore,  exhibits  the  possibiHty  of  as 
many  synthetical  cognitions  a  priori  as  are  found  in  the 
general  doctrine  of  motion. 

As  in  the  case  of  space,  so  here,  after  ending  the  meta- 
physical and  transcendental  expositions  of  time,  Kant 
draws  certain  conclusions.  The  world  constituted  in 
time  is  an  empiricaUy  real  world  only,  and  has  no  claim 
to  absolute  reaHty.  Time  is  nothing  but  the  form  of  our 
internal  intuition.  Without  the  pecuHar  condition  of  our 
sensibility  time  vanishes,  because  it  is  not  inherent  in 
the  objects  but  only  in  the  subject  that  perceives  them. 
Time  and  space  therefore  are  two  sources  of  knowledge 
from  which  various  a  priori  synthetical  cognitions  can  be 


TRANSCENDENTAL  'ESTHETIC  33 

derived.  But  these  sources  of  knowledge  a  priori  (being 
merely  conditions  of  our  sensibility)  fix  their  own  limits 
in  that  they  can  refer  to  objects  only  in  so  far  as  they  are 
considered  as  phenomena,  but  can  not  represent  things 
as  they  are  in  themselves.  Phenomena  are  the  only 
field  in  which  they  are  valid;  beyond  this  field  they  admit 
of  no  objective  application. 

General  Observations  on  Transcendental 

^Esthetic 

The  foregoing  considerations  now  enable  Kant  to 
point  out  what  he  believes  to  be  the  nature  of  sensuous 
knowledge. 

All  our  intuition  is  nothing  but  the  representation  of 
phenomena.  Things,  as  phenomena,  can  not  exist  by 
themselves,  but  only  in  relation  to  us.  It  remains  com- 
pletely unknown  to  us  what  objects  may  be  in  them- 
selves apart  from  the  receptivity  of  our  senses.  We  know 
nothing  but  our  manner  of  percei\dng  objects;  this  is 
what  alone  concerns  us.  Even  if  we  could  impart  the 
highest  degree  of  clearness  to  our  intuition,  we  should 
not  come  one  step  nearer  to  the  nature  of  objects  in 
themselves.  We  should  know  our  mode  of  intuition, 
that  is,  our  sensibility,  more  completely,  but  always 
under  the  indefeasible  conditions  of  space  and  time. 
What  the  objects  are  in  themselves  would  never  become 
known  to  us,  even  through  the  clearest  knowledge  of 
that  which  alone  is  given  us,  the  phenomenon.  If  we 
drop  our  subjective  condition,  the  object,  as  represented 
with  its  qualities  bestowed  on  it  by  sensuous  intuition, 


,i 


34      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

is  nowhere  to  be  found,  and  can  not  possibly  be  found, 
because  its  form,  as  phenomenal  appearance,  is  deter- 
mined by  those  very  subjective  conditions. 

It  has  been  customary  in  dealing  with  phenomena  to 
distinguish  between  what  is  essential  in  them,  and  what 
is  due  to  a  particular  position  and  organization  of  this 
or  that  sense.  Such  a  procedure  overlooks  the  trans- 
cendental distinction,  for  it  impHes  the  behef  that  we 
know  things  in  themselves.  An  illustration  may  help 
to  clarify  this  point.  People  might  call  the  rainbow  a 
mere  phenomenal  appearance,  but  the  rain  they  would 

call  the  thin^Jn- itself .    This  would  be  quite  right,  phys- 

^  ically  speaking,  and  taking  rain  as  something  which,  in 
our  ordinary  experience  and  under  all  possible  relations 
to  our  senses,  can  be  determined  thus  and  thus  only  in 
our  intuition.  But  if  we  take  the  empirical  in  general, 
and  ask,  without  caring  whether  it  is  the  same  with 
every  particular  observer,  whether  it  represents  a  thing 
in  itself  (not  the  drops  of  rain,  for  these  are  already,  as 
phenomena,  empirical  objects),  then  the  question  as  to 
the  relation  between  the  representation  and  the  object 
becomes  transcendental,  and  not  only  the  drops  as  mere 
phenomena,  but  even  their  round  shape,  nay  even  the 
space  in  which  they  fall,  are  nothing  in  themselves,  but 
1  only  modifications  or  fundamental  dispositions  of  our 
M-^  sensuous  intuition,  the  thing  in  itself  remaining  unknown 
\Jj  to  us. 

The  next  observation  that  Kant  makes,  is  that  the 
transcendental  aesthetic  furnishes  not  only  a  possible 
or  probable,  but  a  necessary  hypothesis  of  the  function 
of  space  and  time  as  determining  factors  in  the  constitu- 


fM^ 


TRANSCENDENTAL  .ESTHETIC  35 

tion  of  phenomena.  This  is  done  by  reiterating  with 
emphasis  some  of  the  considerations  in  the  metaphysical 
and  transcendental  expositions  of  space  and  time  which 
had  been  brought  forward  to  show  not  only  the  a  priority 
and  so  the  necessity,  but  also  the  synthetic  character  of 
the  conclusions  derived  through  space  and  time. 

The  second  edition  contains  a  striking  supplementary 
argument  in  confirmation  of  the  theory  of  the  phenom- 
enality  of  all  objects  of  the  senses.  It  is  an  argument 
based  on  the  relational  nature  of  all  our  knowledge  which 
belongs  to  intuition.  This  knowledge  which  belongs  to 
intuition  contains  nothing  but  mere  relations,  namely, 
of  the  places  in  an  intuition  (extension) ,  change  of  places 
(motion),  and  laws,  according  to  which  that  change  is 
determined  (moving  forces) .  No  tiling  is  told  us  thereby 
as  to  what  is  present  in  the  place,  or  what,  besides  the 
change  of  place,  is  active  in  the  things.  A  thing  in  itself, 
however,  can  not  be  known  by  mere  relations,  and  we 
may,  therefore,  fairly  conclude  that,  as  the  external 
sense  gives  us  nothing  but  representations  of  relations, 
that  sense  can  contain  in  its  representation  only  the  rela- 
tion of  an  object  to  the  subject,  and  not  what  is  inside  the 
object  in  itself.  The  same  applies  to  internal  intuition. 
Not  only  do  the  representations  of  the  external  sc7ises 
constitute  its  proper  material  with  which  we  fill  our  mind, 
but  time,  in  which  these  representations  are  placed, 
and  which  precedes  even  our  consciousness  of  them  in 
experience,  nay,  forms  the  formal  condition  of  the  manner 
in  which  we  place  them  in  the  mind,  contains  itself  rela- 
tions of  succession,  co-existence,  and  that  which  must 
be  co-existent  with  succession,  namely,  the  permanent. 


36      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Now  that  which,  as  a  representation,  can  precede  every 
act  of  thinking  something,  is  the  intuition:  and,  if  it 
contains  nothing  but  relations,  then  the  form  of  intuition. 
As  this  represents  nothing  except  what  is  being  placed 
in  the  mind,  it  can  itself  be  the  manner  only  in  which 
the  mind,  through  its  own  activity,  that  is,  by  this 
placing  of  its  representation,  is  affected  by  itself,  in 
other  words,  an  internal  sense  with  respect  to  its  form. 
Whatever  is  represented  by  a  sense  is  so  far  always 
phenomenal,  and  we  should  therefore  have  either  to 
admit  no  internal  sense  at  all,  or  the  subject,  which  is  its 
object,  could  be  represented  by  it  as  phenomenal  only. 
The  consciousness  of  self  is  a  simple  representation  of  the 
ego.  In  man,  this  consciousness  requires  internal  per- 
ception of  the  manifold,  which  is  previously  given  in  the 
subject,  and  the  manner  in  which  this  is  given  in  the 
mind  must  be  called  sensibility.  If  the  faculty  of  self- 
consciousness  is  to  seek  for,  that  is,  to  apprehend  what 
lies  in  the  mind,  it  must  affect  the  mind,  and  can  thus 
only  produce  an  intuition  of  itself.  The  form  of  this, 
which  lay  antecedently  in  the  mind,  determines  the  man- 
ner in  which  the  manifold  exists  together  in  the  mind, 
namely,  in  the  representation  of  time.  The  intuition  of 
self,  therefore,  is  not,  as  if  it  could  represent  itself 
immediately  and  as  spontaneously  and  independently 
active,  but  according  to  the  manner  in  which  it  is  inter- 
nally affected,  consequently  as  it  appears  to  itself,  not 
as  it  is. 

If  our  consciousness  of  external  objects  and  of  the  self 
is  phenomenal,  that  does  not  in  any  way  mean  that  it  is 
illusory. 


TRAJ^SCENDENTAL  ESTHETIC  37 


Conclusion  of  the  Transcendental  ^Esthetic 

We  have  now  completely  before  us  one  part  of  the 
solution  of  the  general  problem  of  transcendental  philos- 
ophy, namely,  the  question.  How  are  synthetical  propo- 
sitions a  priori  possible?  That  is  to  say,  we  have  shown 
that  we  are  in  possession  of  pure  a  priori  intuitions, 
namely,  space  and  time,  in  which  we  find,  when  in  a 
judgment  a  priori  we  pass  out  beyond  the  given  concep- 
tion, something  which  is  not  discoverable  in  that  concep- 
tion, but  is  certainly  found  a  priori  in  the  intuition  which 
corresponds  to  the  conception,  and  can  be  united  syn- 
thetically with  it.  But  the  judgments  which  these  pure 
intuitions  enable  us  to  make,  never  reach  farther  than  to 
objects  of  the  senses,  and  are  valid  only  for  objects  of 
possible  experience.* 

What  is  the  general   significance  of  the  Esthetic? 
How  is  its  doctrine  to  be  understood?     When  Kant; 
seems  to  say  that  mind  receives,  and  in  conformity  tol 
its  own  forms  and  capacities,  orders  the  material  which  \ 
objects  impress  upon  it,  mind  seems  to  be  viewed  as  an  ' 
independent  and  pre-existing  entity  which  is  in  external 
relation  to  these  objects.     If  this  is  Kant's  meaning,  i 
then  the  question  arises  how  the  pre-existence  and  ex-  \ 
ternal  relation  of  mind  and  objects  can  be  reconciled 
with  the  inseparability  of  consciousness  and  its  object 
asserted  later,  and  if  there  be  such  contradiction,  why  it 

*  It  may  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  suggest  that  results  reached 
in  the  Analytic  have  a  vital  bearing  on  a  complete  statement  of 
Kant's  doctrine  of  space  and  time. 


I\ 


38      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

was  allowed  to  remain.  Is  there  any  way  of  understand- 
ing how  such  contradiction  or  apparent  contradiction 
arose?  Kant  passed  through  various  stages  in  his  philo- 
sophical development,  and  it  may  be  possible  to  view  the 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason  as  a  synthesis  of  these  stages 
in  which  the  various  parts  have  been  brought  over,  but 
the  external  form  of  which  has  not  been  modified  suffi- 
ciently to  bring  out  explicitly  the  underlying  principle 
through  which  the  synthesis  of  these  parts  has  been 
made.  If  this  be  considered  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
space  and  time  manifest  themselves  through  the  medium 
of  mind  and  require  consciousness,  and  in  view  of  the 
notion  of  mind  then  prevalent,  we  may  find  the  reason 
for  this  difficulty.  It  was  customary  to  look  upon  mind 
as  a  substance  having  thoughts,  that  is,  as  the  underlying 
condition  of  conscious  states.  Mind,  therefore,  was  not 
identical  with  conscious  experiences,  but  was  more  funda- 
mental since  it  was  their  condition.  But  now  since  Kant 
saw  that  the  given  material  of  sense  could  not  furnish 
space,  time,  and  the  other  relations  required  by  the 
existence  of  an  experience  such  as  ours,  he  might  say 
that  they  could  arise  from  the  mind  considered  in  the 
substantial  sense,  that  is,  that  the  mind  precedes  and 
renders  experience  possible.  Had  Kant  identified  mind 
and  consciousness,  we  should  have  had  this  conclusion 
in  direct  contradiction  with  his  well-established  conclu- 
sion that  consciousness  and  its  object  are  correlative. 
But  when  mind  is  considered  as  the  condition  of  con- 
sciousness, there  is  no  contradiction  and  the  argument 
of  the  ^Esthetic  remains  valid,  even  after  he  repudiates 
the  substance  view  of  mind,  because  all  the  time  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ESTHETIC  39 

argument  concerned  the  fundamental  conditions  under- 
lying consciousness.* 

It  can  not  be  denied  that  some  aspects  of  Kant's  doc- 
trine seem  to  point  to  solutions  of  the  difficulty  essen- 
tially different  from  the  one  which  has  been  outhned 
above.  Those  who  class  Kant  as  a  subjectivist  are  not 
without  reasons  for  their  view.  They  point  to  the  fact 
that  Kant  seemed  to  believe  in  an  external  interaction 
between  mind  and  real  objects.  Objects  act  upon  the 
human  organism,  and  when  his  organism  is  affected,  the 
conscious  subject  refers  the  resulting  sensations  to  ex- 
ternal objects  as  their  producing  causes.  The  general 
form  and  the  universal  laws  of  the  phenomenal  world 
resulting  from  such  interpretation,  are,  from  this  point 
of  view,  supposed  to  depend  upon  the  essential  nature 
of  an  independent  mind.    If  it  were  possible  to  reconcile 

*  Kant  held  that  human  experience  is  from  the  first  a  space  and 
time  experience,  that  is,  he  held  that  space  and  time  are  presup- 
posed by  such  experience.  But  space  and  time  can  not  be  given 
by  the  atomic  sense  material,  therefore  they  must  be  given  by 
conditions  basic  to  consciousness.  At  first,  if  he  held  a  substance 
view  of  mind,  Kant  could  identify  these  basic  conditions  with 
mind;  but  later  he  doubts  whether  their  identification  can  be 
theoretically  justified.  It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  such  a 
change  of  view  concerning  mind  would  in  no  wise  affect  the  validity 
of  his  argument.  In  the  /Esthetic  as  in  all  parts  of  the  Critique 
Kant  held  that  space  and  time  must  come  from  unconscious  con- 
ditions which  result  in  conscious  experience.  Whether  these  con- 
ditions be  identified  with  the  mind  considered  as  a  substantial 
entity,  or  whether  they  be  considered  as  conditions  basic  to  the 
mind,  though  not  included  in  it,  makes  not  the  slightest  dilTcrcnce 
to  this  argument;  though  it  may  have  important  consequences 
in  other  connections.    Cf.  note,  p.  30. 


40      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

this  view  with  other  portions  of  Kant's  doctrine,  the 
significance  of  mind  in  the  Esthetic  would  be  clear; 
but  the  great  bulk  of  evidence  is  against  this  position. 
It  is  true  that  Kant  seems  to  hold  that  the  phenomenal 
object  and  the  human  organism  act  upon  each  other,  and 
it  is  also  true  that  his  general  form  of  statement  is  in- 
fluenced by  this  view.  But  much  of  the  Critique  indi- 
cates that  Kant  looked  upon  this  interaction  as  falling 
within  a  wider  sphere  conditioned  on  both  sides  by  a 
reality  more  ultimate  than  either  human  subject  or 
phenomenal  object.  This  leads  us  to  consider  another 
interpretation  which  says  that  Kant  started  from  a 
dualism,  out  of  which  he  is  forced  by  the  logic  of  his  own 
thought.  At  this  point  he  looks  upon  all  reaHty  as  exist- 
ing in  the  subject-object  form,  consequently,  things  in 
themselves  and  selves  in  themselves  are  seen  to  be  fic- 
tions. Consciousness  by  its  very  nature  goes  beyond  it- 
self to  include  objects.  Consciousness  can  not  manifest 
itself  except  in  the  subject-object  form.  All  essential 
separation  between  consciousness  and  reality  vanishes. 
Reality  is  the  manifestation  or  objectivity  of  reason. 
In  so  far  as  human  knowledge  is  not  adequate  to  account 
for  this  result,  it  is  supposed  to  be  due  to  an  absolute 
consciousness  functioning  in  the  finite  subject  and  its 
correlative,  the  world.  It  must  be  admitted  that  this 
interpretation  of  Kant  is  based  on  a  very  important 
and  carefully  elaborated  part  of  his  work.  It  may 
even  be  that  this  is  the  logical  outcome  of  Kant's 
position.  But  it  does  not  seem  to  be  the  position  which 
he  holds.* 

*Cf.  pp.  175,  176. 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ^ESTHETIC  4I 

We  may  now  point  out  briefly  some  implications  of   ^/^-^ 
the  position  which  Kant  takes  in  the  ^Esthetic. 

The  extreme  empirical  position  has  been  refuted. 
Human  beings  do  not  first  have  mere  isolated  sense  im- 
pressions which  somehow  group  themselves  and  produce 
the  appearance  of  an  external  world  related  to  a  self. 
From  such  atomic  elements  alone  no  perceived  world 
and  no  knowledge  would  arise.  It  is  necessary  to  assume 
the  principles  of  connection  as  being  present  in  experi- 
ence from  the  beginning. 

As  the  space  and  time  aspect  of  experience  is  in  some 
way  dependent  upon  the  basic  conditions  of  conscious- 
ness, the  universality  and  necessity  of  mathematics  can 
be  explained.  Being  conditioned  as  we  are,  all  our  ob- 
jects must  be  in  space  and  all  our  internal  experiences 
in  time.  Space  and  time  are  constant  factors  which 
furnish  the  foundation  for  a  priori  knowledge.  But 
Kant  thinks  that  this  argument  makes  it  necessary  to 
deny  that  things  in  themselves  exist  in  space  and  time. 
Though  space  and  time  are  the  forms  of  all  our  percep- 
tions, they  themselves  depend  upon  more  ultimate  condi- 
tions, and  of  course,  they  can  not  condition  the  conditions 
out  of  which  they  arise. 

If  Kant  held  that  the  perceived  world  depends  upon 
something  more  ultimate  than  individual  forms  and 
activities,  many  of  the  objections  to  his  system  lose  their 
point.  The  perceived  world,  though  implying  conscious- 
ness, would  then  have  a  relatively  independent  existence 
of  its  own.  In  this  world  natural  man  could  arise  and 
pass  away.  And  although  the  whole  phenomenal  world 
is  a  correlative  of  consciousness,  the  natural  organism 


42      INTRODUCTION   TO    KANT  S    CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

which  arises  in  time  might  be  an  indispensable  condition 
connected  with  consciousness.  In  this  world,  knowledge, 
culture  and  civilization  might  arise  and  pass  away.  In 
other  words,  this  point  of  view  would  give  to  objective 
existence  all  the  reaHty  that  could  possibly  be  desired. 
It  is  not  necessarily  inconsistent  with  this  general  point 
of  view  to  hold  that  although  human  beings  arise  in 
connection  with  the  space  and  time  order  of  things, 
they,  as  conscious  and  moral  beings,  manifest  a  capacity 
and  a  worth  which  transcend  the  natural  order  of  things. 
The  conscious  and  moral  self  is  a  unique  factor  in  ex- 
perience. True,  the  human  self  springs  out  of  conditions 
of  which  he  is  not  directly  conscious,  and  passes  at  the 
end  of  natural  Kfe  into  conditions  which  his  keenest 
insight  can  not  fathom.  But  in  the  phenomenal  world 
his  consciousness  is  the  correlative  of  objects  in  genera' 1. 
As  a  moral  agent  he  feels  impelled  and  able  to  introduc  e 
a  new  order,  to  change  and  shape  the  course  of  event  . 
For  him  the  phenomenal  world  though  relatively  real 
is  not  the  last  word. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC 

Our  knowledge  arises  from  two  fundamental  sources 
of  the  mind,  the  first  of  which  is  the  reception  of  repre- 
sentations (the  receptivity  of  impressions),  the  second 
the  power  of  knowing  an  object  through  these  representa- 
tions (spontaneity  of  concepts);  through  the  first  an 
object  is  given  to  us,  through  the  second,  this  object  is 
thought  in  relation  to  that  representation  (as  mere  deter- 
mination of  mind).  Intuition  and  concepts,  therefore,  ^^ 
constitute  the  elements  of  all  our  knowledge,  so  that 
neither  concepts  which  are  without  any  corresponding 
intuition,  nor  intuition  without  concepts  can  result  in 
knowledge.  Both  are  either  pure  or  empirical.  They 
are  empirical  when  they  contain  sensation  (which  pre- 
supposes the  actual  presence  of  the  object);  pure  when 
no  sensation  is  mixed  with  the  representation.  One 
may  call  the  latter  the  material  of  sensuous  knowledge. 
Consequently  pure  intuition  contains  the  form  alone 
under  which  something  is  intuited,  and  pure  conception 
contains  only  the  form  of  tliinking  an  object  in  general. 
Only  pure  intuitions  and  pure  conceptions  are  possible 
a  priori;  the  empirical  only  a  posteriori. 

We  would  call  the  receptivity  of  our  mind,  that  is,  its 
power  of  receiving  representations,  whenever  it  is  in 
in  any  wise  affected,  sensibility,  while  the  understanding, 
on  the  contrary,  is  the  power  of  producing  representa- 
tions, or  the  spontaneity  of  knowledge.    Our  nature  is  so 

43 


44      INTRODUCTION   TO   ILA.NT's   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

constituted,  that  intuition  can  never  be  other  than  sen- 
suous, that  is,  it  contains  only  the  way  in  which  we  are 
affected  by  objects.  On  the  contrary,  the  understanding 
is  the  power  of  thinking  the  object  of  sensuous  intuition. 
Neither  of  these  powers  is  to  be  preferred  over  the  other. 
Without  sensibihty  no  object  would  be  given  to  us,  and 
without  understanding  no  object  could  be  thought  by  us. 
Thoughts  without  content  are  empty,  and  intuitions  without 
concepts  are  blind.  Consequently  it  is  just  as  necessary 
to  make  one's  concepts  sensuous  (that  is,  to  add  to  them 
the  object  in  intuition)  as  to  make  one's  intuitions  in- 
telligible (that  is,  to  bring  them  under  concepts).  Neither 
of  these  powers  or  capacities  can  exchange  its  proper 
function.  The  understanding  can  not  intuit  anything, 
and  the  senses  can  not  think  anything.  Only  through 
their  union  can  knowledge  arise.  Consequently  one  must 
not  confuse  the  part  which  each  plays,  but  must  carefully 
separate  and  distinguish  each  from  the  other.  Conse- 
quently we  distinguish  the  science  of  the  rules  of  the  sen- 
sibility in  general,  that  is,  the  Esthetic,  from  the  science 
of  the  rules  of  the  understanding  in  general,  that  is, 
Logic.  The  discipline  which  expounds  the  forms  of 
thought  is  called  logic.  Kant  distinguishes  between 
universal  logic  and  particular  logic.  The  former  deals 
strictly  with  the  forms  of  thought,  the  latter  with  the 
application  of  those  forms  to  particular  instances.  But 
universal  logic  does  not  cover  the  problem  as  it  presents 
itself  to  Kant,  for,  since  thought  without  intuitions  is 
empty,  we  must  seek  forms  of  thought  which  are  pure 
and  at  the  same  time  are  objective  in  their  appHcation. 
This  is  the  mission  of  transcendental  logic.     Not  every 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  45 

kind  of  knowledge  a  priori  can  be  called  transcendental, 
but  only  that  by  which  we  know  that  and  how  certain 
representations  (intuitional  or  conceptual)  can  be  used 
or  are  possible  a  priori  only.    Transcendental  logic,  then,  ^ 
seeks  those  forms  of  thinking,  which  are  not  merely  a 
priori  forms,  but  at  the  same  time  refer  a  priori  to  objects 
of  experience.    In  other  words,  transcendental  logic  must  \ 
determine  the  origin,  the  extent  and  objective  vaHdity  \  \ 
of  those  kinds  of  knowledge  which  deal  with  the  laws  of  / 
understanding  and  reason. 

Transcendental  logic,  like  general  logic,  has  two  di- 
visions: analytic  and  dialectic.  That  part  of  tran- 
scendental logic  which  teaches  the  elements  of  the  pure 
knowledge  of  the  understanding,  and  the  principles 
without  which  no  object  can  be  thought,  is  transcen- 
dental analytic,  and  at  the  same  time  a  logic  of  truth. 
No  knowledge  can  contradict  it  without  losing  at  the 
same  time  all  content,  that  is,  all  relation  to  any  object, 
and  therefore  all  truth. 

In  general  logic,  in  the  dialectic,  the  understanding 
runs  the  risk  of  making,  through  mere  sophisms,  a  mate- 
rial use  of  the  purely  formal  principles  of  the  pure  under- 
standing, and  thus  of  judging  indiscriminately  of  objects 
which  are  not  given  to  us,  nay,  perhaps  can  never 
be  given.  In  transcendental  logic,  the  transcendental 
dialectic  must  therefore  form  a  critique  of  that  dialectical 
semblance. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC 

Part  I 

TRANSCENDENTAL    ANALYTIC 

Transcendental  analytic  consists  in  the  dissection  of  all 
our  knowledge  a  priori  into  the  elements  which  consti- 
tute the  knowledge  of  the  pure  understanding.  Four 
points  are  here  essential:  first,  that  the  concepts  should 
be  pure  and  not  empirical;  secondly,  that  they  should 
not  belong  to  intuition  and  sensibiHty,  but  to  thought 
and  understanding;  thirdly,  that  the  concepts  should 
be  basic  and  carefully  distinguished  from  derivative  or 
composite  concepts;  fourthly,  that  our  tables  should 
cover  the  whole  field  of  the  pure  understanding.  This 
completeness  of  a  science  can  not  be  confidently  accepted 
on  the  strength  of  a  mere  estimate,  or  by  means  of  re- 
peated experiments  only;  what  is  required  for  it  is  an 
idea  of  the  totality  of  the  a  priori  knowledge  of  the 
understanding,  and  a  classification  of  the  concepts  based 
upon  it;  in  fact,  a  systematic  treatment.  This  involves 
two  parts :  the  analytic  of  the  concepts  of  the  pure  under- 
standing and  the  analytic  of  the  principles  of  the  pure 
understanding. 


46 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC 
BOOK  I.    ANALYTIC  OF  CONCEPTS 

By  analytic  of  concepts  Kant  means  the  dissection  of 
the  faculty  of  the  understanding  itself,  with  the  sole  ob- 
ject of  discovering  the  possibility  of  the  concepts  a 
priori^  by  looking  for  them  nowhere  but  in  the  under- 
standing itself  as  their  birthplace,  and  analyzing  the 
pure  use  of  the  understanding,  freed  from  all  inherent 
empirical  conditions. 

As  in  the  sesthetic,  all  intuitions,  being  sensuous, 
depend  on  affections,  so  in  the  analytic,  the  under- 
standing in  using  concepts  depends  on  functions.  By  "~^ 
function,  Kant  here  means  the  unity  of  the  act  of  ar- 
ranging different  representations  under  one  common 
representation.  The  onlyjusewhich^  the  understanding  k 
can  make  of  these  concepts  is  to  form,  judgments  by  them. 
All  judgments  are  functions  of  unity  among  our  rep- 
resentations, the  knowledge  of  an  object  being  brought 
about,  not  by  an  immediate  representation,  but  by  a 
higher  one,  comprehending  this  and  several  others,  so 
that  many  possible  cognitions  are  collected  into  one. 
As  all  acts  of  the  understanding  can  be  reduced  to  judg- 
ments, the  understanding  may  be  defined  as  the  faculty 
of  judging.  Thus  the  functions  of  the  understanding  can 
be  discovered  in  their  completeness,  if  it  is  possible  to 
represent  the  functions  of  unity  in  judgfu cuts. 

47 


48      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Discovery  of  the  Categories 

If  we  leave  out  of  consideration  the  contents  of  any 
judgment,  and  fix  our  attention  on  the  mere  form  of  the 
understanding,  we  find  that  the  function  of  thought  in  a 
judgment  can  be  brought  under  four  heads,  each  of  them 
having  three  sub-divisions.  These  may  be  stated  as 
follows: 

I. 


Quantity  of  judgments 

Universal. 

Particular. 

Singular. 

n. 

III. 

Quality 

Relation 

Afiirmative. 

Categorical. 

Negative. 

Hypothetical, 

Infinite. 

IV. 

Modality 

Problematical. 

Assertory. 

Apodictic. 

Disjunctive. 

We  find  that  Kant  has  gone  somewhat  beyond  the 
conventional  classification  in  so  far  that  he  has  added  the 
singular  judgment  under  the  head  of  quantity,  and  the 
infinite  judgment  under  the  head  of  quality.  Formal 
logic  has  treated  the  singular  like  the  universal  judgment. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  49 

Since  these  singular  judgments  have  no  extent  at  all,  the 
predicate  can  not  refer  to  part  only  of  that  which  is  con- 
tained in  the  concept  of  the  subject,  and  be  excluded 
from  the  rest.  But  if  we  compare  the  singular  and  univer- 
sal judgments,  looking  only  at  the  quantity  of  knowledge 
conveyed  by  each,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  singular  judg- 
ment stands  to  the  universal  judgment  as  unity  to  in- 
finity, and  is  therefore  essentially  different  from  it.  Like- 
wise with  the  addition  of  the  infinite  judgment  to  the 
affirmative  and  the  negative  judgments  under  the  head 
of  quality.  General  logic  asks  only  whether  the  predi- 
cate is  affirmed  or  denied.  Transcendental  logic,  on  the 
contrary,  considers  a  judgment  according  to  the  value 
also  or  the  contents  of  a  logical  affirmation  by  means  of 
a  purely  negative  predicate,  and  asks  how  much  is  gained 
by  that  affirmation,  with  reference  to  the  sum  total  of 
knowledge.  For  example :  w^hen  we  say,  the  soul  is  not 
mortal,  we  have  really  affirmed  that  the  soul  is  non- 
mortal.  This  means  that  we  have  placed  the  soul  in 
the  unlimited  sphere  of  non-mortal  beings.  The  whole 
sphere  of  possible  beings  can  be  designated  as  the  mortal 
and  the  non-mortal,  and  so  in  this  judgment  the  infinite 
sphere  of  all  that  is  possible  becomes  Hmited  only  in  so 
far  that  all  that  is  mortal  is  excluded  from  it,  and  that 
aftej  wards  the  soul  is  placed  in  the  remaining  part  of  its 
original  extent.  But  this  part,  even  after  its  limita- 
tion, still  remains  infinite.  These  judgments,  therefore, 
tho  igh  infinite^Avith.respectJo  their  logical  extent,  are,_ 
with  respect  to  their  contents,  limitative  only,  and  so 
can  not  be  passed  over  in  a  transcendental  table  of  all 
vaneties  of  thought  in  judgments. 


50      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

The  examples  just  given  help  to  illustrate  another 
point  which  is  of  prime  importance  in  the  present  state- 
ment of  Kant's  metaphysical  deduction  of  the  categories 
of  the  understanding.  They  are  concrete  instances 
which  show  that  these  forms  of  judgment  given  in  the 
table  are  still  from  Kant's  point  of  \dew  merely  analytic. 
General  logic,  he  believes,  in  so  far  that  it  is  concerned 
with  formal  processes  of  thought,  proceeds  analytically. 
But  in  order  to  have  analysis,  there  must  first  have  been 
synthesis.  Our  thought  requires  that  what  is  manifold 
in  pure  intuition  should  first  be  examined,  received,  and 
connected,  in  order  to  transform  it  into  knowledge. 
This  is  what  Kant  calls  synthesis.  Knowledge  is  first 
produced  by  the  synthesis  of  what  is  manifold.  That 
knowledge  may  at  first  be  crude  and  confused  and  in 
need  of  analysis,  but  it  is  synthesis  which  really  collects 
the  elements  of  knowledge,  and  unites  them  to  a  certain 
extent.  It  is  therefore  the  first  thing  wh'ch  we  have  to 
consider  if  we  want  to  form  an  opinion  concerning  the 
first  origin  of  our  knowledge. 

Synthesis  in  general  is  the  mere  result  of  what  Kant 
calls  a  bhnd  but  indispensable  function  of  the  soul, 
without  which  we  should  have  no  knowledge  whatever, 
and  of  which  we  are  seldom  even  conscious.  But  to 
reduce  this  synthesis  to  concepts  is  a  function  that  be- 
longs to  the  understanding,  and  by  wliich  the  under- 
standing supphes  us  for  the  first  time  with  knowledge 
properly  so  called. 

Pure  synthesis  in  its  most  general  meaning  gives  us 
the  pure  concept  of  the  understanding.  By  this  pure 
synthesis  Kant  means  that  which  rests  on  the  foundation 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  5I 

of  what  he  calls  synthetical  unity  a  priori.  Thus  our 
counting  (as  we  best  perceive  when  dealing  with  higher 
numbers)  is  a  synthesis  according  to  concepts,  because 
resting  on  a  common  ground  of  unity,  as  for  instance, 
the  decade.  The  unity  of  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold 
becomes  necessary  under  this  concept. 

By  means  of  analysis  different  representations  are 
brought  under  one  concept,  a  task  treated  of  in  general 
logic  as  exemplified  in  the  foregoing  table  of  judgments. 
But  how  to  bring,  not  the  representations,  but  the  pure 
synthesis  of  representations,  under  concepts,  that  is 
\  what  transcendental  logic  means  to  teach.  Tlie  first 
that  must  be  given  us  a  priori  for  the  sake  of  knowledge 
of  all  objects,  is  the  manifold  in  pure  intuition.  The 
second  is_the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  by  means  of 
Imagination.  But  tliis  does  not  yet  produce  true  knowl- 
edge. The  concepts  which  impart  unity  to  this  pure 
synthesis  and  consist  entirely  in  the  representation  of 
this  necessary  synthetical  unity,  add  the  third  contri- 
bution towards  the  knowledge  of  an  object,  and  rest  on 
the  understanding. 

The  same  function  which  imparts  unity  to  various 
representations  in  one  judgment  imparts  unity  Hkewise 
to  the  mere  synthesis  of  various  representations  in  one 
intuition,  which  in  a  general  wiy  may  be  called  the  pure  , 
concept  of  the  understanding.  The  same  understanding,  '^ 
and  by  the  same  operations  by  which  in  concepts  it 
achieves  through  analytical  unity  the  logical  form  of  a 
judgment,  introduces  also,  through  the  synthetical  unity 
of  the  manifold  in  intuition,  a  transcendental  element 
into  its  representations.    They  are  therefore  called  pure 


52      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

concepts  of  the  understanding,  and  they  refer  a  priori 
to  objects,  which  would  be  quite  impossible  in  general 
logic. 

In  this  manner,  there  arise  exactly  so  many  pure  con- 
cepts of  the  understanding  which  refer  a  priori  to  objects 
of  intuition  in  general,  as  there  were  in  our  table  logical 
functions  in  all  possible  judgments,  because  those  func- 
tions completely  exhaust  the  understanding,  and  com- 
prehend every  one  of  its  faculties.  Borrowing  a  term  of 
Aristotle,  Kant  calls  these  concepts  categories,  his  inten- 
tion being  originally  the  same  as  that  of  Aristotle,  though 
widely  diverging  from  it  in  its  practical  appHcation. 


Table  of  Categories 

T 

X. 

Of  Quantity 

Unity. 

Plurality. 

TotaHty. 

n. 

III. 

Of  Quality 

Of  Relation 

Pvcality. 

Of  Inherence  and  Subsistence 

Negation. 

(substantia  et  accidens). 

Limitation. 

Of  Causality  and  Dependence 

(cause  and  effect). 

Of  Community 

(reciprocity  between  the 

active  and  passive). 

TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  53 

IV. 

Of  Modality 

Possibility.  Impossibility. 
Existence.    Non-existence. 
Necessity.    Contingency. 

This  then  is  the  list  of  all  original  pure  concepts  of 
synthesis,  which  the  understanding  includes  in  itself, 
and  on  account  of  which  only  it  is  a  pure  understanding. 

The  importance  of  the  preceding  obscure  argument  • 
renders  some  explanation  necessary.  What  is  sometimes 
called  the  metaphysical  deduction  seems  to  be  based  on 
the  assumption  that  the  different  processes  involved  in 
the  experiences  of  a  self  are  necessarily  connected,  and 
hence  that  they  may  be  expected  to  throw  light  upon  one 
another.  This  seems  to  be  Kant's  position  despite  his 
belief  that  reason's  demands  for  unity  can  not  be  gratified 
and  in  general  that  theoretical  thought  is  unable  to  know 
ultimate  reality.  Granting  then  that  conscious  experi- 
ence must  be  a  more  or  less  unified  experience  in  all  its 
parts,  it  appears  obvious  that  the  instruments  by  means 
of  which  formal  thought  attains  unity,  may  be  looked 
upon  as  furnishing  a  clue  for  the  discovery  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  unity  operating  in  the  sphere  of  objective  reality. 
This  expectation  seems  reasonable  for  two  reasons:  (i) 
formal  thought  and  concrete  experience  belong  to  the 
same  consciousness;  (2)  formal  thought  presupposes  and 
depends  upon  concrete  knowledge  for  its  material.  It 
is  now  possible  to  take  a  further  step  in  the  argument. 


54      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

In  formal  thought  judgment  is  the  principle  of  unity, 
and  formal  logic  if  completed  gives,  according  to  Kant, 
a  complete  list  of  the  analytic  judgments ;  and  as  analysis 
presupposes  a  synthesis,  the  analytic  judgments  of 
formal  logic  are  supposed  to  imply  just  so  many  synthetic 
processes.  When  we  attempt  to  reduce  these  processes 
to  conceptions,  we  arrive  at  Kant's  famous  table  of 
categories.  The  categories  represent  the  basic  principles 
presupposed  by  all  our  thought  concerning  reahty.  They 
are  implicitly  present  in  the  thought  and  experience  of 
all  men  and  determine  the  ways  in  which  that  experience 
can  be  organized.  We  are  led  to  employ  these  general 
conceptions  as  if  by  instinct.  It  is  as  if  the  noumenal 
conditions  of  our  being  predetermined  certain  grooves 
in  the  general  form  of  our  conscious  experience  along 
which  our  thought  is  constrained  to  move.  We  have 
found  the  categories,  but  their  justification  can  not  be 
establish?d  without  a  transcendental  deduction;  that  is 
Kant's  next  task. 

Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories 

Jurists,  when  speaking  of  rights  and  claims,  distin- 
guish in  every  law  suit  the  question  of  right  from  the 
question  of  fact,  and  in  demanding  proof  of  both,  they 
call  the  former,  which  is  to  show  the  right,  the  deduction. 
Some  concepts  which  have  been  used  are  legitimate  and 
some  are  illegitimate.  Hume  holds  that  the  criterion  of 
the  legitimacy  of  the  use  of  such  concepts  is  their 
being  found  in  experience.  The  principles  of  causality 
and  substance,  for  example,  he  believes  to  be  the  re- 
sults of  an  instinctive  activity  aroused  by  experience. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  55 

but  on  account  of  this  very  instinctiveness  and  not 
direct  experiential  presence,  he  calls  them  illegitimate 
concepts.  Kant  also  makes  these  principles  the  results 
of  an  instinctive  activity,  but  unlike  Hume,  holds  them 
to  be  legitimate,  because  these  principles  are  justified 
by  the  fact  that  they  are  involved  in  the  very  possibiHty 
of  all  experience.  The  elaboration  and  grounding  of 
this  proposition,  then,  is  the  problem  which  he  considers 
in  the  Transcendental  Deduction  of  the  Categories. 

By  tra2iscende/iTMl^e4'^Lction  Kant  vieansjhe  explanation 
oj  tliB-wa^Ldn-MliicJi  the  pure  concepts  of  syntJtesis  can  a 
priori  refer  to  objects.  This  is  very  different  from  an 
empirical  deduction  which  simply  shows  how  a  concept 
may  be  gained  either  by  experience  or  by  reflection  upon 
experience.  It  is  ob\dous  therefore  that  the  empirical 
deduction,  since  it  is  empirical,  in  no  wise  proves  the 
legitimacy  of  the  concepts,  but  only  accounts  for  their 
empirical  origin.  There  are  two  possible  ways  in  which 
synthetical  representations  and  their  objects  can  refer 
to  each  other  with  necessity.  Either  the  object  alon^f 
makes  the  representation  possible,  or  the  representation  \, 
alone  makes  the  object  possible.  The  former  alternative 
can  give  only  an  empirical  relation,  and  so  the  representa-^ 
tion  is  never  possible  a  priori.  In  the  latter  case,  though 
representation  by  itself  (for  we  do  not  speak  here  of  its 
causahty  by  means  of  the  will)  can  not  produce  its 
object  so  far  as  its  existence  is  concerned,  nevertheless 
the  representation  determines  the  object  a  priori,  if 
through  it  alone  it  is  possible  to  know  anything  as  an 
object. 

The  question  nov/  is  Vv'hcthcr  there  are  not  antecedent 


\jji)\ 


56      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

concepts  a  priori,  forming  conditions  under  which  some- 
thing can  be  thought  as  an  object  in  general;  for  in  that 
case  all  empirical  knowledge  of  objects  would  necessarily 
conform  to  such  concepts,  it  being  impossible  that  any- 
thing should  become  an  object  of  experience  without 
them.  Such  concepts  of  objects  in  general  therefore 
must  form  conditions  a  priori  of  all  knowledge  produced 
by  experience,  and  the  objective  vaHdity  of  the  categories 
as  being  such  concepts  a  priori,  rests  on  this  very  fact 
that  by  them  alone,  so  far  as  the  form  of  thought  is 
concerned,  experience  becomes  possible.  If  by  them  only  "^ 
it  is  possible  to  think  any  object  of  experience,  it  follows 
that  they  refer  by  necessity  and  a  priori  to  all  objects 
of  experience. 

SUBJECTIVE  DEDUCTION 

The  concepts  which  comprehend  the  pure  thinking 
a  priori  involved  in  every  experience  are  discovered  in  the 
categories,  and  it  is  a  sufficient  deduction  of  them  and  a 
justification  of  their  objective  validity,  if  we  can  succeed 
in  proving  that  by  them  alone  an  object  can  be  thought. 
But  as  in  such  a  process  of  thinking  more  is  at  work  than 
the  faculty  of  thinking  only,  namely,  the  understanding; 
and  as  the  understanding,  as  a  faculty  of  knowledge 
which  is  meant  to  refer  to  objects,  requires  quite  as  much 
an  explanation  as  to  the  possibility  of  such  a  reference, 
it  is  necessary  for  us  to  consider  the  subjective  sources 
which  form  the  foundation  a  priori  for  the  possibility 
of  experience,  not  according  to  their  empirical,  but 
according  to  their  transcendental  character. 

If  every  single  representation  stood  by  itself,  as  if 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  57 

isolated  and  separated  from  the  others,  nothing  Hke  what 
we  call  knowledge  could  ever  arise,  because  knowledge 
forms  a  whole  of  representations  connected  and  compared 
with  each  other.  Kant  maintains,  therefore,  if  one  as- 
cribes to  the  senses  a  synopsis,  because  in  their  intuition 
they  contain  something  manifold,  there  corresponds  to 
it  always  a  synthesis,  and  receptivity  can  make  knowl- 
edge possible  only  when  joined  with  spontaneity.  This 
[  spontaneity  appears  as  a  three-fold  synthesis  which 
must  take  place  in  every  kind  of  knowledge,  "namely, 
first,  that  of  the  apprehension  of^presentations  as  modi- 
fications of  the  soul  in  intuition,  secondly^  of  the  repro- 
ducHon  of~tEem  in  the  imagination,  and,  thifdly^ffiat  of 
their  reco^njEhndnconcepts.  ^~nnis  leads  iis^to  three  sub- 
jective sources  of  knowledge  which  render  possible  the 
understanding,  and  through  it,  all  experience  as  an 
empirical  product  of  the  understanding. 


I.  Of  the  Synthesis  of  Apprehension  in  Intuition 

Whatever  the  origin  of  our  representations  may  be, 
whether  they  be  due  to  the  influence  of  external  things 
or  to  internal  causes,  whether  they  have  arisen  a  priori 
or  empirically  as  phenomena,  as  modifications  of  the 
mind  they  must  always  belong  to  the  internal  sense, 
and  all  our  knowledge  must  therefore  finally  be  subject 
to  the  formal  condition  of  that  internal  sense,  namely, 
time,  in  which  they  are  all  arranged,  joined,  and  brought 
into  certain  relations  to  each  other. 

Every  representation  contains  something  manifold, 
which  could  not  be  represented  as  such,  unless  the  mind 


58      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

distinguished  the  time  in  the  succession  of  one  impression 
after  another;  for  as  contained  in  one  moment,  each 
representation  can  never  be  anything  but  absolute  unity. 
In  order  to  change  this  manifold  into  a  unity  of  intuition 
(as,  for  instance,  in  the  representation  of  space),  it  is 
necessary  first  to  run  through  the  manifold  and  then  to 
hold  it  together.  It  is  this  act  which  Kant  calls  the 
synthesis  of  apprehension,  because  it  refers  directly 
to  intuition  which  no  doubt  offers  something  manifold, 
but  which,  without  a  synthesis,  can  never  make  it  such, 
as  is  contained  in  one  representation. 

This  synthesis  of  apprehension  must  be  carried  out 
a  priori  also,  that  is,  with  reference  to  representations 
which  are  not  empirical.  For  without  it  we  should  never 
be  able  to  have  the  representations  either  of  space  or  of 
time  a  priori,  because  these  can  not  be  produced  except 
by  synthesis  of  the  manifold  which  the  senses  offer  in 
their  original  receptivity.  It  follows  therefore  that  we 
have  a  pure  synthesis  of  apprehension. 

II.  Of  the  Synthesis  of  Reproduction  in  Imagination 

It  is  no  doubt  nothing  but  an  empirical  law  according 
to  which  representations  which  have  often  followed  or 
accompanied  one  another,  become  associated  so  closely 
that,  even  without  the  presence  of  the  object,  one  of 
these  representations  will,  according  to  an  invariable 
law,  produce  a  transition  of  the  mind  to  the  other.  This 
law  of  reproduction,  however,  presupposes  that  there  is 
in  the  variety  of  these  representations  a  sequence  and 
concomitancy  subject  to  certain  rules;  for  without  this 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  59 

the  faculty  of  empirical  imagination  would  never  find 
anything  to  do,  that  it  is  able  to  do,  and  would  remain, 
therefore,  buried  within  our  mind  as  a  dead  faculty,  un- 
known to  ourselves. 

There  must  therefore  be  something  to  make  this 
reproduction  of  phenomena  possible  by  being  itself  the 
foundation  a  priori  of  a  necessary  synthetical  unity  of 
them.  This  becomes  clear  if  we  only  remember  that  all 
phenomena  are  not  things  in  themselves  but  only  the 
play  of  our  representations,  all  of  which  are  in  the  end 
determinations  only  of  the  internal  sense.  If  therefore 
we  could  prove  that  even  our  purest  intuitions  a  priori 
give  us  no  knowledge,  unless  they  contain  such  a  com- 
bination of  the  manifold  as  to  render  a  constant  synthesis 
of  reproduction  possible,  it  would  follow  that  this  syn- 
thesis of  the  imagination  is,  before  all  experience,  founded 
on  principles  a  priori,  and  that  we  must  admit  a  pure 
transcendental  synthesis  of  the  imagination  which  forms 
even  the  foundation  of  the  possibility  of  all  experience, 
such  experience  being  impossible  without  the  reproduc- 
tibility  of  phenomena.  Now  when  I  draw  a  Hne  in 
thought,  or  if  I  think  the  time  from  one  noon  to  another, 
or  if  I  only  represent  to  myself  a  certain  number,  it  is 
clear  that  I  must  first  necessarily  apprehend  one  of  these 
manifold  representations  after  another.  If  I  were  to 
lose  from  my  thoughts  what  precedes,  whether  the  first 
parts  of  a  Hne  or  the  antecedent  portions  of  time,  or  the 
numerical  unities  representing  one  after  the  other,  and 
if,  while  I  proceed  to  what  follows,  I  were  unable  to  re- 
produce what  came  before,  there  would  never  be  a  com- 
plete representation,  and  none  of  the  before-mentioned 


6o      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

thoughts,  not  even  the  first  and  purest  representations 
of  space  and  time,  could  ever  arise  within  me. 

The  synthesis  of  apprehension  is  therefore  inseparably 
connected  with  the  synthesis  of  reproduction,  and  as  the 
former  constitutes  the  transcendental  ground  of  the 
possibility  of  all  knowledge  in  general,  it  follows  that  a 
reproductive  synthesis  of  imagination  belongs  to  the 
transcendental  acts  of  the  soul.  We  may  therefore  call 
this  faculty  the  transcendental  faculty  of  imagination. 

III.  Of  the  Synthesis  of  Recognition  in  Concepts 

Without  recognition  that  what  we  are  thinking  now 
is  the  same  as  what  we  thought  a  moment  before,  all 
reproduction  in  the  series  of  representations  would  be 
vain.  Each  representation  would,  in  its  present  state, 
be  a  new  one,  and  in  no  wise  belonging  to  the  act  by  which 
it  was  to  be  produced  by  degrees,  and  the  manifold  in  it 
would  never  form  a  whole,  because  deprived  of  that  unity 
which  consciousness  alone  can  impart  to  it. 

Since  we  can  deal  only  with  the  manifold  in  our 
representations,  and  since  the  object  corresponding  to 
them — for  it  is  to  be  something  different  from  all  our 
representations, — is  really  nothing  to  us,  it  is  clear  that 
the  unity  necessitated  by  the  object,  can  not  be  anything 
but  the  formal  unity  of  our  consciousness  in  the  syn- 
thesis of  the  manifold  in  our  representations.  Then  and 
then  only  do  we  say  that  we  know  an  object,  if  we  have 
produced  synthetical  unity  in  the  manifold  of  intuition. 
Such  unity  would  be  impossible,  if  the  intuition  could  not 
be  produced,  according  to  a  rule,  by  such  a  function  of 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  6 1 

synthesis  as  would  make  the  reproduction  of  the  mani- 
fold a  priori  necessary,  and  would  make  possible  a  con- 
cept in  which  that  manifold  is  united.  For  example,  we 
conceive  a  triangle  as  an  object,  if  we  are  conscious  of 
the  combination  of  three  straight  lines,  according  to  a 
rule  (a  principle  of  synthesis)  which  renders  such  an 
intuition  possible  at  all  times.  This  wiity  of  rule  deter- 
mines the  manifold  and  limits  it  to  conditions  which 
render  the  unity  of  apperception  possible,  and  the  con- 
cept of  that  unity  is  really  the  representation  of  an 
object  =  X,  which  I  think,  by  means  of  the  predicates  of 
a  triangle. 

No  knowledge  is  possible  without  a  concept,  however 
obscure  or  imperfect  it  may  be,  and  a  concept  is  always, 
with  regard  to  its  form,  something  that  can  serve  as  a 
rule.  The  concept  body,  for  example,  is  a  rule,  and  as 
such,  a  principle  of  synthetical  unity  in  our  consciousness 
of  the  manifold,  that  is,  the  concept  body,  whenever  we 
perceive  something  outside  us,  necessitates  the  repre- 
sentation of  extension,  and  with  it,  those  of  imper- 
meabiHty,  etc. 

Necessity  is  always  founded  on  transcendental  condi- 
tions. There  must  be  therefore  a  transcendental  ground 
of  the  unity  of  our  consciousness  in  the  synthesis  of  the 
manifold  of  all  our  intuitions,  and  therefore  also  a  trans- 
cendental ground  of  all  concepts  of  objects  in  general, 
and  therefore  again  of  all  objects  of  experience,  without 
which  it  would  be  impossible  to  add  to  our  intuitions 
the  thought  of  an  object,  for  the  object  is  no  more  than 
that  something  of  which  the  concept  predicates  such  a 
necessity  of  synthesis. 


V 


62      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S    CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

Before  continuing  the  statement  of  the  deduction  it 
becomes  necessary  to  point  out,  and  in  what  follows  to 
keep  in  mind,  two  ways  in  which  Kant  may  be  inter- 
preted, since  Kant  here  seems  to  be  fluctuating  between 
two  positions.*  One  of  the  positions  is  that  the  ground 
of  this  synthesis  is  the  synthetical  unity  of  apperception, 
and  that  objectivity  is  given  as  a  direct  result  of  this 
unity  of  self-consciousness,  that  is,  making  the  synthetic 
process  the  direct  contribution  or  indeed  synonymous 
with  the  synthetical  unity  of  apperception.  The  diffi- 
culty involved  in  this  interpretation  is  that  it  would 
involve  an  assertion  that  we  have  a  knowledge  of  the 
noumenal  conditions  of  the  self,  which  seems  to  be  in- 
consistent with  the  main  body  of  his  teaching,  for  ex- 
ample, the  statements  concerning  the  nature  of  self- 
consciousness  in  the  Paralogisms,  and  inconsistent  with 
his  doctrine  that  the  thing  in  itself  is  unknown,  and  un- 
knowable theoretically,  and  with  his  general  conclusions 
concerning  the  limits  of  knowledge. 

The  other  alternative  interpretation  is  much  less  evi- 
dent, but  at  the  same  time  very  definitely  stated  by  him 
when  he  says  from  time  to  time  that  these  synthetical 
processes  are  expressed  through  the  bhnd  function  of 
imagination,  and  only  thereafter  become  represented 
in  clear  consciousness.  That  is,  that  these  synthetical 
processes  are  absolutely  basal  to  human  consciousness 
and  apprehension,  and  are  processes  which  must  take 

*  Cf.  Andrew  Seth,  Scottish  Philosophy,  pp.  131-49.  Norman 
Kemp  Smith,  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific 
Methods,  Vol.  ix,  pp.   113-28.     T.  H.   Green,   Works,  Vol.  ii, 

pp.  8-10 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  63 

place  before  we  can  have  objects,  and  even  either  con- 
sciousness or  self-consciousness.  This  means  that  Kant 
is  holding  that  these  synthetical  processesarejifipendent 
upon  noumejiaf  conditions  arid^afe"unknown,  but,  when 
he  tries  to  represent  these  synthetical  pr^eise&3^  he  is 
compirfiMTo'3escribe  thenTBymeans  of  analogies  drawn 
from  the  phenomena  of _self-consciousjiess.  Even  though 
these  underlying  synthetical  processes  are  conditions  of 
objects,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  in  order  to  have  a 
known  world  scientifically  organized  these  processes  must 
be  represented  by  concepts  in  consciousness,  and  so 
in  terms  of  consciousness.  These  synthetical  processes 
always  carry  with  them  the  potentiality  of  consciousness, 
and  only  in  so  far  as  they  do  result  in  consciousness, 
do  they  lead  to  a  phenomenal  world  which  is  the  only 
world  that  we  know.  Thus  Kant  shows  that  in  order  to 
have  such  a  world  of  experience  as  we  actually  do  have, 
it  is  necessary  to  presuppose  these  synthetical  processes 
as  a  foundation,  and  furthermore,  in  order  to  reach 
validity  in  objective  relations  it  is  necessary  for  con- 
sciousness to  operate  by  means  of  certain  definite  prin- 
ciples or  categories.  This  carries  us  over  into  the  ob- 
jective deduction. 

Objective  Deduction 

The  manifold  of  representations  may  be  given  in  an 
intuition  which  is  purely  sensuous,  that  is,  nothing  but 
receptivity,  and  the  form  of  that  intuition  may  He  a  priori 
in  our  faculty  of  representation,  without  being  anything 
but  the  manner  in  which  a  subject  is  affected.    But  the 


64      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S    CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

connection  of  anything  manifold  can  never  enter  into 
us  through  the  senses,  and  can  not  be  contained,  there- 
fore, already  in  the  pure  form  of  sensuous  intuition,  for 
it  is  a  spontaneous  act  of  the  power  of  representation; 
and  as,  in  order  to  distinguish  this  from  sensibility,  we 
must  call  it  understanding,  we  see  that  all  connecting, 
whether  we  are  conscious  of  it  or  not,  and  whether  we 
connect  the  manifold  of  intuition  of  several  concepts 
together,  and  again,  whether  that  intuition  be  sensuous 
or  not  sensuous,  is  an  act  of  the  understanding.  This 
act  we  shall  call  by  the  general  name  of  synthesis,  in 
order  to  show  that  we  can  not  represent  to  ourselves  any- 
V  thing  as  connected  in  the  object,  without  having  pre- 
j  viously  connected  it  ourselves,  and  that  of  all  represen- 
tations connection  is  the  only  one  which  can  not  be  given 
through  the  objects,  but  must  be  carried  out  by  the  sub- 
ject itself,  because  it  is  an  act  of  its  spontaneity.  It  can 
be  easily  perceived  that  this  act  must  be  originally  one 
and  the  same  for  every  kind  of  connection,  and  that  its 
dissolution,  that  is,  the  analysis,  which  seems  to  be  its 
opposite,  always  presupposes  it.  For  where  the  under- 
standing has  not  previously  connected,  there  is  nothing 
for  it  to  disconnect,  because,  as  connected,  it  could 
only  be  given  by  the  understanding  to  the  faculty  of 
representation. 

But  the  concept  of  connection  includes,  besides  the 

J    concept  of  the  manifold  and  the  synthesis  of  it,  the 

\    concept  of  the  unity  of  the  manifold  also.    Connection 

\  is  representation  of  the  synthetical  unity  of  the  manifold. 

The  representation  of  that  unity  can  not  therefore  be 

the  result  of  the  connection;  on  th£_£ontrary,  the  concept 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  65 

of  ^tbe-Luimcclloii  bcLoiit€^-£rst^Qssibl£^b;yLthe  represen- 
tation of  unit3^__b£ing  ndHed  tr>  the  rppre^entaban  of 
thfijoianifold.  And  this  unity,  which  precedes  a  priori 
all  concepts  of  connection,  must  not  be  mistaken  for 
the  category  of  unity;  for  all  categories  depend  on  logical 
functions  in  judgments,  and  in  these  we  have  already 
connection,  and  therefore  unity  of  given  concepts.  The 
category,  therefore,  presupposes  connection,  and  we 
must  consequently  look  still  higher  for  this  unity  as 
qualitative,  in  that,  namely,  which  itself  contains  the 
ground  for  the  unity  of  different  concepts  in  judgments, 
that  is,  the  ground  for  the  very  possibiHty  of  the  under- 
standing, even  in  its  logical  employment. 

It  must  be  possible  that  the  /  think  should  accompany 
all  my  representations:  for  otherwise  something  would 
be  represented  within  me  that  could  not  be  thought,  in 
other  words,  the  representation  would  either  be  impos- 
sible or  nothing,  at  least  so  far  as  I  am  concerned.  That 
representation  which  can  be  given  before  all  thought, 
is  called  intuition,  and  all  the  manifold  of  intuition  has 
therefore  a  necessary  relation  to  the  I  think  in  the  same 
subject  in  which  that  manifold  of  intuition  is  found. 
That  representation,  however,  is  an  act  of  spontaneity, 
that  is,  can  not  bej:onsidered  as  belonging  to  sensibiHty. 
Kant  calls  iX^SjM-Jippcrccptior^  in  order  to  distinguish 
it  from  empirical  apperception,  because  it  is  that  self- 
consciousness  which  by  producing  the  representation, 
/  think  (which  must  accompany  all  others,  and  is  one 
and  the  same  in  every  act  of  consciousness),  can  not 
itself  be  accompanied  by  any  other.  He  also  calls  the 
unity  of  it  the  transcendental  unity  of  self-consciousness, 


66      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

in  order  to  indicate  that  it  contains  the  possibility  of 
knowledge  a  priori. 

For  the  manifold  representations  given  in  any  intui- 
tion would  not  be  my  representations,  if  they  did  not 
all  belong  to  one  self-consciousness.  What  he  means  is 
that,  as  my  representations  (even  though  I  am  not 
conscious  of  them  as  such),  they  must  be  in  accordance 
with  that  condition,  under  which  alone  they  can  stand 
together  in  one  common  self-consciousness,  because 
otherwise  they  would  not  all  belong  to  me.  From  this 
original  connection  the  following  important  conclusions 
can  be  deduced. 

H  The  unbroken  identity  of  apperception  of  the  manifold 
that  is  given  in  intuition  contains  a  synthesis  of  represen- 
tations, and  is  possible  only  through  the  consciousness 
of  that  synthesis.  The  empirical  consciousness,  which 
accompanies  various  representations,  is  itself  various 
and  disunited,  and  without  reference  to  the  identity  of 
the  subject.  Such  a  relation  takes  place,  not  by  my 
simply  accompanying  every  relation  with  consciousness, 
but  by  my  adding  one  to  the  other  and  being  conscious 
of  that  act  of  adding,  that  is,  of  that  synthesis.  Only 
because  I  am  able  to  connect  the  manifold  of  given  repre- 
sentations in  one  consciousness,  is  it  possible  for  me  to 
represent  to  myself  the  identity  of  the  consciousness  in 
these  representations,  that  is,  only  under  the  supposition 
of  some  synthetical  unity  of  apperception  does  the 
analytical  unity  of  apperception  become  possible. 

This  analytical  unity  of  consciousness  belongs  to  all 
general  concepts,  as  such.  If,  for  instance,  I  think  red 
in  general,  I  represent  to  myself  a  property,  which  (as  a 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  67 

characteristic  mark)  may  be  found  in  sometliing,  or 
can  be  connected  with  other  representations;  that  is  to 
say,  only  under  a  presupposed  possible  synthetical  unity 
can  I  represent  to  myself  the  analytical.  The  synthetical 
unity  of  apperception  is,  therefore,  the  highest  point 
with  which  all  employment  of  the  understanding,  and 
even  the  whole  of  logic,  and  afterwards  the  whole  of 
transcendental  philosophy,  must  be  connected;  ay,  that 
faculty  is  the  understanding  itself. 

The  thought  that  the  representations  given  in  intui- 
tion belong  all  of  them  to  me,  is  therefore  the  same  as 
that  I  connect  them  in  one  self-consciousness,  or  am  able 
at  least  to  do  so;  and  though  this  is  not  yet  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  synthesis  of  representations,  it  nevertheless 
presupposes  the  possibility  of  this  synthesis.  In  other 
words,  it  is  only  because  I  am  able  to  comprehend  the 
manifold  of  representations  in  one  consciousness,  that 
I  call  them  altogether  my  representations,  for  otherwise, 
I  should  have  as  manifold  and  various  a  self  as  I  have 
representations  of  which  I  am  conscious.  The  syn- 
thetical unity  of  the  manifold  of  intuitions  as  given  a 
priori  is  therefore  the  ground  also  of  the  identity  of  that 
apperception  itself  which  precedes  a  priori  all  definite 
thought. 

The  understanding  in  its  most  general  sense  is  the 
faculty  of  cognitions.  These  consist  in  a  definite  relation 
of  given  representations  to  an  object;  and  an  object  is 
that  in  the  concept  of  which  the  manifold  of  a  given 
intuition  is  connected.  All  such  connection  of  representa- 
tions requires  of  course  the  unity  of  the  consciousness 
in  their  synthesis:  consequently,  the  unity  of  conscious- 


63      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

ness  is  that  which  alone  constitutes  the  relation  of  repre- 
sentations to  an  object,  that  is,  their  objective  validity, 
and  consequently  their  becoming  cognitions,  so  that 
the  very  possibiUty  of  the  understanding  depends  on  it. 

The  first  pure  cognition  of  the  understanding,  there- 
fore, on  wliich  all  the  rest  of  its  employment  is  founded, 
and  which  at  the  same  time  is  entirely  independent  of 
all  conditions  of  sensuous  intuition,  is  this  very  principle 
of  the  original  synthetical  unity  of  apperception.  Space, 
the  mere  form  of  external  sensuous  intuition,  is  not  yet 
cognition:  it  only  supplies  the  manifold  of  intuition  a 
priori  for  a  possible  cognition.  In  order  to  know  any- 
thing in  space,  for  instance,  a  line,  I  must  draw  it,  and 
produce  synthetically  a  certain  connection  of  the  mani- 
fold that  is  given,  so  that  the  unity  of  that  act  is  at  the 
same  time  the  unity  of  the  consciousness  (in  the  concept 
of  a  line),  and  (so  that)  an  object  (a  determinate  space) 
is  then  only  known  for  the  first  time.  The  synthetical 
unity  of  consciousness  is,  therefore,  an  objective  condi- 
tion of  all  knowledge;  a  condition,  not  necessary  for 
myself  only,  in  order  to  know  an  object,  but  one  to  which 
each  intuition  must  be  subject,  in  order  to  become  an 
object  for  me,  because  the  manifold  could  not  become 
connected  in  one  consciousness  in  any  other  way,  and 
without  such  a  synthesis. 

And  yet  this  need  not  be  a  principle  for  every  possible 
understanding,  but  only  for  that  which  gives  nothing 
manifold  through  its  pure  apperception  in  the  represen- 
tation, I  am.  An  understanding  which  through  its  self- 
consciousness  could  give  the  manifold  of  intuition,  and 
by  whose  representation  the  objects  of  that  representa- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  69 

tion  should  at  the  same  time  exist,  would  not  require  a 
special  act  of  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  for  the  unity 
of  its  consciousness,  while  the  human  understanding, 
which  possesses  the  power  of  thought  only,  but  not  of 
intuition,  requires  such  an  act.  To  the  human  under- 
standing that  first  principle  is  so  indispensable  that  it 
really  can  not  form  the  least  concept  of  any  other  possible 
understanding,  whether  it  be  intuitive  by  itself,  or  pos- 
sessed of  a  sensuous  intuition,  different  from  that  in 
space  and  time. 

The  transcendental  unity  of  apperception  connects 
all  the  manifold  given  in  an  intuition  into  a  concept  of 
an  object.  It  is  therefore  called  objective,  and  must  be 
distinguished  from  the  subjective  unity  of  consciousness, 
which  is  a  form  of  the  internal  sense,  by  which  the  mani- 
fold of  intuition  is  empirically  given,  to  be  thus  con- 
nected. Whether  I  can  become  empirically  conscious  of 
the  manifold,  as  either  simultaneous  or  successive,  de- 
pends on  circumstances,  or  empirical  conditions.  The 
empirical  unity  of  consciousness,  therefore,  through  the 
association  of  representations,  is  itself  phenomenal  and 
wholly  contingent,  while  the  pure  form  of  intuition  in 
time,  merely  as  general  intuition  containing  the  manifold 
that  is  given,  is  subject  to  the  original  unity  of  the  con- 
sciousness, through  the  necessary  relation  only  of  the 
manifold  of  intuition  to  the  one,  I  think, — that  is,  through 
the  pure  synthesis  of  the  understanding,  which  forms  the 
a  priori  ground  of  the  empirical  synthesis.  That  unity 
alone  is,  therefore,  valid  objectively;  the  empirical  unity 
of  apperception,  which  we  do  not  consider  here,  and  which 
is  only  derived  from  the  former,  under  given  conditions 


70      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

in  concreto,  has  subjective  validity  only.  One  man  con- 
nects the  representation  of  a  word  with  one  thing,  an- 
other with  another,  and  the  unity  of  consciousness,  with 
regard  to  what  is  empirical,  is  not  necessary  nor  univer- 
sally vahd  with  reference  to  that  which  is  given. 

Kant  proceeds:  If  I  examine  the  relation  of  given 
cognitions  in  every  judgment,  and  distinguish  it,  as 
belonging  to  the  understanding,  from  the  relation  ac- 
cording to  the  rules  of  reproductive  imagination  (which 
has  subjective  vaHdity  only),  I  find  that  a  judgment  is 
nothing  but  the  mode  of  bringing  given  cognitions  into 
the  objective  unity  of  apperception.  This  is  what  is  in- 
tended by  the  copula  is,  which  is  meant  to  distinguish 
the  objective  unity  of  given  representations  from  the 
subjective.  It  (the  copula  is)  indicates  their  relation 
to  the  original  apperception,  and  their  necessary  imity, 
even  though  the  judgment  itself  be  empirical,  and  there- 
fore contingent;  as,  for  instance,  bodies  are  heavy.  By 
this  I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  these  representations 
belong  necessarily  to  each  other,  in  the  empirical  intui- 
tion, but  that  they  belong  to  each  other  by  means  of 
the  necessary  unity  of  apperception  in  the  synthesis  of 
intuitions,  that  is,  according  to  the  principles  of  the  ob- 
jective determination  of  all  representations,  so  far  as 
any  cognition  is  to  arise  from  them,  these  principles 
being  all  derived  from  the  principle  of  the  transcendental 
unity  of  apperception.  Thus,  and  thus  alone,  does  the 
relation  become  a  judgment,  that  is,  a  relation  that  is 
valid  objectively,  and  can  thus  be  kept  sufficiently  dis- 
tinct from  the  relation  of  the  same  representations,  if 
it  has  subjective  vahdity  only,  for  instance,  according 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  7 1 

to  the  laws  of  association.  In  the  latter  case,  I  could 
only  say,  that  if  I  carry  a  body  I  feel  the  pressure  of  its 
weight,  but  not,  that  it,  the  body,  is  heavy,  which  is 
meant  to  say  that  these  two  representations  are  con- 
nected together  in  the  object,  whatever  the  state  of  the 
subject  may  be,  and  not  only  associated  or  conjoined 
in  the  perception,  however  often  it  may  be  repeated. 

The  manifold  which  is  given  us  in  a  sensuous  intuition 
is  necessarily  subject  to  the  original  synthetical  unity 
of  apperception,  because  by  it  alone  the  unity  of  intui- 
tion becomes  possible.  That  act  of  the  understanding, 
further,  by  which  the  manifold  of  given  representations 
(whether  intuitions  or  concepts)  is  brought  under  one 
apperception  in  general,  is  the  logical  function  of  a  judg- 
ment. The  manifold  therefore,  so  far  as  it  is  given  in  an 
empirical  intuition,  is  determined  with  regard  to  one  of 
the  logical  functions  of  judgment,  by  which,  indeed,  it 
is  brought  to  consciousness  in  general.  The  categories, 
however,  are  nothing  but  these  functions  of  judgment, 
so  far  as  the  manifold  of  a  given  intuition  is  determined 
with  respect  to  them.  Therefore  the  manifold  in  any 
given  intuition  is  naturally  subject  to  the  categories. 

The  manifold,  contained  in  an  intuition  which  I  call 
my  own,  is  represented  through  the  synthesis  of  the 
understanding,  as  belonging  to  the  necessary  unity  of 
self-consciousness,  and  this  takes  place  through  the 
category. 

This  category  indicates,  therefore,  that  the  empirical 
consciousness  of  the  manifold,  given  in  any  intuition, 
is  subject  to  a  pure  self-consciousness  a  priori,  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  empirical  intuition  is  subject  to  a 


72      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

pure  sensuous  intuition  which  Hkewise  takes  place  a 
priori. 

In  the  above  proposition  a  beginning  is  made  of  a  de- 
duction of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding.  In 
this  deduction,  as  the  categories  arise  in  the  understand- 
ing only,  independent  of  all  sensibility,  Kant  thinks  he 
ought  not  to  take  any  account  as  yet  of  the  manner  in 
which  the  manifold  is  given  for  an  empirical  intuition, 
but  attend  exclusively  to  the  unity  which,  by  means  of 
the  category,  enters  into  the  intuition  through  the  under- 
standing. In  what  follows  he  proposes  to  show,  from  the 
manner  in  which  the  empirical  intuition  is  given  in  sen- 
sibility, that  its  unity  is  no  other  than  that  which  is 
prescribed  by  the  category  to  the  manifold  of  any  given 
intuition.  Thus  only,  that  is,  by  showing  their  vahdity 
a  priori  with  respect  to  all  objects  of  our  senses,  the 
purpose  of  our  deduction  will  be  fully  attained. 

There  is  one  thing,  however,  of  which,  in  the  above 
demonstration,  Kant  says,  I  could  not  make  abstraction : 
namely,  that  the  manifold  for  an  intuition  must  be  given 
antecedently  to  the  synthesis  of  the  understanding,  and 
independently  of  it; — how,  remains  uncertain.  For  if 
I  were  to  imagine  an  understanding,  itself  intuitive  (for 
instance,  a  divine  understanding,  which  should  not  repre- 
sent to  itself  given  objects,  but  produce  them  at  once  by 
his  representation),  the  categories  would  have  no  mean- 
ing with  respect  to  such  cognition.  They  are  merely  rules 
for  an  understanding  whose  whole  power  consists  in 
thinking,  that  is,  in  the  act  of  bringing  the  synthesis  of 
the  manifold,  which  is  given  to  it  in  intuition  from  else- 
where, to  the  unity  of  apperception;  an  understanding 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  73 

which  therefore  knows  nothing  by  itself,  but  connects 
only  and  arranges  the  material  for  cognition,  that  is, 
the  intuition  which  must  be  given  to  it  by  the  object. 
This  peculiarity  of  our  understanding  of  producing  unity 
of  apperception. a  priori  by  means  of  the  categories  only, 
and  again  by  such  and  so  many,  can  not  be  further  ex- 
plained, any  more  than  why  time  and  space  are  the  only 
forms  of  a  possible  intuition  for  us. 

We  have  seen  that  to  think  an  object  is  not  the  same 
g,s^to  know~an_QbjecL  ETorder  to  know  an  object,  we  -, 
must  have  the  concept  by  which  any  object  is  thought 
(the  category),  and  likewise  the  intuition  by  which  it 
is  given.  If  no  corresponding  intuition  could  be  given 
to  a  concept,  it  w^ould  still  be  a  thought,  so  far  as  its  form 
is  concerned:  but  it  would  be  without  an  object,  and  no 
knowledge  of  anything  would  be  possible  by  it,  because, 
so  far  as  I  know,  there  would  be  nothing,  and  there  could 
be  nothing,  to  which  my  thought  could  be  referred.  Now 
the  only  possible  intuition  for  us  is  sensuous;  the  thought 
of  any  object,  therefore,  by  means  of  a  pure  concept 
of  the  understanding,  can  with  us  become  knowledge 
only,  if  it  is  referred  to  objects  of  the  senses.  Sensuous 
intuition  is  either  pure  (space  and  time),  or  empirical, 
that  is,  if  it  is  an  intuition  of  that  which  is  represented  in 
space  and  time,  through  sensation  as  immediately  real.  \/ 
By  means  of  pure  intuition  we  can  gain  knowledge  a  priori 
of  things  as  phenomena  (in  mathematics),  but  only  so 
far  as  their  form  is  concerned;  but  whether  there  are 
things  which  must  be  perceived,  according  to  that  form, 
remains  unsettled.  I\Iathcmatical  concepts,  by  them--!  / 
selves,  therefore,  are  not  yet  knavvlcHge7~SFccpininder 


74      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  supposition  that  there  are  things  which  admit  of 
being  represented  by  us,  according  to  the  form  of  that 
pure  sensuous  intuition  only.  Consequently,  as  things 
in  space  and  time  are  only  given  as  perceptions  (as  repre- 
sentations accompanied  by  sensations),  that  is,  through 
empirical  representations,  the  pure  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing, even  if  appHed  to  intuitions  a  priori,  as  in 
mathematics,  give  us  knowledge  in  so  far  only  as  these 
pure  intuitions,  and  therefore  through  them  the  concepts 
of  the  understanding  also,  can  be  applied  to  empirical 
intuitions.  Consequently  the  categories,  by  means  of 
intuition,  do  not  give  us  any  knowledge  of  things,  except 
under  the  supposition  of  their  possible  application  to 
eigpirical  intuition;  they  serve,  in  short,  for  thejpo^sibihty 
of  empirical.liiaz£iWg€--onl^ 

From  this  it  follows  that  the  categories  admit  of  no  other 
employment  for  the  cognition  of  things,  except  so  far 
only  as  these  are  taken  as  objects  of  possible  experience. 
The  foregoing  proposition  is  of  the  greatest  importance, 
for  it  determines  the  Hmits  of  the  employment  of  the 
pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  with  reference  to 
objects,  in  the  same  manner  as  the  transcendental 
iEsthetic  determined  the  limits  of  the  employment  of 
the  pure  form  of  our  sensuous  intuition.  Space  and  time 
are  conditions  of  the  possibiHty  of  how  objects  can  be 
given  to  us,  so  far  only  as  objects  of  the  senses,  therefore 
of  experience,  are  concerned.  Beyond  these  limits  they 
represent  nothing,  for  they  belong  only  to  the  senses, 
and  have  no  reality  beyond  them.  Pure  concepts  of  the 
understanding  are  free  from  this  limitation,  and  extend 
to  objects  of  intuition  in  general,  whether  that  intui- 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  75 

tion  be  like  our  own  or  not,  if  only  it  is  sensuous  and 
not  intellectual.  This  further  extension,  however,  of 
concepts  beyond  our  sensuous  intuition,  is  of  no  avail 
to  us;  for  they  are  in  that  case  empty  concepts  of  objects, 
and  the  concepts  do  not  even  enable  us  to  say,  whether 
such  objects  be  possible  or  not.  They  are  mere  forms 
of  thought,  without  objective  reality:  because  we  have 
no  intuition  at  hand  to  which  the  synthetical  unity  of 
apperception,  which  is  contained  in  the  concepts  alone, 
could  be  applied,  so  that  they  might  determine  an  object. 
Nothing  can  give  them  sense  and  meaning,  except  our 
sensuous  and  empirical  intuition. 

If,  therefore,  we  assume  an  object  of  a  non-sensuous  in- 
tuition as  given,  we  may,  no  doubt,  determine  it  through 
all  the  predicates,  which  follow  from  the  supposition  that 
nothing  belonging  to  sensuous  ijituition  belongs  to  it,  that, 
therefore,  it  is  not  extended,  or  not  in  space,  that  its 
duration  is  not  time,  that  no  change  (succession  of  de- 
terminations in  time)  is  to  be  met  in  it,  etc.  But  we  can 
hardly  call  this  knowledge,  if  w^e  only  indicate  how  the 
intuition  of  an  object  is  not,  without  being  able  to  say 
what  is  contained  in  it,  for,  in  that  case,  I  have  not  repre- 
sented the  possibility  of  an  object,  corresponding  to  my 
pure  concept  of  the  understanding,  because  I  could  give 
no  intuition  corresponding  to  it,  but  could  only  say  that 
our  intuition  did  not  apply  to  it.  But  what  is  the  most 
important  is  this,  that  not  even  a  single  category  could 
be  applied  to  such  a  thing;  as,  for  instance,  the  concept 
of  substance,  that  is,  of  something  that  can  exist  as  a 
subject  only,  but  never  as  a  mere  predicate.  For  I  do 
not  know  whether  there  can  be  anything  corresponding 


76      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

to  such  a  determination  of  thought,  unless  empirical 
intuition  supplies  the  case  for  its  appHcation. 

The  pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  refer,  through 
the  mere  understanding,  to  objects  of  intuition,  whether 
it  be  our  own,  or  any  other,  if  only  sensuous  intuition, 
but  they  are,  for  that  very  reason,  mere  forms  of  thought, 
by  which  no  definite  object  can  be  known.  The  syn- 
thesis, or  connection  of  the  manifold  in  them,  referred 
only  to  the  unity  of  apperception,  and  became  thus  the 
ground  of  the  possibiUty  of  knowledge  a  priori,  so  far 
as  it  rests  on  the  understanding,  and  is  therefore  not 
only  transcendental,  but  also  purely  intellectual.  Now 
as  there  exists  in  us  a  certain  form  of  sensuous  intuition 
a  priori,  which  rests  on  the  receptivity  of  the  faculty 
of  representation,  the  understanding,  as  spontaneity, 
is  able  to  determine  the  internal  sense  through  the 
manifold  of  given  representations,  according  to  the 
synthetical  unity  of  apperception,  and  can  thus  think 
synthetical  unity  of  the  apperception  of  the  manifold 
of  sensuous  intuition  a  priori,  as  the  condition  to  which 
all  objects  of  our  intuition  must  necessarily  be  subject. 
Thus  the  categories,  though  pure  forms  of  thought, 
receive  objective  reality,  that  is,  application  to  objects 
which  can  be  given  to  us  in  intuition,  but  as  phenomena 
only;  for  it  is  with  reference  to  them  alone  that  we  are 
capable  of  intuition  a  priori. 

This  synthesis  of  the  manifold  of  sensuous  intuition, 
which  is  possible  and  necessary  a  priori,  may  be  called 
figurative  {synthesis  speciosa),  in  order  to  distinguish  it 
from  that  which  is  thought  in  the  mere  category,  with 
reference  to  the  manifold  of  an  intuition  in  general,  and 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  77 

is  called  intellectual  synthesis  (synthesis  intellectualis) . 
Both  are  transcendental,  not  only  because  they  them- 
selves are  carried  out  a  priori,  but  because  they  establish 
also  the  possibility  of  other  knowledge  a  priori. 

But  this  figurative  synthesis,  if  it  refers  to  the  original 
synthetical  unity  of  apperception  only,  that  is,  to  that 
transcendental  unity  which  is  thought  in  the  categories, 
must  be  called  the  transcendental  synthesis  of  the  faculty 
of  imagination,  in  order  thus  to  distinguish  it  from  the 
purely  intellectual  synthesis.  Imagination  is  the  faculty 
of  representing  an  object^e^^fn  imfhoiU-  iff  pyr'^rnre  in 
intuition.  As  all  our  intuition  is  sensuous,  the  faculty  ,  .<?.  , 
of  imagination  belongs,  on  account  of  the  subjective  ^  j^^"^ 
condition  under  which  alone  it  can  give  a  corresponding  ~^  j 
intuition  to  the  concepts  of  the  understanding,  to  our 
sensibility.  As,  however,  its  synthesis  is  an  act  of  spon- 
taneity, determining,  and  not,  like  the_  senses,  iieter- 
minabl£_only,  and  therefore  able  to  determine  a  priori 
the  senses,  so  far  as  their  form  is  concerned,  according 
to  the  unity  of  apperception,  the  faculty  of  imagination 
is,  so  far,  a  faculty  of  determining  our  sensibility  a  priori, 
so  that  the  synthesis  of  the  intuitions,  according  to  the 
categories,  must  be  the  transcendental  synthesis  of  the 
faculty  of  imagination.  This  is  an  effect,  produced  by 
the  understanding  on  our  sensibihty,  and  the  first  appli- 
cation of  it  (and  at  the  same  time  the  ground  of  all  others) 
to  objects  of  the  intuition  which  is  only  possible  to  us. 
As  figurative,  it  is  distinguished  from  the  intellectual 
synthesis,  which  takes  place  by  the  understanding  only, 
without  the  aid  of  the  faculty  of  imagination.  In  so 
far  as  imagination  is  spontaneity,  Kant  calls  it,  occa- 


78      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT'S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

sionally,  productive  imagination:  distinguishing  it  from 
the  reproductive,  which  in  its  synthesis  is  subject  to  em- 
pirical laws  only,  namely,  those  of  association,  and  which 
is  of  no  help  for  the  explanation  of  the  possibility  of 
knowledge  a  priori,  belonging,  therefore,  to  psychology, 
and  not  to  transcendental  philosophy. 

This  is  the  proper  place  for  trying  to  account  for  the 
paradox,  which  must  have  struck  everybody  in  the 
exposition  of  the  form  of  the  internal  sense;  namely, 
how  that  sense  represents  to  the  consciousness  even 
ourselves,  not  as  we  are  in  ourselves,  but  as  we  appear 
to  ourselves,  because  we  perceive  ourselves  only  as  we 
are  affected  internally.  This  seems  to  be  contradictory, 
because  we  should  thus  be  in  a  passive  relation  to  our- 
selves; and  for  this  reason  the  founders  of  the  systems  of 
psychology  have  preferred  to  represent  the  internal  sense 
as  identical  with  the  faculty  of  apperception^  while  we 
have  carefully  distinguished  the  two. 

What  determines  the  internal  sense  is  the  understand- 
ing, and  its  original  power  of  connecting  the  manifold 
of  intuition,  that  is,  of  bringing  it  under  one  appercep- 
tion, this  being  the  very  ground  of  the  possibility  of  the 
understanding.  As  in  us  men  the  understanding  is  not 
itself  an  intuitive  faculty,  and  could  not,  even  if  intui- 
tions were  given  in  our  sensibility,  take  them  into  itself, 
in  order  to  connect,  as  it  were,  the  manifold  of  its  own 
intuition,  the  synthesis  of  the  understanding,  if  con- 
sidered by  itself  alone,  is  nothing  but  the  unity  of  action, 
of  which  it  is  conscious  without  sensibility  also,  but 
through  which  the  understanding  is  able  to  determine 
that  sensibility  internally,  with  respect  to  the  manifold 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  79 

which  may  be  given  to  it  (the  understanding)  according 
to  the  form  of  its  intuition.  The  understanding,  there- 
fore, exercises  its  activity,  under  the  name  of  a  tran- 
scendental synthesis  of  the  faculty  of  imagination,  on  the 
passive  subject  to  which  it  belongs  as  a  faculty,  and  we 
are  right  in  saying  that  the  internal  sense  is  affected  by 
that  activity.  The  apperception  with  its  synthetical 
unity  is  so  far  from  being  identical  with  the  internal 
sense,  that,  as  the  source  of  all  synthesis,  it  rather  apphes, 
under  the  name  of  the  categories,  to  the  manifold  of 
intuitions  in  general,  that  is,  to  objects  in  general  before 
all  sensuous  intuition;  while  the  internal  sense,  on  the 
contrary,  contains  the  mere  form  of  intuition,  but  with- 
out any  connection  of  the  manifold  in  it,  and  therefore, 
as  yet,  no  definite  intuition,  which  becomes  possible 
only  through  the  consciousness  of  the  determination 
of  the  internal  sense  by  the  transcendental  act  of  the 
faculty  of  imagination  (the  synthetical  influence  of  the 
understanding  on  the  internal  sense)  which  I  have  called 
the  figurative  synthesis. 

This  we  can  always  perceive  in  ourselves.  We  can 
not  think  a  line  without  drawing  it  in  thought;  we  can 
not  think  a  circle  without  describing  it;  we  can  not  repre- 
sent, at  all,  the  three  dimensions  of  space,  without  plac- 
ing, from  the  same  point,  three  lines  perpendicularly  on 
each  other;  nay,  we  can  not  even  represent  time,  except 
by  attending,  during  our  drawing  sl  straight  line  (which 
is  meant  to  be  the  external  figurative  representation  of 
time)  to  the  act  of  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  only  by 
which  we  successively  determine  the  internal  sense,  and 
thereby  to  the  succession  of  that  determination  in  it. 


8o      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

It  is  really  motion,  as  the  act  of  the  subject  (not  as  the 
determination  of  an  object),  therefore  the  synthesis  of 
the  manifold  in  space  (abstraction  being  made  of  space, 
and  our  attention  fixed  on  the  act  only  by  which  we 
determine  the  internal  sense,  according  to  its  form), 
which  first  produces  the  very  concept  of  succession.  The 
understanding  does  not,  therefore,  find  in  the  internal 
sense  such  a  connection  of  the  manifold,  but  produces  it 
by  affecting  the  internal  sense.  It  may  seem  difficult 
to  understand  how  the  thinking  ego  can  be  different  from 
the  ego  which  sees  or  perceives  itself  (other  modes  of 
intuition  being  at  least  conceivable),  and  yet  identical 
with  the  latter  as  the  same  subject,  and  how,  therefore, 
I  can  say:  I,  as  intelligence  and  thinking  subject,  know 
myself  as  an  object  thought  so  far  as  being  given  to  myself 
in  intuition  also,  but  like  other  phenomena,  not  as  I  am 
to  the  understanding,  but  only  as  I  appear  to  myself. 
In  reality,  however,  this  is  neither  more  nor  less  difficult 
than  how  I  can  be,  to  myself,  an  object,  and,  more  es- 
pecially, an  object  of  intuition  and  of  internal  percep- 
tions. But  that  this  must  really  be  so,  can  clearly  be 
shown — if  only  we  admit  space  to  be  merely  a  pure  form 
of  the  phenomena  of  the  external  senses — by  the  fact 
that  we  can  not  represent  to  ourselves  time,  which  is 
no  object  of  external  intuition,  in  any  other  way  than 
under  the  image  of  a  line  which  we  draw,  a  mode  of 
representation  without  which  we  could  not  realize  the 
unity  of  its  dimension;  or  again  by  this  other  fact  that 
we  must  always  derive  the  determination  of  the  length 
of  time,  or  of  points  of  time  for  all  our  internal  percep- 
tions, from  that  which  is  represented  to  us  as  changeable 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  8 1 

by  external  things,  and  have,  therefore,  to  arrange  the 
determinations  of  the  internal  sense  as  phenomena  in 
time,  in  exactly  the  same  way  in  which  we  arrange  the 
determinations  of  the  external  senses  in  space.  If,  then, 
with  regard  to  the  latter,  we  admit  that  by  them  we 
know  objects  so  far  only  as  we  are  affected  externally, 
we  must  also  admit,  with  regard  to  the  internal  sense, 
that  by  it  we  only  are,  or  perceive  ourselves,  as  we  are  in- 
ternally affected  by  ourselves;  in  other  words,  that  with 
regard  to  internal  intuition  we  know  our  own  self  as  a 
phenomenon  only,  and  not  as  it  is  by  itself. 

In  the  transcendental  synthesis,  however,  of  the 
manifold  of  representations  in  general,  and  therefore  in 
the  original  synthetical  unity  of  apperception,  I  am 
conscious  of  myself,  neither  as  I  appear  to  myself,  nor 
as  I  am  in  myself,  but  only  that  I  am.  This  representa- 
tion is  an  act  of  thought,  not  of  intuition.  Now,  in  order 
to  know  ourselves,  we  require,  besides  the  act  of  think- 
ing, which  brings  the  manifold  of  every  possible  intuition 
to  the  unity  of  apperception,  a  definite  kind  of  intuition 
also  by  which  that  manifold  is  given,  and  thus,  though 
my  own  existence  is  not  phenomenal  (much  less  a  mere 
illusion),  yet  the  determination  of  my  existence  can  only 
take  place  according  to  the  form  of  the  internal  sense, 
and  in  that  special  manner  in  which  the  manifold,  which 
I  connect,  is  given  in  the  internal  intuition.  This  shows 
that  I  have  no  knowledge  of  myself  as  I  am,  but  only  as 
I  appear  to  myself.  The  consciousness  of  oneself  is 
therefore  very  far  from  being  a  knowledge  of  oneself,  in 
Spite  of  all  the  categories  which  constitute  the  thinking 
of  an  object  in  general,  by  means  of  the  connection  of  the 


82      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

manifold  in  an  apperception.  As  for  the  knowledge  of 
an  object  different  from  myself  I  require,  besides  the 
thinking  of  an  object  in  general  (in  a  category),  an 
intuition  also,  to  determine  that  general  concept,  I  re- 
quire for  the  knowledge  of  my  own  self,  besides  con- 
sciousness, or  besides  my  thinking  myself,  an  intuition 
also  of  the  manifold  in  me,  to  determine  that  thought. 
I  exist,  therefore,  as  such  an  intelhgence,  which  is  sim- 
ply conscious  of  its  power  of  connection,  but  with  re- 
spect to  the  manifold  that  has  to  be  connected,  is  sub- 
ject to  a  limiting  condition  which  is  called  the  internal 
sense,  according  to  which  that  connection  can  only  be- 
come perceptible  in  relations  of  time,  which  lie  entirely 
outside  the  concepts  of  the  understanding.  Such  an  in- 
telligence, therefore,  can  only  know  itself  as  it  appears 
to  itself  in  an  intuition  (which  can  not  be  intellectual  and 
given  by  the  understanding  itself),  and  not  as  it  would 
know  itself,  if  its  intuition  were  intellectual. 

In  the  metaphysical  deduction  of  the  categories  their 
a  priori  origin  was  proved  by  their  complete  accordance 
with  the  general  logical  functions  of  thought,  while  in 
their  transcendental  deduction .  Kant  established  their 
possibility  as  knowledge  a  priori  of  objects  of  an  intui- 
tion in  general.  Now  he  has  to  explain  the  possibility 
of  our  knowing  a  priori,  by  means  of  the  categories, 
whatever  objects  may  come  before  our  senses,  and  this 
not  according  to  the  form  of  their  intuition,  but  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  their  connection,  and  of  our  thus  pre- 
scribing laws  to  nature,  nay,  making  nature  possible. 
Unless  they  were  adequate  to  that  purpose,  we  could 
not  understand  how  everything  that  may  come  before 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  83 

our  senses  must  be  subject  to  laws  which  have  their 
origin  a  priori  in  the  understanding  alone. 

First  of  all,  Kant  observes  that  by  the  synthesis  of 
apprehension  he  understands  the  connection  of  the  mani- 
fold in  an  empirical  intuition,  by  which  perception,  that 
is,  empirical  consciousness  of  it  (as  phenomenal),  be- 
comes possible. 

We  have  forms  of  the  external  as  well  as  the  internal 
intuition  a  priori,  in  our  representations  of  space  and 
time:  and  to  these  the  synthesis  of  the  apprehension  of 
the  manifold  in  phenomena  must  always  conform,  be- 
cause it  can  take  place  according  to  that  form  only. 
Time  and  space,  however,  are  represented  a  priori,  not 
only  as  forms  of  sensuous  intuition,  but  as  intuitions 
themselves  (containing  a  manifold),  and  therefore  with 
the  determination  of  the  unity  of  that  manifold  in  them.* 
Therefore  unity  of  the  synthesis  of  the  manifold  without 
or  within  us,  and  consequently  a  connection  to  which 
everything  that  is  to  be  represented  as  determined  in 

*  Kant's  note:  Space,  represented  as  an  object  (as  required  in 
geometry),  contains  more  than  the  mere  form  of  intuition,  namely, 
the  comprehension  of  the  manifold,  which  is  given  according  to  the 
form  of  sensibility,  into  a  perceptible  (intuitable)  representation,  so 
that  the  form  of  intuition  gives  the  manifold  only,  while  the 
formal  intuition  gives  unity  of  representation.  In  the  ^Esthetic 
I  had  simply  ascribed  this  unity  to  sensibiHty,  in  order  to  show 
that  it  precedes  all  concepts,  though  it  presupposes  a  synthesis 
not  belonging  to  the  senses,  and  by  which  all  concepts  of  space 
and  time  become  first  possible.  For  as  by  that  synthesis  (the 
understanding  determining  the  sensibility)  space  and  time  are 
first  given  as  intuitions,  the  unity  of  that  intuition  a  priori  belongs 
to  space  and  time,  and  not  to  the  concept  of  the  undcrstand- 
in;z. 


84      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

space  and  time  must  conform,  is  given  a  priori  as  the 
condition  of  the  synthesis  of  all  apprehension  simul- 
taneously with  the  intuitions,  not  in  them,  and  that 
synthetical  unity  can  be  no  other  but  that  of  the  con- 
nection of  the  manifold  of  any  intuition  whatsoever  in  an 
original  consciousness,  according  to  the  categories,  only 
applied  to  our  sensuous  intuition.  Consequently,  all 
synthesis,  without  which  even  perception  would  be  im- 
possible, is  subject  to  the  categories;  and  as  experience 
consists  of  knowledge  by  means  of  connected  perceptions, 
the  categories  are  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  ex- 
perience, and  valid  therefore  a  priori  also  for  all  objects 
of  experience. 

If,  for  instance,  I  raise  the  empirical  intuition  of  a 
house,  through  the  apprehension  of  the  manifold  con- 
tained therein,  into  a  perception,  the  necessary  unity  of 
space  and  of  external  sensuous  intuition  in  general  is 
presupposed,  and  I  draw,  as  it  were,  the  shape  of  the 
house  according  to  that  synthetical  unity  of  the  manifold 
in  space.  But  this  very  synthetical  unity,  if  I  make 
abstraction  of  the  form  of  space,  has  its  seat  in  the 
understanding,  and  is  in  fact  the  category  of  the  synthesis 
of  the  homogeneous  in  intuition  in  general:  that  is,  the 
category  of  quantity,  to  which  that  synthesis  of  appre- 
hension, that  is,  the  perception,  must  always  conform.* 

*  Kant's  note:  In  this  manner  it  is  proved  that  the  synthesis  of 
apprehension,  which  is  empirical,  must  necessarily  conform  to  the 
synthesis  of  apperception,  which  is  intellectual,  and  contained  in 
the  category  entirely  a  priori.  It  is  one  and  the  same  spontaneity, 
which  there,  under  the  name  of  imagination,  and  here,  under  the 
name  of  understanding,  brings  connection  into  the  manifold  of  in- 
tuition. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  85 

Or  if,  to  take  another  example,  I  perceive  the  freezing 
of  water,  I  apprehend  two  states  (that  of  fluidity  and 
that  of  solidity),  and  these  as  standing  to  each  other  in 
a  relation  of  time.  But  in  the  time,  which  as  internal 
intuition  I  make  the  foundation  of  the  phenomenon,  I 
represent  to  myself  necessarily  synthetical  unity  of  the 
manifold,  without  which  that  relation  could  not  be 
given  as  determined  in  an  intuition  (with  reference  to  the 
succession  of  time).  That  synthetical  unity,  however,  as 
a  condition  a  priori,  under  which  I  connect  the  manifold 
of  any  intuition,  turns  out  to  be,  if  I  make  abstraction 
of  the  permanent  form  of  my  intuition,  namely,  of  time, 
the  category  of  cause,  through  which,  if  I  apply  it  to  my 
sensibility,  I  determine  everything  that  happens,  according 
to  its  relation  in  time.  Thus  the  apprehension  in  such 
an  event,  and  that  event  itself  considered  as  a  possible 
perception,  is  subject  to  the  concept  of  the  relation  of 
cause  and  ejffect.    The  same  applies  to  all  other  cases. 

Categories  are  concepts  which  a  priori  prescribe  laws 
to  all  phenomena,  and  therefore  to  nature  as  the  sum 
total  of  all  phenomena  (natura  materialiter  spectata) .  The 
question  therefore  arises,  as  these  laws  are  not  derived 
from  nature,  nor  conform  to  it  as  their  model  (in  which 
case  they  would  be  empirical  only),  how  we  can  under- 
stand that  nature  should  conform  to  them,  that  is,  how 
they  can  determine  a  priori  the  connection  of  the  mani- 
fold in  nature,  without  taking  that  connection  from 
nature.    The  solution  of  that  riddle  is  this. 

It  is  no  more  surprising  that  the  laws  of  phenomena  in 
nature  must  agree  with  the  understanding  and  its  form 
a  priori,  that  is,  with  its  power  of  C07inccting  the  mani- 


86      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

fold  in  general,  than  that  the  phenomena  themselves 
must  agree  with  the  form  of  sensuous  intuition  a  priori. 
For  laws  exist  as  little  in  phenomena  themselves,  but 
relatively  only,  with  respect  to  the  subject  to  which, 
so  far  as  it  has  understanding,  the  phenomena  belong, 
as  phenomena  exist  in  themselves,  but  relatively  only, 
with  respect  to  the  same  being  so  far  as  it  has  senses. 
Things  in  themselves  would  necessarily  possess  their 
conformity  to  the  law,  independent  also  of  any  under- 
standing by  which  they  are  known.  But  phenomena  are 
only  representations  of  things,  unknown  as  to  what  they 
may  be  in  themselves.  As  mere  representations  they 
are  subject  to  no  law  of  connection,  except  that  which 
is  prescribed  by  the  connecting  faculty.  Now  that 
which  connects  the  manifold  of  sensuous  intuition  is  the 
faculty  of  imagination,  which  receives  from  the  under- 
standing the  unity  of  its  intellectual  synthesis,  and  from 
sensibihty  the  manifoldness  of  apprehension.  Thus, 
as  all  possible  perceptions  depend  on  the  synthesis  of 
apprehension,  and  that  synthesis  itself,  that  empirical 
synthesis,  depends  on  the  transcendental,  and,  there- 
fore, on  the  categories,  it  follows  that  all  possible  per- 
ceptions, everything  in  fact  that  can  come  to  the  empiri- 
cal consciousness,  that  is,  all  phenomena  of  nature, 
must,  so  far  as  their  connection  is  concerned,  be  subject 
to  the  categories.  On  these  categories,  therefore,  nature 
(considered  as  nature  in  general)  depends,  as  on  the 
original  ground  of  its  necessary  conformity  to  law  (as 
natura  formaliter  speclata).  Beyond  the  laws,  on  which 
nature  in  general,  as  a  lawful  order  of  phenomena  in 
space  and  time  depends,  the  pure  faculty  of  the  under- 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  87 

standing  is  incapable  of  prescribing  a  priori,  by  means 
of  mere  categories,  laws  to  phenomena.  Special  laws, 
therefore,  as  they  refer  to  phenomena  which  are  em- 
pirically determined,  can  not  be  completely  derived  from 
the  categories,  although  they  are  all  subject  to  them. 
Experience  must  be  superadded  in  order  to  know  such 
special  laws:  while  those  other  a  priori  laws  inform  us 
only  with  regard  to  experience  in  general,  and  what  can 
be  known  as  an  object  of  it. 

We  can  not  thi7ik  any  object  except  by  means  of  the 
categories;  we  can  not  know  any  object  that  has  been 
thought,  except  by  means  of  intuitions,  corresponding 
to  those  concepts.  Now  all  our  intuitions  are  sensuous, 
and  this  knowledge,  so  far  as  its  object  is  given,  is  em- 
pirical. But  empirical  knowledge  is  experience,  and 
therefore  no  knowledge  a  priori  is  possible  to  us,  except 
of  objects  of  possible  experience  alone. 

This  knowledge,  however,  though  limited  to  objects 
of  experience,  is  not,  therefore,  entirely  derived  from 
experience,  for  both  the  pure  intuitions  and  the  pure 
concepts  of  the  understanding  are  elements  of  knowledge 
which  exist  in  us  a  priori.  Now  there  are  only  two  ways 
in  which  a  necessary  harmony  of  experience  with  the 
concepts  of  its  objects  can  be  conceived;  either  experience 
makes  these  concepts  possible,  or  these  concepts  make 
experience  possible.  The  former  will  not  hold  good  with 
respect  to  the  categories  (nor  with  pure  sensuous  intui- 
tion), for  they  are  concepts  a  priori,  and  therefore  inde- 
pendent of  experience.  To  ascribe  to  them  an  empirical 
origin,  would  be  to  admit  a  kind  of  generatio  ccquivoca. 
There  remains,  therefore,  the  second  alternative  only 


88      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

(a  kind  of  system  of  the  epigenesis  of  pure  reason), 
namely,  that  the  categories,  on  the  part  of  the  under- 
standing, contain  the  grounds  of  the  possibility  of  all 
experience  in  general.  How  they  render  experience  pos- 
sible, and  what  principles  of  the  possibility  of  experience 
they  supply  in  their  employment  on  phenomena,  will 
be  shown  more  fully  in  the  following  chapter  on  the 
transcendental  employment  of  the  faculty  of  judgment. 
Some  one  might  propose  to  adopt  a  middle  way  be- 
tween the  two,  namely,  that  the  categories  are  neither 
self-produced  first  principles  a  priori  of  our  knowledge, 
nor  derived  from  experience,  but  subjective  dispositions 
of  thought,  implanted  in  us  with  our  existence,  and  so 
arranged  by  our  Creator  that  their  employment  should 
accurately  agree  with  the  laws  of  nature,  which  deter- 
mine experience  (a  kind  of  system  of  preformation  of  pure 
reason).  But,  in  that  case,  not  only  would  there  be  no 
end  of  such  an  hypothesis,  so  that  no  one  could  know 
how  far  the  supposition  of  predetermined  dispositions 
to  future  judgments  might  be  carried,  but  there  is  this 
r  j  decided  objection  against  that  middle  course  that,  by 
W^  j  adopting  it,  the  categories  would  lose  that  necessity 
which  is  essential  to  them.  Thus  the  concept  of  cause, 
which  asserts,  under  a  presupposed  condition,  the  neces- 
sity of  an  effect,  would  become  false,  if  it  rested  only  on 
some  subjective  necessity  implanted  in  us  of  connecting 
jjT^  certain  empirical  representations  according  to  the  rule 
\  ^^^A  of  causal  relation.  I  should  not  be  able  to  say  that  the 
J  effect  is  connected  with  the  cause  in  the  object  (that  is, 

jL^-l^      by  necessity),  but  only,  I  am  so  constituted  that  I  can 
'  \  ,^    not  think  these  representations  as  connected  in  any 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  89 

other  way.  This  is  exactly  what  the  sceptic  most  de- 
sires, for  in  that  case  all  our  knowledge,  resting  on  the 
supposed  objective  validity  of  our  judgments,  is  nothing 
but  mere  illusion,  nor  would  there  be  wanting  people  to 
say  they  know  nothing  of  such  subjective  necessity 
(which  can  only  be  felt) ;  and  at  all  events  we  could  not 
quarrel  with  anybody  about  what  depends  only  on  the 
manner  in  which  his  own  subject  is  organized. 

The  deduction  of  the  pure  concepts  of  the  understand- 
ing (and  with  them  of  all  theoretical  knowledge  a  priori) 
consists  in  representing  them  as  principles  of  the  possi- 
bility of  experience,  and  in  representing  experience  as 
the  determination  of  phenomena  in  space  and  time, — 
and,  lastly,  in  representing  that  determination  as  de- 
pending on  the  principle  of  the  original  synthetical 
unity  of  apperception,  as  the  form  of  the  understanding, 
applied  to  space  and  time,  as  the  original  forms  of  sensi- 
bihty. 

In  this  deduction  Kant  shows  that  categories  as  forms 
of  synthesis  must  be  presupposed  in  order  to  explain  the 
consciousness  of  a  world  of  objects.  It  is  obvious,  fur- 
thermore, that  it  is  impossible  to  have  self-consciousness 
without  a  connected  consciousness  of  objects.  No  ma- 
terial elements  can  be  present  to  me  as  recognized  parts 
of  my  consciousness  unless  they  are  capable  of  being 
united  with  the  other  parts  of  my  consciousness  as  ele- 
ments in  the  consciousness  of  an  objective  world.  This 
means  that  nothing  can  be  an  object  for  a  self  without 
conforming  to  the  conditions  of  self-consciousness.  Any- 
thing that  we  are  ever  able  to  know,  therefore,  must  be 


V 


go      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

known  in  such  a  way  that  self-consciousness,  the  con- 
sciousness of  a  self  in  relation  to  all  its  objects,  shall  be 
possible.  Even  though  perceptions  of  objects  precede 
such  self-consciousness,  it  still  remains  true  that  they 
must  conform  to  this  requirement.  From  this  point  of 
view,  we  see  why  it  is  possible  to  say  that  the  unity  of 
self  must  be  taken  as  a  pre-condition  of  all  experience. 
This  enables  us  to  say  that  the  manifold  of  perception 
must  be  present  to  one  subject  in  such  a  way  as  to  make 
possible  the  consciousness  of  one  self  in  relation  to  that 
manifold.  Even  supposing  perceptions  to  be  given  prior 
to,  and  independent  of  the  consciousness  of  self  with 
its  principles  for  the  determination  of  objects,  it  is  never- 
theless true  that  there  must  be  a  pre-estabHshed  harmony 
between  perceptions  and  the  principles  of  consciousness. 
This  implies  that  sense  perceptions  conform  to  certain 
synthetic  principles  and  that  the  conscious  application 
of  these  synthetic  principles  results  in  the  consciousness 
of  an  objective  order,  the  correlative  of  self-consciousness. 
Thus  the  principles  or  categories  involved  in  such  an 
objective  world  are  justified.* 

How  are  we  to  understand  the  objective  deduction 
in  which  Kant  justifies  the  categories  by  asserting  that 
without  them  nature  and  conscious  experience  as  we 
know  them  would  be  impossible?  Perhaps  we  can  state 
the  matter  in  this  way.  Reflective  scientific  conscious- 
ness arises  out  of  unreflective  and  unscientific  conscious- 
ness. It  gives  a  validity  and  necessity  which  was  pre- 
viously lacking.  But  it  develops  out  of  the  other  as  a 
natural  outgrowth.  The  conditions  were  all  there  though 
*  E.  Caird,  The  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant,  Vol.  I,  pp.  347,  ff. 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  9 1 

consciousness  was  not  fully  aware  of  the  fact.  There 
are  synthetic  principles  in  phenomena  as  the  necessary 
ground  of  their  existence  as  phenomena,  and  these  neces- 
sary principles  are  similar  to  the  categories.  In  other 
words,  experience,  objective  and  subjective,  impUes 
principles  of  synthesis  or  of  connection  in  all  its  parts. 
External  experience  means  objects  related  to  each  other 
and  this  conditions  and  is  conditioned  by  the  unity  of 
consciousness.  The  two  poles  of  experience  are  or- 
ganically connected.  This  is  the  point  of  departure 
from  which  reflective  experience  arises  and  upon  which 
it  is  based.  The  grounds  of  necessity  and  validity  are 
already  present  in  the  starting  point,  but  man  is  not 
fully  conscious  of  all  this,  even  though  he  more  or  less 
instinctively  turns  to  objective  reality  as  the  criterion 
or  test  of  the  truth  of  his  ideas.  His  ideas  must  conform 
to  a  reality  which  has  an  existence  not  dependent  upon 
his  subjective  thought  and  to  which  his  subjective 
thought  must  conform  if  it  is  to  think  the  truth.  What 
is  our  justification  for  asserting  that  the  categories  are 
the  laws  of  nature,  and  hence  that  they  are  justified?  It 
is  this:  when  the  experience  of  human  beings  is  reduced 
to  its  pure  framework,  when  all  that  is  subjective  is 
removed  or  discounted,  human  experience  in  general 
is  found  to  involve  certain  fundamental  principles  or 
conceptions.  These  are  true  for  consciousness  in  general 
and  are  involved  in  all  conscious  experience,  that  is, 
they  are  in  no  sense  individual  contributions.  Hence 
they  depend  upon  the  ultimate  conditioning  factors 
upon  which  all  human  conscious  beings  depend.  Human 
beings  may  be  quite  unaware  of  the  necessity  or  even  of 


92      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

the  presence  of  these  factors,  but  when  they  turn  upon 
their  experience  and  attempt  to  rationalize  it  they  find 
these  principles  and  find  themselves  justified  in  using 
them.  In  other  words,  it  seems  necessary  to  assume  these 
principles  as  the  very  foundation  of  all  conscious  ex- 
perience, that  is,  they  are  the  laws  of  nature.  Conscious- 
ness and  objectivity  as  correlatives  arise  together  out 
of  these  conditions  and  go  forward  to  the  position  of 
full  validity  and  necessity,  but  in  the  entire  process  our 
results  are  dependent  upon  and  arise  out  of  the  original 
conditions. 

If  Kant's  objective  deduction  of  the  categories  be 
considered  by  itself,  one  can  easily  get  a  wrong  impres- 
sion of  its  true  significance.  It  might  then  be  taken  as 
justifying  a  position  radically  different  from  that  im- 
plied by  the  greater  part  of  the  Critique.  Once  started 
on  the  train  of  thought  involved  by  this  point  of  view, 
it  is  natural  that  everything  opposed  to  such  a  view 
should  be  looked  upon  as  an  inconsistency  in  Kant  either 
to  be  explained  away  or  to  be  ignored.  The  reason  for 
this  difficulty  of  interpretation  is  not  far  to  seek.  It 
can  be  baldly  stated  in  this  way:  all  unity  in  experience 
implies  unity  in  thought;  without  some  coherence  and 
connection  in  consciousness,  no  experience  of  any  sort; 
consciousness  and  objective  experience  are  correlatives 
which  must  not  be  sundered.  Complete  unity  of  thought 
and  the  thought  object  is  the  highest  point  or  ideal  of 
consciousness.  It  is  with  this  problem  that  Kant  is 
struggling  and  his  attempts  to  do  full  justice  to  this 
situation  have  laid  him  open  to  much  false  criticism  and 
interpretation.    It  should  be  noted  that  there  is  no  neces- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  93 

sary  inconsistency  involved  in  holding,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  both  consciousness  and  nature  depend  upon  non- 
subjective  conditions,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  maintain- 
ing that  unity  in  nature  and  in  consciousness  are  mu- 
tually determining  conditions.  Neither  unity  without 
nor  unity  within  can  exist  without  the  other;  they  are 
organically  connected.  Kant's  constant  insistence  here 
upon  the  truth,  that  no  one  of  these  necessary  elements 
involved  in  an  experience  such  as  ours  can  be  correctly 
understood  in  isolation  from  the  others,  and  his  special 
insistence  upon  the  necessity  for  unity  of  consciousness 
to  which  all  conscious  experiences  point  and  lead,  may 
easily  be  misunderstood.  The  unity  of  the  self  may 
then  be  taken  to  mean  that  such  unity  either  actually 
or  logically  precedes  and,  in  either  case,  projects  itself 
into  nature.  In  other  words,  when  Kant  says  that  the 
unity  of  consciousness  is  the  highest  condition  of  all 
activity  of  thought,  one  may  be  misled  and  infer  that 
Kant  believed  it  to  be  the  original  producing  cause. 
Now  it  is  legitimate  to  assume  that  a  degree  of  unity  is 
implied  at  every  point  in  the  development  of  conscious- 
ness and  its  corresponding  development  of  objective 
knowledge,  and  it  is  also  true  that  the  desire  for  a  greater 
unity  is  the  constant  demand  of  all  conscious  activity. 
But  this  in  no  wise  militates  against  the  view  that  the 
entire  situation  arises  out  of  more  ultimate  conditions. 
It  would  seem  that  what  Kant  means  is  only  this:  some 
unity  of  consciousness  is  a  fact  and  a  necessary  fact 
implied  by  all  experience.  Therefore  all  our  attempts  at 
explanation  must  keep  it  in  mind  as  something  not  to 
be  explained  away.    To  ignore  this  condition  would  be 


94      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

to  ignore  a  factor  absolutely  essential  to  the  existence  of 
the  phenomenal  world.  To  admit  this,  however,  need 
not  necessarily  imply  that  consciousness  acting  as  an 
ultimate  principle  actually  produces  the  objective  world. 
It  would  seem  better  to  take  a  more  conservative  view 
and  say  with  Kant  that  conscious  experience  and  its 
necessary  correlative,  objective  existence,  depend  for 
all  that  we  can  prove  to  the  contrary  upon  more  ulti- 
mate conditions.  We  must  not  overlook,  however,  that 
consciousness  is  necessarily  connected  with  and  involved 
by  that  which  gives  laws  to  nature.* 

By  reason  of  the  difficulty  of  the  thought,  and  the  com- 
plexity of  the  two  deductions  of  the  categories,  it  may 
be  considered  advisable  to  sum  up  in  a  general  way  in 
what  position  Kant's  thought  up  to  this  time  has  left  us. 

After  Hume  it  was  possible  to  say  that  from  experience 
we  get  so  much  and  no  more,  consequently  all  that  is 
contained  in  the  phenomenal  world  over  and  above  the 
experience  given,  must  come  from  elsewhere.  This  is  the 
position  taken  by  Kant.  Profiting  by  Hume's  results, 
Kant  saw,  first,  that  experience  produced  by  real  things 
is  necessary,  secondly,  that  experience  alone  is  incapable 
of  accounting  for  our  phenomenal  world  and  the  knowl- 
edge which  we  have  concerning  this  world,  thirdly,  that 
the  noumenal  conditions  of  the  self  must  somehow  fur- 
nish the  otherwise  lacking  conditions. 

Furthermore,  it  must  be  remembered  that  Hume  had 

pointed  out  some,  at  least,  of  the  elements  of  knowledge 

which  experience  can  not  give,  and  had  admitted  that  we 

can  not  help  thinking  in  terms  of  substance  and  causality. 

*  Cf.  H.  Vaihinger,  Die  Philosophic  des  Als-Ob,  pp.  284,  ff. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  95 

As.  radical  empiricist  he  m  the  end  reduced  these  ideas 
to  illusions,  but  as  observer  of  facts  he  admitted  that 
we  can  not  get  rid  of  them.  From  his  point  of  view 
they  are  necessary  illusions  dependent  upon  the  structure 
of  the  mind.  Kant's  great  work  consists  in  proving  that 
without  Hume's  so-called  necessary  illusions  no  knowl- 
edge and  no  experience  are  possible. 

In  the  aesthetic  Kant  begins  his  solution  of  this  prob- 
lem by  giving  a  tentative  account  of  two  important 
elements,  space  and  time,  which  can  not  come  from  expe- 
rience. Here  Kant  seems  to  hold  that  objects  can  be 
given  without  any  activity  on  the  part  of  the  subject. 
The  only  requirement,  apparently,  is  that  objects  should 
conform  to  certain  fixed  forms,  that  is,  they  must  be 
run  into  moulds  furnished  by  the  subject.  The  analytic, 
however,  throws  further  light  on  this  problem  by  proving 
the  impossibility  of  having  an  object  without  an  active 
connecting  of  elements.  In  other  words,  no  object  can 
be  given  without  something  corresponding  to  an  act 
of  synthesis  which  binds  the  elements  together  and  gives 
the  finished  product  under  the  forms  of  space  and  time. 

This  last  statement  brings  us  to  the  deduction  of  the 
categories.  In  the  subjective  deduction  Kant  shows  how 
the  subjective  laws  employed  by  the  associationists 
presuppose  transcendental  conditions.  It  is  no  doubt 
true  that  we  have  representations,  but  whatever  the 
cause  of  such  representations  may  be,  it  is  necessary 
that  they  should  be  subject  to  time,  the  formal  condition 
of  the  inner  sense.  The  unity  of  the  representation  in- 
volves a  succession  of  distinct  impressions  and  the  bind- 
ing of  these  together  into  a  unity.    In  short,  the  subjcc- 


96      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

tive  principles  assumed  by  the  associationists  to  account 
for  the  bringing  about  of  such  unity,  really  include  as 
presuppositions  for  their  existence  more  fundamental 
synthetic  processes  or  transcendental  principles  of  unity. 
This  means  that  the  explanation  which  the  associationists 
give  does  not  account  for  the  unity  at  all,  but  that  there 
must  be  an  underlying  noumenal  unity  acting  through 
these  synthetic  processes.  The  empirical  subjective  unity 
of  consciousness  is  neither  self-explanatory,  nor  can  it  be 
explained  by  laws  of  association,  for  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion presuppose  some  sort  of  unity  which  is  functioning 
within,  as  well  as  an  orderly — and  by  the  associationists 
unexplained — uniformity  without.  This  much  at  least 
seems  to  be  required  by  a  mere  perceptual  experience 
which  as  yet  is  not  knowledge  in  the  true  sense.  To 
repeat,  in  order  to  have  the  subjective  empirical  unity 
of  consciousness,  we  must  have  a  synthesis  of  apprehen- 
sion in  intuition,  a  synthesis  of  reproduction  in  imagina- 
tion, and  a  synthesis  of  recognition  in  concepts.  And 
to  have  the  fulfilment  of  these  conditions  there  must  be 
unity  of  action  within  and  uniformity  of  nature  without. 
At  a  stage  like  the  preceding  we  have  neither  true 
experience  nor  true  knowledge.  Such  a  stage  may 
correspond  to  animal  experience.  Further  conditions 
must  be  postulated  to  account  for  an  experience  such  as 
ours,  and  this  is  essentially  the  business  of  the  objective 
deduction.  Kant's  problem  here  is  two-fold,  on  the  one 
hand  he  wishes  to  show  the  logical  laws  and  presupposi- 
tions of  our  knowledge,  on  the  other  hand  he  seeks  to 
indicate,  so  far  as  possible,  the  basal  noumenal  conditions 
underlying  both  consciousness  and  phenomenal  objects. 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  97 

The  highest  formal  condition  is  the  unity  of  con- 
sciousness or  personal  identity  by  which  is  meant 
merely  that  I  must  be  able  to  think  my  various  ex- 
periences together.  Everything  which  it  is  ever  possible 
for  me  to  experience  must  conform  to  this  condition.* 
But  I  have  certain  definite  ways  of  thinking  or  judging 
and  these  ways  are  the  categories.  The  justification  of 
these  categories  depends  upon  the  fact  that  without 
them  I  could  have  no  connected  external  experience  and 
therefore  no  connected  experience  or  self.  Until  these 
categories  are  consciously  used  our  knowledge  lacks  the 
universality  and  necessity  which  seems  to  be  a  character- 
istic of  scientific  knowledge.  Up  to  this  point  we  are 
unconscious  of  the  transcendental  con^itions~which  are 
iAvolyed!  ^And  we,  in  formulating  such  knowledge  as 
we  have  at  this  level,  seem  to  be  dependent  upon  the 
empirical  laws  of  association.  Hence  these  synthetical 
processes  furnish  the  conditions  necessary  to  account 
for  objects  and,  at  the  same  time,  for  a  self  which  may 
become  aware  of  itself.  Though  according  to  Kant  we 
can  not  know  either  the  objects  or  the  self  as  they  are 
in  themselves  but  only  that  they  are.  The  fundamental 
point  insisted  upon  by  Kant  is  that  object  and  conscious- 
ness are  correlatives.  No  consciousness  without  objects 
and  no  objects  without  consciousness.  This,  however, 
holds  merely  within  the  phenomenal  realm. 

This  brings  us  to  another  point,  namely,  the  given  of 
the  aesthetic.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  we  must 
assume  synthetic  processes  which  are  working  blindly 

*  That  is,  there  must  be  the  potentiality  of  sclf-consciousncss 
though  the  I  think  need  not  consciously  accompany  all  experience. 


gS      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

in  order  to  account  for  consciousness  and  for  what  is 
phenomenally  inseparably  connected  with  it,  objects. 
This  enables  us  to  see  a  reason  why  all  objects  of  sense 
perception  have  the  appearance  of  being  given.  These 
sense  perceptions  result  partly  from  processes  not  con- 
scious, and  when  consciousness  appears  on  the  scene,  the 
given  is  already  there  as  the  result  of  prior  synthetic 
processes. 

But  there  is  more  in  the  Kantian  position  than  this. 
It  has  just  been  said  that  phenomenal  consciousness  is 
dependent  upon  those  underlying  processes.  But  so 
also  are  space  and  time  for  they  are  the  product  of  an 
activity  whereby  the  manifold  of  sense  is  brought  to- 
gether. When  we  get  to  a  higher  level  and  have  conscious 
synthesis  which  gives  us  necessary  knowledge,  the  same 
mysterious  process  continues.  Objects  are  still  given; 
consciousness  does  not  consciously  produce  them.  If 
we  would  say  that  they  are  produced  by  mind,  then  we 
must  mean  by  mind  something  that  includes  more  than 
consciousness.  We  may  become  conscious  of  the  results, 
and  concepts  corresponding  to  the  processes  involved 
may  be  formed,  but  of  anything  more  we  are  rarely 
conscious. 

Certain  important  conclusions  can  now  be  drawn. 
Noumenal  conditions  of  the  self  necessitate  the  use  of  the 
forms,  space  and  time  and  the  categories,  while  the  self 
known  by  us  is  determined  in  its  existence  by  its  environ- 
ment both  past  and  present.  It  may  gradually,  and  with 
a  vast  amount  of  work,  come  to  a  clearer  and  clearer 
knowledge  of  the  phenomenal  world.  Here  it  uses  con- 
ceptions which  must  conform  to  the  formal  unity  of 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  99 

consciousness.  In  its  interpretations  of  nature  it  may 
advance  far  and  increasingly  organize  the  phenomena, 
but  go  as  far  as  it  may,  it  is  no  nearer  to  the  ultimate 
nature  of  reality. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC 

BOOK  II.    ANALYTIC  OF  PRINCIPLES 

The  analytic  of  principles  is  a  canon  of  the  faculty  of 
judgment,  teaching  it  how  to  apply  toj)henomena  the 
concepts  of  the  understanding,  which  contain  the  condi- 
tion of  rules  a  priori.  Kant's  transcendental  doctrine 
of  the  faculty  of  judgment  consists  of  two  parts.  The 
first  treats  of  the  sensuous  condition  under  which  alone 
pure  concepts  of  the  understanding  can  be  used.  This 
is  what  he  calls  the  schematism  of  the  pure  understanding. 
The  second  part  treats  of  the  synthetical  judgments, 
which  can  be  derived  a  priori  under  these  conditions  from 
pure  concepts  of  the  understanding,  and  on  which  all 
knowledge  a  priori  depends.  It  treats,  therefore,  of 
the  principles  of  the  pure  understanding. 

Schematism  of  the  Pure  Concepts  of  the  Under- 
standing 

In  comprehending  any  object  under  a  concept,  the 
representation  of  the  former  must  be  homogeneous  with 
the  latter.  The  question  here  is:  how  can  we  apply  the 
categories,  which  are  concepts  and  are  a  priori^  to  per- 
ceptions which  are  intuitions  and  empirical.  There  is 
a  heterogeneity  here  which  makes  the  discovery  of  some 
underlying  homogeneous  principle  necessary,  some  inter- 
mediate representation  which  is  pure,  that  is,  free  from 
all  that  is  empirical,  and  yet  intellectual  on  the  one  side, 

lOO 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  lOI 

and  sensuous  on  the  other.  Such  a  representation  is  the 
transcendental  schema.  This  mediating  faculty  is  the 
imagination  working  under  the  form  of  time.  Time  is 
the  form  of  the  mediating  function  because  it  is  homo- 
geneous with  the  categories  since  it  has  an  a  priori 
character,  and  homogeneous  with  perception  for  it  is 
contained  in  every  representation  of  the  manifold.  It 
is  consequently  both  pure  and  sensuous.    ' 

To  proceed  to  the  categories  as  schematized.  The 
imagination  representing  quantity  under  the  form  of 
time  gives  us  a  series  of  time,  namely,  number,  that  is, 
an  addition  of  units.  The  beginning  of  the  number 
series  gives  unity;  progress  in  the  series  gives  plurality; 
the  series  taken  as  a  whole  gives  totality.  Quality  rep- 
resented under  the  form  of  time  gives  us  the  contents  of 
time,  that  is,  degree  in  the  filHng  of  time.  We  have,  then, 
reality  or  time  filled,  negation  or  time  empty,  and  limita- 
tion or  time  partially  filled.  Relation  represented  under 
the  form  of  time  gives  us  an  order  of  time.  There  is  per- 
manence of  the  real  in  time  or  substance,  orderly  succes- 
sion in  time  or  causation,  and  reciprocal  causality  of  sub- 
stances or  reciprocity.  ModaKty  represented  under  the 
form  of  time  gives  us  the  comprehension  of  time.  Agree- 
ment with  the  conditions  of  time  in  generalls  the  schema 
of  possibility,  existence  at  a  given  time  is  the  schema  of 
reality,  and  the  existence  of  an  object  at  all  times  is  the 
schema  of  necessity.  "^-  • 

Principles  of  the  Pure  Understanding 

The  preceding  section  on  the  schematism  of  the  pure 
concepts  of  the  understanding  had  as  its  purpose  the 


I02      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

statement  of  the  categories  in  the  form  which  they  as- 
sume as  real  categories  of  the  phenomenal  world.  The 
problem  before  us  in  the  Principles  is,  What  are  the  syn- 
thetic a  priori  judgments  which  the  categories  place  us  in 
a  position  to  make  with  regard  to  nature?  In  the  trans- 
cendental deduction  of  space  and  time,  Kant  pointed 
out  that  from  their  a  priority  could  be  deduced  other 
necessary  principles,  e.  g.  some  mathematical  principles. 
So  here,  with  regard  to  the  categories,  Kant  now  asks. 
What  necessary  statements  concerning  some  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  physical  science  are  we  enabled  to  make  on  the 
basis  of  the  categories?  In  the  course  of  the  discussion, 
Kant  considers,  among  others,  these  fundamental  no- 
tions: matter,  causality,  and  nature  as  an  interrelated 
system.  His  discussion  of  these,  however,  is  not  always 
clearly  evident  on  account  of  the  artificial  machinery 
gotten  from  formal  logic  which  he  uses  as  the  outhne  of 
his  treatment. 

The  table  of  the  categories  is  the  natural  clue  to  the 
principles  in  so  far  as  they  are  merely  the  rule  of  objec- 
tively applying  the  categories. 

'I'he  principles  are 

I. 

Axioms  of  Intuition. 

II.  III. 

Anticipations  of  Perception.       Analogies  of  Experience. 

IV. 

Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought  in  General. 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  IO3 

I.  Axioms  of  Intuition.  Their  principle  is:  All 
intuitions  are  extensive  quantities. 

All  phenomena  contain,  so  far  as  their  form  is  con- 
cerned, an  intuition  in  space  and  time,  which  forms  the 
a  priori  foundation  of  all  of  them.  They  can  not,  there- 
fore, be  apprehended,  that  is,  received  into  empirical 
consciousness,  except  through  the  synthesis  of  the  man- 
ifold, by  which  the  representations  of  a  definite  space 
or  time  are  produced,  that  is,  through  the  synthesis  of 
the  homogeneous,  and  the  consciousness  of  the  syn- 
thetical unity  of  the  manifold.  Now  the  consciousness 
of  the  manifold  and  homogeneous  in  intuition,  so  far  as 
by  it  the  representation  of  an  object  is  first  rendered 
possible,  is  the  concept  of  quantity.  Therefore  even 
the  perception  of  an  object  as  a  phenomenon  is  possible 
onlyTIirough  the  same  synthetical  unity  of  the  manifold 
of  the^given  sensuous  intuition^^Bywhich  the  unity  of 
the  composition  of  the  manifold  and  homogeneous  is 
conceivedm  the  concept  of  a  quantity;  thatjs,  phenomena 
are  always  quantities,  and  extensive  quantities;  because 
as  inturti(3ns  in  space  and"  time  they  mustbe  represented 
through  jthe  same  synthesis  through  which  space  and 
time  in  general  are  determined. 

'  In  other  words,  in  the  Axioms  we  have  a  deduction  of 
appHed  mathematics.  Since  alTphenomena  are  in  space 
and  time  they  are  extensive  in  tljjdi^-j^rUure  and  hence 


are   mpnt;nrnf>lp,    (l]yi<^ih](^    nnrl    rnimprnhlo        From 


this  itToJlows  that  geometry  and  arithmetic  apply  to 
phenomena.  Hence  all  that  these  sciences  find  true  of 
pure  space  and  tTme^^l  also  be  found  true  of  phenomena 
so  far  as  they  are  in  space  and  time. 


I04      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S    CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

II.  Anticipations  of  Perception.  Their  principle 
is :  In  all  phenomena  the  real,  which  is  the  object  of  a 
senzation,  has  intensive  quantity,  that  is,  a  degree. 

All  knowledge  by  means  of  which  I  may  know  and 
determine  a  priori  whatever  belongs  to  empirical  knowl- 
edge, may  be  called  an  anticipation.  But  as  there  is 
always  in  phenomena  something  which  can  never  be 
known  a  priori,  and  constitutes  the  real  difference  be- 
tween empirical  and  a  priori  knowledge,  namely,  sensa- 
tion (as  matter  of  perception),  it  follows  that  this  can 
never  be  anticipated.  The  pure  determinations,  on  the 
contrary  in  space  and  time,  as  regards  both  figure  and 
quantity,  may  be  called  anticipations  of  phenomena, 
because  they  represent  a  priori  whatever  may  be  given 
a  posteriori  in  experience.  If,  however,  there  should  be 
something  in  every  sensation  that  could  be  known 
a  priori  as  sensation  in  general,  even  if  no  particular 
sensation  be  given,  this  would,  in  a  very  special  sense, 
deserve  to  be  called  anticipation,  because  it  seems  ex- 
traordinary that  we  should  anticipate  experience  in  that 
which  concerns  the  matter  of  experience  and  can  be  de- 
rived from  experience  only.  Yet  such  is  really  the  case 
in  the  anticipation  of  intensive  quantity,  that  is,  degree. 

What  corresponds  in  every  empirical  intuition  to 
sensationTs  reality,  what  Corresponds  to  its  absence  is 
negation  =  o.  Every  sensation,  therefore,  and  every 
reality  in  piienomena  however  small  it  may  be,  has  a 
degree,  that  is,  an  intensive  quantity  which  can  always 
be  diminished,  and  tliere  is  between  reahty  and  negation 
a  continuous  connection  or"pdssibTe"~rea!ities,   and  of 

~^v5y  color,  red,  for  in- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  IO5 

stance,  has  a  degree,  which,  however  small,  is  never  the 
smallest;  and  the  same  applies  to  heat,  the  momentum 
of  gravity,  etc. 

Kant's  dynamical  theory  of  matter  is  here  given  a 
transcendental  basis.  Science  has  hitherto  been  mechan- 
ical; it  has  held  to  the  strict  homogeneity  of  matter,  and 
has  explained  differences  of  bodies  in  terms  of  diifferent 
quantities  of  homogeneous  parts  contained  in  the  same 
volume.  To  this  Kant  opposes  another  view:  that  al- 
though the  same  spaces  are  perfectly  filled  by  two  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  matter,  so  that  there  is  no  point  in  either 
of  them  where  matter  is  not  present,  yet  the  real  in  either, 
the  quahty  being  the  same,  has  its  own  degree  (of  resist- 
ance or  weight)  which,  without  any  diminution  of  its 
extensive  quantity,  may  grow  smaller  and  smaller  in 
infinitum,  before  it  reaches  the  void  and  vanishes.  Thus 
a  certain  expansion  which  fills  space,  for  instance,  heat, 
and  every  other  kind  of  phenomenal  reaHty,  may,  without 
leaxdng  the  smallest  part  of  space  empty,  diminish  by 
degrees  in  infinitum,  and  nevertheless  fill  space  with  its 
smaller,  quite  as  much  as  another  phenomenon  with 
greater  degrees.  Kant  says  that  he  does  not  mean  to  say 
that  this  is  really  the  case  with  the  different  kinds  of 
matter  according  to  their  specific  gravity.  He  only  wants 
to  show  by  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  pure  under- 
standing, that  the  nature  of  our  perception  renders  such 
an  explanation  possible,  and  that  it  is  wrong  to  look  upon 
the  real  in  phenomena  as  equal  in  degree,  and  different 
only  in  aggregation  and  its  extensive  quantity,  nay,  to 
maintain  this  on  the  pretended  authority  of  an  a  priori 
principle  of  the  understanding. 


Io6      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

III.  Analogies  of  Experience.  Their  principle 
is:  Experience  is  possible  only  through  the  representa- 
tion of  a  necessary  connection  of  perceptions. 

The  Analogies  of  Experience  demand  a  more  detailed 
treatment  than  do  the  preceding  Principles  of  the  Pure 
Understanding.  The  Analogies  consider  principles 
which  are  not  only  of  the  utmost  importance  as  synthetic 
principles  of  knowledge,  but  which  also  claim  to  be 
fundamental  ontological  principles,  and  which  in  this, 
role  have  played  an  important  part  in  all  scientific  and 
philosophical  speculation.  Moreover  we  must  remember 
how  Hume's  treatment  of  causality  set  Kant  to  thinking 
and  finally  led  to  the  production  of  the  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason.  Furthermore,  if  we  consider  the  difficulty  of 
comprehending  the  significance  of  causality,  one  of  the 
most  bafHing  conceptions  in  philosophy,  we  shall  under- 
stand why  the  Analogies  merit  and  demand  more  than 
passing  notice. 

The  three  modes_^f__tjme,,axe  permanence,  ^succession. 
and  co-existence.    There  will  therefore  bethree  rules  of 


all  relations  of  phenomena  in  time,  by  which  the  existence 
of  every  phenomenon  with  regard  to  the  unity  of  time 
is  determined,  and  these  rules  are  presupposed  in  all 
experience,  indeed,  render  all  experience  possible. 

Experience  in  reference  to  nature  is  empirical  knowl- 
edge, that  is,  knowledge  which  determines  an  object  by 
means  of  perceptions.  >ta^tuiejs,_lherefbre^_^^^^ 
of  perceptions^.a_synthesis  which  itself  is  not  contained 
in  the  perception.  The  synthetical  unity  of  the  manifold 
of  the  perceptions  is  contained  in  a  consciousness,  that 
unity  constituting  the  essential  of  our  knowledge  of  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  I07 

objects  of  the  senses,  that  is,  of  experience.  In  subjective 
experience,  perceptions  come  together  contingently  only, 
so  that  no  necessity  of  their  connection  could  be  discov- 
ered in  the  perceptions  themselves  or  in  their  order, 
apprehension  being  only  a  composition  of  the  manifold 
of  empirical  intuition,  but  containing  no  representation 
of  the  real  connection  of  existence  in  space  and  time. 
Objective  experience,  on  the  contrary,  and  that  referred 
to  at  the  beginning  of  the  paragraph,  is  a  knowledge  of 
objects  by  perceptions,  in  which  therefore  the  relation 
of  the  existence  of  the  manifold  is  to  be  represented,  not 
as  it  is  put  together  in  time,  but  as  it  is  really  in  time, 
objectively.  Now,  as  time  itself  can  not  be  perceived, 
the  determination  of  the  existence  of  objects  in  time  can 
take  place  only  by  their  connection  in  time  in  general, 
that  is,  through  concepts  connecting  them  a  priori.  As  i 
these  concepts  always  imply  necessity,  we  are  justified! 
in  saying  that  experience  is  possible  only  through  a  I 
representation  of  the  necessary  connection  of  perceptions. 
What  has  been  said  of  all  synthetical  principles,  and 
what  is  said  here,  is,  that  these  analogies  have  their 
meaning  and  validity,  not  as  principles  of  the  trans- 
cendent, but  only  as  principles  of  the  empirical  use  of 
the  understanding. 

A.  First  Analogy.  Principle  of  the  Permanence 
OF  Substance:  In  all  changes  of  phenomena  the  substance 
is  permanent,  and  its  quantum  is  7ieither  increased  nor 
diminished  in  nature. 

All  phenomena  take  place  in  time.  Phenomena  can 
be  determined  in  time  in  two  ways,  either  as  successive 


Io8      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

or  as  co-existent.    In  the  first  case  time  is  considered  as 
a  series,  in  the  second  as  a  whole. 

Our  apprehension  of  the  manifold  of  phenomena  is 
always  successive,  and  therefore  always  changing.  By 
it  alone  therefore  we  can  never  determine  whether  the 
manifold,  as  an  object  of  experience,  is  co-existent  or 
successive,  unless  there  is  something  in  it  which  exists 
always,  that  is,  something  constant  and  permanent, 
while  change  and  succession  are  nothing  but  so  many 
kinds  of  time  in  which  the  permanent  exists.  Relations 
of  time  are  therefore  possible  in  the  permanent  only 
(co-existence  and  succession  being  the  only  relations  of 
time)  so  that  the  permanent  is  the  substratum  of  the 
empirical  representation  of  time  itself,  and  in  it  alone  all 
determination  of  time  is  possible.  Permanence  expresses 
time  as  the  constant  correlative  of  all  existence  of  phe- 
nomena, of  all  change  and  concomitancy.  For  change 
idoes  not  affect  time  itself,  but  only  phenomena  in  time 
(nor  is  co-existence  a  mode  of  time  itself,  because  in  it  no 
parts  can  be  co-existent,  but  successive  only).  Only 
through  the  permanent  does  existence  in  different  parts 
of  a  series  of  time  assume  a  quantity  which  we  call  dura- 
tion.  For  in  mere  succession  existence  always  comes  and 
goes,  and  never  assumes  the  slightest  quantity.  Without 
something_^£rmanent,-theref ore,-  no  relation  of  Jime  is 
fpossible.  Time  by  itself,  however,  can  not  be  perceived, 
and  it  is  therefore  the  permanent  in  phenomena  that 
forms  the  substratum  for  all  determination  of  time,  and 
at  the  same  time  the  condition  of  the  possibihty  of  all 
synthetical  unity  of  perceptions,  that  is,  of  experience; 
while  with  regard  to  that  permanent  all  existence  and 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  lOQ 

all  change  in  time  can  only  be  taken  as  a  mode  of  exist- 
ence of  what  is  permanent.  In  all  phenomena,  therefore, 
the  permanent  isjthe  object  itself,  that  is,  the  substance 
(phenomenon),  while  all  that  changes  or  can  change  be- 
longs  only  to  the  mode  in  which  substance  or  substances 
exist,  therefore,  to  their  determinations.  This  perma-  /  y 
nence,  however,  is  nothing  but  the  manner  in  which  we' 
represent  the  existence  of  things  (as  phenomenal).        --^ 

On  this  permanence  also  depends  the  right  under- 
standing of  the  concept  of  change.  To  arise  and  to  perish 
are  not  changes  of  that  which  arises  or  perishes.  Change 
is  a  mode  of  existence,  which  follows  another  mode  of 
existence  of  the  same  object.  Hence  whatever  changes 
is_permanent,  and  its  condition  only  changes.  As  this 
alteration  refers  only  to  determinations  which  may  have 
an  end  or  a  beginning,  we  may  use  an  expression  that 
seems  somewhat  paradoxical  and  say:  the  permanent 
only  (substance)  is  changed,  the  changing  itself  suffers 
no  change,  but  there  is  only  an  alteration,  certain  deter- 
minations ceasing  to  exist,  while  others  begin. 

Substances,  therefore  (as  phenomena),  are  the  true 
substrata  of  all  determinations  of  time.  Permanence, 
therefore,  is  a  necessary  condition  under  which  alone 
phenomena,  as  things  or  objects,  can  be  determined  in  a 
possible  experience.* 

Here  again  we  have  a  clear  example  of  the  transcenden- 
tal method.  Kant  shows  that  the  proposition:  amid  all 
change  of_phenomena  substance  is  permanent,  and  the 


quantrty  of  it  is  in  nature  neither  inc^'^-'^ ''^^d  ri2LiiJl^iri- 

*  This  same  necessity  is  recognized  in  physical  science  in  the 
assertion  that  the  amount  of  energy  remains  constant. 


no      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ished,  can  neither  come  from  experiencg^^JiQii-beijased  on 
logical  certainty,  but  that  it  is  only  on  the,  assumption 
of  this  proposition,  that  experience  is  possible. 

B.  Second  Analogy.  Principle  of  the  Succession 
OF  Time,  according  to  the  Law  of  Causality:  All 
changes  take  place  according  to  the  law  of  connection  be- 
tween cause  and  efect. 

The  apprehension  of  the  manifold  of  phenomena  is 
always  successive.  The  representations  of  the  parts 
follow  one  upon  another;  whether  they  also  follow  one 
upon  the  other  in  the  object  not  being  thus  determined. 
Since  phenomena  are  not  things  in  themselves,  and  are 
lyet  the  only  things  that  can  be  given  us  to  know,  the 
question  is  what  kind  of  connection  in  time  belongs  to 
the  manifold  of  the  phenomena  itself,  when  the  rep- 
resentation of  it  in  our  apprehension  is  always  successive. 
Thus,  for  instance,  the  apprehension  of  the  manifold 
in  the  phenomenal  appearance  of  a  house  is  successive. 
The  question  then  arises,  whether  the  manifold  of  the 
house  itself  be  successive,  which  of  course  no  one  would 
admit.  Whenever  I  ask  for  the  transcendental  meaning 
of  my  concepts  of  an  object,  I  find  that  a  house  is  not 
a  thing  in  itself,  but  a  phenomenon  only,  that  is,  a  rep- 
*  resentation  the  object-in-itself  of  which  is  unknown. 
«/  'what  then  can  be  the  meaning  of  the  question,  how  the 
manifold  in  the  phenomenon  itself  (which  is  not  a  thing 
in  itself)  may  be  connected?  Here  that  which  is  con- 
tained in  our  successive  apprehension  is  considered  as 
representation,  and  the  given  phenomenon,  though  it  is 
nothing  but  the  whole  of  these  representations,  as  their 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  III 

object,  with  which  my  concept,  drawn  from  the  represent- 
ations of  my  apprehension,  is  to  accord.  As  the  accord 
between  knowledge  and  its  object  is  truth,  it  is  easily 
seen,  that  we  can  ask  here  only  for  the  formal  conditions 
of  empirical  truth,  and  that  the  phenomenon,  in  con- 
tradistinction to  the  representations  of  our  apprehension, 
can  only  be  represented  as  the  object  different  from  them, 
if  it  is  subject  to  a  rule  distinguishing  it  from  every  other 
apprehension,  and  necessitating  a  certain  kind  of  con- 
junction of  the  manifold.  That  which  in  the  phenomenon 
contains  the  condition  of  this  necessar^jQile  of.apprehen^/ 
sion  is  the  object. 

Every  apprehension  of  an  event  is  a  perception 
following  on  another  perception.  But  as  this  applies  to 
all  synthesis  of  apprehension,  as  was  shown  before,  in 
the  phenomenal  appearance  of  a  house,  that  apprehen- 
sion would  not  thereby  be  different  from  any  other.  But 
I  observe  at  the  same  time,  that  if  in  a  phenomenon 
which  contains  an  event  I  call  the  antecedent  state  of 
perception,  A,  and  the  subsequent,  B,  B  can  only  follow 
A  in  my  apprehension,  wliile  the  perception  A  can  never 
follow  B,  but  can  only  precede  it.  I  see,  for  instance,  a 
ship  gliding  down  a  stream.  My  perception  of  its  place 
below  follows  my  perception  of  its  place  higher  up  in  the 
course  of  the  stream,  and  it  is  impossible  in  the  apprehen- 
sion of  this  phenomenon  that  the  ship  should  be  perceived 
first  below  and  then  higher  up.  We  see,  therefore,  that 
the  order  in  the  succession  of  perceptions  in  our  apprchcn-/ 
sion  IS  here  determined,  and  our  apprehension  regulated 
by  that  order.  In  the  former  example  of  a  house  my 
perceptions  could  begin  in  the  apprehension  at  the  roof 


112      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

and  end  in  the  basement,  or  begin  below  and  end  above; 
they  could  apprehend  the  manifold  of  the  empirical 
intuition  from  right  to  left  or  from  left  to  right.  There 
was  therefore  no  determined  order  in  the  succession  of 
these  perceptions,  determining  the  point  where  I  had  to 
begin  in  apprehension,  in  order  to  connect  the  manifold 
empirically;  while  in  the  apprehension  of  an  event  there 
is  always  a  rule,  which  makes  the  order  of  the  successive 
perceptions  (in  the  apprehension  of  this  phenomenon) 
^necessary. 

We  shall  have  to  derive  the  ^subjective  succession)  in 
our  apprehension  from  the(objective  succession^,  of  the 
phenomena,  because  otherwise  the  former  would  be 
entirely  undetermined,  and  unable  to  distinguish  one 
phenomenon  from  another.  The  former  alone  proves 
nothing  as  to  the  connection  of  the  manifold  in  the  object, 
because  it  is  quite  arbitrary.  The  latter  must  therefore 
consist  in  the  order  of  the  manifold  in  a  phenomenon, 
according  to  which  the  apprehension  of  what  is  happening 
follows  upon  the  apprehension  of  what  has  happened,  in 
conformity  with  a  rule.  Thus  only  may  one  say  not  only 
of  my  apprehension,  but  of  the  phenomenon  itself,  that 
there  exists  in  it  a  succession,  which  is  the  same  as  to  say 
that  one  can  not  arrange  the  apprehension  otherwise  than 
in  that  very  succession. 

In  conformity  with  this,  there  must  exist  in  that  which 
always  precedes  an  event  the  condition  of  a  rule,  by  which 
this  event  follows  at  all  times,  and  necessarily;  but  I  can 
not  go  back  from  the  event  and  determine  by  apprehen- 
sion that  which  precedes.  Ypr  no  phenomenon^  goes 
back  fronijhe  succeeding  to  the  preceding  point  of  time, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  II3 

thoi;dx-it^is.,jjdat£d^Jn-.SQiii^^  point  ^f  time, 

wbik-4be~43rogress  from  a  given  time  to  a  determined 
folliiwm^tiiiieisjiecessary.  ThereforeTas  there  certainly 
is  something  that  follows,  I  must  necessarily  refer  it  to 
sometlilng  else  which  precedes,  andjapon  which  it  follows 
by  rule,  that  is,  by  necessity.  So  that  the  event,  as  being 
conditional,  affords  a  safe  indication  of  some  kind  of  con- 
dition, while  that  condition  itself  determines  the  event. 

If  we  supposed  that  nothing  precedes  an  event  uponj 
which  such  event  must  follow  according  to  rule,  all 
succession  of  perception  would  then  exist  in  apprehension 
only,  that  is,  subjectively;  but  it  would  not  thereby  be( 
determined  objectively,  what  ought  properly  to  be  the, 
antecedent  and  what  the  subsequent  in  perception.  We 
should  thus  have  a  mere  play  of  representations  uncon- 
nected with  any  object,  that  is,  no  phenomenon  w^ould, 
by  our  perception,  be  distinguished  in  time  from  any 
other  phenomenon,  because  the  succession  in  apprehen- 
sion would  always  be  uniform  and  there  would  be  notliing 
in  the  phenomena  to  determine  the  succession,  so  as  to 
render  a  certain  sequence  objectively  necessary.  I  could, 
not  say  therefore  that  two  states  follow  each  other  in  a' 
phenomenon,  but  only  that  one  apprehension  follows 
another,  which  is  purely  subjective,  and  does  not  deter- 
mine any  object,  and  can  not  be  considered  therefore  as 
knowledge  of  anytliing  (even  of  something  purely^ 
phenomenal). 

If  therefore  experience  teaches  us  that  something 
happens,  \vc  always  ^r^^suppose  that  something  precedes 
on  which  it  follows  by  rule.  Otherwise  I  could  not  say 
of  the  object  that  it  followed,  because  its  following  in  my 


/ 


114      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

apprehension  only,  without  being  determined  by  rule 
in  reference  to  what  precedes,  would  not  justify  us  in 
admitting  an  objective  following.  It  is  therefore  always 
with  reference  to  a  rule  by  which  phenomena  as  they 
follow,  that  is,  as  they  happen,  are  determined  by  an 
antecedent  state,  that  I  can  give  an  objective  character 
V  to  my  subjective  synthesis  (of  apprehension);  nay,  it  is 
under  this  supposition  only  that  an  experience  of  any- 
thing that  happens  becomes  possible. 

It  is  impossible  that  such  rule  should  be  derived  by  a 
,   perception  and  comparison  of  many  events  following  in 
/    the  same  manner  on  preceding  phenomena,  for  it  would 
"^     tjien  be  only  an  empirical  generalization. 

'  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  show  by  examples  that  we 
never,  even  in  experience,  ascribe  the  sequence  or  con- 
sequence (of  an  event  or  something  happening  that  did 
not  exist  before)  to  the  object,  and  distinguish  it  from  the 
subjective  sequence  of  an  apprehension,  except  when 
there  is  a  rule  which  forces  us  to  observe  a  certain  order 
of  perceptions,  and  no  other;  nay,  that  it  is  this  force 
which  from  the  first  renders  the  representation  of  a  suc- 
Icession  in  the  object  possible. 

We  have  representations  within  us,  and  can  become 
conscious  of  them;  but  the  representations  are  rep- 
resentations only,  that  is,  internal  determinations  of  our 
mind"nn:Jiis  or  thafTelation  of  time.  What  right  have 
we  jheji_tQ,  ascrjbg  to  these  modifications  an  objective 
reality  beyondtheir  subjective  one?  Their  objective 
character  can  not  consist  in  the  mere  relation  of  rep- 
resentations to  each  other.  If  we  try  to  find  out  what 
new  quality  or  dignity  is  imparted  to  our  representations 


TRANSCENDENTAL   ANALYTIC  II5 

by  their  relation  to  an  object,  we  find  that  it  consists  in  / 
nothing  but  the  rendering  necessary  the  connection  or 
representations  in  a  certain  way,  and  subjecting  them 
to  a  rule ;  and  that  on  the  other  hand  they  receive  their 
objective  character  only  because  a  certain  order  is  nec- 
essaryjn  thejimejelations  of  our  representations. 

If  then  it  is  a  necessary  law  of  our  sensibility,  and 
therefore  a  formal  condition  of  all  perception,  that  a 
preceding,  necessarily  determines  a  succeeding  time 
(because  I  can  not  arrive  at  the  succeeding  time  except 
through  the  preceding),  it  is  also  an  indispensable  law  of 
the  empirical  representation  of  the  series  of  time  that  the 
phenomena  of  past  time  determine  every  existence  in 
succeeding  times,  nay,  that  these,  as  events,  can  not 
take  place  except  so  far  as  the  former  determine  their 
existence  in  time,  that  is,  determine  it  by  rule.  For  it  is 
of  course  in  phenomena  only  that  we  can  know  empirically 
this  continuity  in  the  coherence  of  times. 

What  is  required  for  all  experience  and  renders  it 
possible  is  the  understanding,  and  the  first  that  is  added 
by  it  is  not  that  it  renders  the  representation  of  objects 
clear,  but  that  it  really  renders  the  representation  of  any 
object  for  the  first  time  possible.  This  takes  place  by 
the  understanding  transferring  the  order  of  time  to  the 
phenomena  and  their  existence,  and  by  assigning  to 
each  of  them  as  to  a  consequence  a  certain  a  priori  de- 
termined place  in  time,  with  reference  to  antecc<:lent 
phenomena,  without  which  place,  phenomena  would  not 
be  in  accord  with  time,  which  determines  a  priori  their 
places  to  all  its  parts.  In  other  words,  what  happens 
or  follows  must  follow  according  to  a  general  rule  on 


Il6      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

that  which  was  contained  in  a  previous  state.  We  thus 
get  a  series  of  phenomena  which,  by  means  of  the  under- 
standing, produces  and  makes  necessary  in  the  series  of 
possible  perceptions  the  same  order  and  continuous 
coherence  which  exists  a  priori  in  the  form  of  internal 
intuition  (time),  in  which  all  perceptions  must  have 
their  place. 

That  something  happens  is  therefore  a  perception 
which  belongs  to  a  possible  experience,  and  this  expe- 
rience becomes  real  when  I  consider  the  phenomenon  as 
determined  with  regard  to  its  place  in  time,  that  is  to 
say,  as  an  object  which  can  always  be  found,  according 
to  a  rule,  in  the  connection  of  perceptions.  This  rule, 
''  by  which  we  determine  everything  according  to  the 
succession  of  time,  is  this :  the  condition  under  which  an 
event  follows  at  all  times  (necessarily)  is  to  be  found  in 
what  precedes.  All  possible  experience,  therefore,  that 
is,  ajl_objectiye_knowledge  of  phenomena  with  regard 
to  their  relation  in  the  succession  ortime,  depenSsojiThe 
prmciple  of  sufhcient  reason. 

^  The  proof  of  this  principle  rests  on  the  foUov/ing  con- 
siderations. All  empirical  knowledge  requires  synthesis 
of  the  manifold  by  imagination,  which  is  always  succes- 
sive. That  succession,  however,  in  the  imagination  is  not 
at  all  determined  with  regard  to  the  order  in  which  some- 
thing precedes  and  something  follows.  If  that  synthesis, 
however,  is  a  synthesis  of  apperception  (of  the  manifold 
in  a  given  phenomenon),  then  the  order  is  determined  in 
theobject,  or,  to  speak  more  a'ccuratefy,  there^is^tlien  in 
it  an  order  of  successive  synthesis  which  determines  the 
object,  and  according  to"  which  something  must  nee- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  II7 

essarily  precede,  and,  when  it  is  once  there,  something  j 
else  must  necessarily  follow.  If,  therefore,  my  percep-' 
tion  is  to  contain  the  knowledge  of  an  event,  or  something 
that  really  happens,  it  must  consist  of  an  empirical  judg- 
ment, by  which  the  succession  is  supposed  to  be  deter- 
mined, so  that  the  event  presupposes  another  phenom- 
enon in  time  on  which  it  follows  necessarily  and  according 
to  a  rule.  If  it  were  different,  if  the  antecedent  phenom- 
enon were  there,  and  the  event  did  not  follow  on  it 
necessarily,  it  would  become  to  me  a  mere  play  of  my 
subjective  imagination,  or  if  I  thought  it  to  be  objective^ 
I  should  call  it  a  dream.  It  is  therefore  the  relation  of  I 
phenomena  ^a^^pQSsibJ.£_perce£tions)"~a:ccordiiig  to  -which 
the  existence  of  the  subsequent(wKat  happens)  is~deter- 
mined  m  Time"  by"  some  thing  antecedent  necessarily  and 
by  ruIeTorTiiTotheFwords,  the  relation  of  cause_and  effect, 
which  tomisTH^^ondition  of  the  objective  validity  of 
ouf*^hlpirical  judgments  with  regard  to  the  series  of  per- 
ceptions, and  therefore  also  the  condition  of  the  empirical 
truth  of  them,  and  of  experience.  The  principle  of  the 
caATsarfelafion  in  The  succession  of  phenomena  is  valid, 
therefore,  for  all  objects  of  experience,  also  (under  the| 
conditions  of  succession),  because  that  principle  i 
itself  the  ground  of  the  possibihty  of  such  experience.  Jj 

Here,  however,  we  meet  with  a  difficulty  that  must 
first  be  removed.  The  principle  of  the  causal  connection 
of  phenomena  is  restricted  in  our  formula  to  their  suc- 
cession, while  in  practice  we  find  that  it  appHes  also  to 
their  co-existence,  because  cause  and  effect  may  exist 
at  the  same  time.  For  example,  the  warmth  of  the  room 
comes  from  the  fire  now  present  in  it.    The  greater  part 


Il8      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  active  causes  in  nature  are  of  this  sort,  and  the 
succession  of  these  effects  in  time  is  due  only  to  this, 
that  a  cause  can  not  produce  its  whole  effect  in  one 
moment.  But  at  the  moment  at  which  an  effect  first 
arises  it  is  always  co-existent  with  the  causality  of  its 
cause,  because  if  that  had  ceased  one  moment  before,  the 
effect  would  never  have  happened.  Here  we  must  well 
*<:onsider_tha^t_wh^t_is  tho^  the 

Uapse  of  time_^_ajjj_thjt_th^relation  remains,  even  if  no 
jtirnehad_lagsed.  The  time  between  the  causahty  of  the 
Iran  se  and  its  immediateeffect  can  be  vanishing  (they  may 
.bejimultaneousLJxut  the  relation  of  the  oiieJ:o  the  other 
remains  for  all  that  determinable  in  time.  A  ball  placed 
on  a  soft  cushion  produces  a  depression  which  is  simul- 
taneous with  the  ball,  but  the  depression  does  not  pro- 
duce the  ball. 

This  causality  leads  to  the  concept  of  action,  that  to 
the  concept  of  force,  and  lastly,  to  the  concept  of  sub- 
stance. Wherever  there  is  action,  therefore  activity  and 
force,  there  must  be  substance,  and  in  this  alone,  the 
seat  of  that  fertile  source  of  phenomena  can  be  sought. 
Action  itself  implies  the  relation  of  the  subject  of  the 
causality  to  the  effect.  As  all  effect  consists  in  that 
which  happens,  that  is,  in  the  changeable,  indicating 
time  in  succession,  the  last  subject  of  it  is  the  permanent, 
as  the  substratum  of  all  that  changes,  that  is,  substance. 
Another  phase  demands  attention.  Hitherto  the  con- 
sideration has  concerned  itself  with  the  law  of  the  succes- 
sion of  phenomena  upon  each  other.  What  must  now 
be  investigated  is  the  transition  from  the  not-being  of  a 
state  into  that  state,  even  though  it  contained  no  quality 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  II9 

whatever  as  a  phenomenon.  This  arising,  as  has  been 
shown  in  the  first  Analogy,  does  not  concern  the  sub- 
stance (because  the  substance  never  arises),  but  its  state 
only.  It  is  therefore  mere  change,  and  not  an  arising 
out  of  nothing.  When  such  an  arising  is  looked  upon  as 
the  effect  of  a  foreign  cause,  it  is  called  creation.  This 
can  never  be  admitted  as  an  event  among  phenomena, 
because  its  very  possibility  would  destroy  the  unity  of 
experience.  If,  however,  we  consider  all  things,  not  as 
phenomena,  but  as  things  in  themselves  and  objects  of 
the  understanding  only,  then,  though  they  are  substances, 
they  must  be  considered  as  dependent  in  their  existence 
on  a  foreign  cause.  Our  words  would  then  assume  quite 
a  different  meaning,  and  no  longer  be  applicable  to 
phenomena,  as  possible  objects  of  experience. 

How  anything  can  be  changed  at  all,  how  it  is  possible 
that  one  state  in  a  given  time  is  followed  by  another  at 
another  time,  of  that  we  have  not  the  sKghtest  concep- 
tion a  priori.  We  want  for  that  a  knowledge  of  real 
powers,  which  can  be  given  empirically  only :  for  instance, 
a  knowledge  of  motive  powers,  or  what  is  the  same,  a 
knowledge  of  certain  successive  phenomena  (as  move- 
ments) which  indicate  the  presence  of  such  forces.  W^hat 
can  be  considered  a  priori,  according  to  the  law  of  causal- 
ity and  the  conditions  of  time,  is  the  form  of  every  change, 
the  condition  under  which  alone,  as  an  arising  of  another 
state,  it  can  take  place  (its  contents,  that  is,  the  state, 
which  is  changed,  being  what  it  may),  and  therefore 
the  succession  itself  of  the  states  (that  which  has  hap- 
pened). Kant  adds  that  he  is  not  speaking  of  the  change 
of  certain  relations,  but  of  the  change  of  a  state.    There- 


I20      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

fore  when  a  body  moves  in  a  uniform  way,  it  does  not 
change  its  state  of  movement,  but  it  does  so  when  its 
motion  increases  or  decreases. 

This  discussion  has  shown  how  it  is  possible  to  know 
a  priori  a  law  of  changes,  as  far  as  their  form  is  concerned. 
We  are  only  anticipating  our  own  apprehension,  the 
formal  conditions  of  which,  as  it  dwells  in  us  before  all 
given  phenomena,  may  well  be  known  a  priori.  In  the 
same  manner  therefore  in  which  time  contains  the  sen- 
suous condition  a  priori  of  the  possibility  of  a  continuous 
progression  of  that  which  exists  to  that  which  follows, 
the  understanding,  by  means  of  the  unity  of  appercep- 
tion, is  a  condition  a  priori  of  the  possibility  of  a  contin- 
uous determination  of  the  position  of  all  phenomena 
in  that  time,  and  this  through  a  series  of  causes  and 
effects,  the  former  producing  inevitably  the  existence 
of  the  latter,  and  thus  rendering  the  empirical  knowledge 
of  the  relations  of  time  valid  for  all  times  (universally) 
and  therefore  objectively  valid. 

In  connection  with  the  foregoing  discussion  it  seems 
advisable  to  call  attention  to  some  aspects  of  Kant's 
work  which  bear  directly  on  the  conception  of  causahty. 
A  complete  unfolding  of  the  implications  connected 
with  the  causal  principle  would  give  an  explanation  of 
the  relations  existing  between  all  the  different  parts  of 
reality.  Such  an  explanation  in  all  its  completeness 
Kant  holds  to  be  impossible.  But  by  a  very  subtle  and 
perplexing  analysis  of  experience  and  its  grounds  he 
indicates  the  different  problems  connected  with  the 
general  principle.    As  in  this  discussion  he  emphasizes 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  121 

now  one  and  then  another  difficulty  to  be  overcome, 
many  different  interpretations  of  his  position  are  made 
possible. 

If  one  reads  Kant's  discussion  of  causality  in  the  light 
of  what  he  says  in  other  places,  the  bases  of  different 
interpretations  of  his  doctrine  of  causahty  come  to  light. 
One  of  Kant's  most  fundamental  contentions  is  that  the 
objects  of  experience  stand  in  organic  relation  to  con- 
sciousness. Consciousness  must^now  its  objects  for 
otherwise  itwould  have_no  conscious  experience.  It 
seems  necessary^_therefore^hat  objects  should  conTorm 


to  Ihe  laws  of  consciousness.  Some  hold  thatTrom  this 
it  is  necessary  to  assert  that  the  realms  the  rational. 
Furthermore  since  theTelatioiT^between  consciousness 
and  its  object  is  inner  and  organic,  they  hold  that  it  is 
not  correctly  conceived  by  means  of  the  causal  relation. 
On  the  objective  side  of  this  organic  whole,  we  find  the 
laws  of  consciousness  objectified.  The  relation  found 
here,  it  is  maintained,  can  not  be  expressed  in  terms  of 
necessary  sequence  but  must  be  considered  as  a  logical 
or  teleological  unity  of  organic  parts.  The  relation  then 
appears  to  be  one  of  necessary  implication,  or  the  rela- 
tion of  ground  to  consequence.  In  this  reduction,  time 
as  a  factor  in  the  causal  relation  vanishes. 

As  was  stated  at  the  outset,  this  point  of  view  is  based 
upon  a  very  real  and  important  aspect  of  Kant's  position. 
It  may  be  that  this  point  of  view  cSn  be  elaborated  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  do  no  violence  to  either  term  of 
the  subject-object  relation.  Ordinarily  however,  this 
point  of  view  takes  a  form  in  which  objects  depend  upon 
subject  to  such  an  extent  that  the  real  force  of  the 


\ 


122      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

subject-object  relation  is  lost.  When  this  is  the  case,  the 
view  is  not  only  opposed  to  many  of  Kant's  explicit 
statements,  but  is  also  opposed  to  the  position  which  was 
its  starting  point.  One  should  not  forget  that  in  the 
subject-object  relation^the  object  is  just  as_real  as  the 
f^iibjprf[jo^riority  is  to  be  asserted  of  either.  It  is  a 
mistake,  therefore,  from  this  point  of  view,  to  take  the 
position  that  consciousness  precedes  and  produces 
objectivity. 

Since  it  is  impossible  to  reduce  either  into  terms  of  the 
other,  and  since  both  of  them  and  their  relation  to  each 
other  seem  to  depend  upon  more  ultimate  conditions, 
the  way  is  open  to  another  aspect  of  Kant's  position 
concerning  cause.  Consciousness  and  with  it  the  entire 
phenomenal  world  seem  to  Kant  to  depend  upon  mate- 
rial and  processes  arising  from  the  activity  of  things  in 
themselves  upon  the  noumenal  conditions  of  the  self. 
Our  concern  here  is  not  with  the  ultimate  nature  either 
of  the  activity  or  of  the  synthetic  processes.  The  im- 
portant point  for  the  consideration  here  is  that  it  is 
necessary  to  assume  them  as  conditions  which  produce 
\  or  ground  our  experience.  These  conditions  are  not  to 
be  conceived  in  temporal  or  spatial  terms  since  space 
and  time  apply  only  to  the  resultant  phenomena.  In  so 
far  as  the  changes  taking  place  in  experience  are  supposed 
to  depend  upon  these  assumed  but  unknown  conditions, 
the  true  nature  of  causaUtyJn  itself  is  unknown. 
""Sjiotherphase,  the  temporal  aspect,  of  causality  is 
explicitly  considered  in  the  Principles  where  Kant  is 
concerned  with  the  a  priori  elements  of  physical  science. 
Before  proceeding  to  this  specific  question  and  its  re- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  1 23 

suits,  it  is  necessary  to  refer  once  more  to  Kant's  general 
position  concerning  the  relation  between  consciousness 
and  objects.  Consciousness  of  time,  as  the  most  prim- 
itive form  of  consciousness,  involves  the  necessity  of  the 
real  connection  of  elements  in  an  object  (substance), 
the  real  connection  of  happenings  in  time  (causahty), 
the  real  spatial  co-existence  and  mutual  determinations 
of  objects  in  a  system  (reciprocity).  These  are  the  objec-  ^ 
tive  side  of  that  primitive  subject-object  relationship 
without  which  there  is  no  consciousness.  Hence  no 
further  demonstration  of  the  a  priority  of  these  elements 
is  required,  and  there  must  be  an  objective  causal  con- 
nection between  events  taking  place  in  time.* 

*  Some  critics  have  found  a  fundamental  inconsistency  in  Kant's 
position  when  he  holds  that  while  the  general  principle  of  causality 
is  a  priori,  particular  laws  of  nature  can  only  be  learned  from  ex- 
perience, and  so  are  a  posteriori.  To  us,  Kant's  position  does  not 
seem  inconsistent,  for  hp  hg.c;  pylifiustively  shown  that  certain 
principles  aj'eji£C£ssaty-Tf4mmaB-~heings  .are. to  linve  nny  experi- 
ence at  all.  This  being  the  case,  it  is  possible  to  predict  with  cer- 
tainty that  such  principles  must  always  be  present  in  human  ex- 
perience. IrrClheT^Words,  these  principles  as  necessary  elements 
in  human  experience  are  known  a  priori.  While  we  can  predicts^ 
with  complete  certainty  what  forms  our  experience  will  take,  we  ^\  / 
can  in  no  wise  predict  what  the  content  of  those  forms  will  hQ\\_y^ 
Therefore,  Kant  holds  that  the  content  of  the  causal  principle 
as  well  as  the  content  of  the  principle  of  substance  must  always 
be  given.  That  is,  even  though  we  must  assume  a  general  dis- 
position, on  the  part  of  the  subject,  to  objectify  and  to  relate  events 
causally,  we  are  equally  constrained  to  look  to  experience  to  fur- 
nish the  material.  In  other  words,  what  the  qualities  are  that 
particular  things  arc  to  have,  and  what  the  things  or  events  are  y  / 
that  arc  to  be  related  causally,  oiL^-hat  the  particularjaws  of 
causal  relation  are,  these  experience  only  can  determine. 


124     INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT'S  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Causality  always  involves  change.  In  explaining  an 
event,  a  preceding  event  is  required.  Even  supposing 
that  the  event  by  which  it  is  to  be  explained  is  contem- 
poraneous, as  is  the  case  in  so  many  causes  and  effects 
in  nature,  that  does  not  after  all  eliminate  the  necessity 
of  a  time  order.  Even  though  cause  and  effect  co-exist, 
taken  together  they  are  facts  that  take  place  in  time  and 
as  such  are  facts  whose  place  in  the  time  order  is  deter- 
mined by  preceding  changes,  without  which  they  would 
not  be  related  in  the  manner  in  which  we  observe  them 
to  be  related.  It  must  in  no  wise  be  taken  from  this 
that  what  happens  is  thus  ultimately  explained.  What 
is  stated  here  concerns  merely  the  way  in  which  we  are 
required  to  view  these  happenings.  If  we  take  time 
abstractly,  the  significance  of  any  moment  of  time  is 
determined  by  the  other  moments  in  the  time  series. 
It  is  impossible  to  reach  any  particular  time  without 
passing  through  the  intervening  times.  What  is  true 
of  pure  time  is  true  of  phenomena  in  time,  therefore 
phenomena  stand  in  necessary  temporal  relationship 
to  one  another. 

CausaHty  manifests  itself  in  time  sequence  and  is 
therefore  under  the  necessary  determinations  of  time 
sequence.  Kant  holds  that  time  sequence  is  a^  nec- 
essary condition  for  a  causal  relation  between  phenom- 
ena. We  are  now  in  a  position  to  see  the  connection  be- 
tween Kant  and  Hume.  Both  insist,  so  far  as  the  known 
significance  of  causaHty  is  concerned,  that  it  can  be 
analyzed  into  a  necessary  temporal  relation  of  antecedent 
and  consequent  phenomena.  The  real  productive  forces, 
however,  are  asserted  by  both  to  be  unknown  and  un- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  1 25 

knowable.  They  agree  again  in  holding  that  concerning 
any  particular  causes  and  effects,  we  are  entirely  de- 
pendent upon  experience.  Anything  may  be  the  cause 
of  anything  else,  for  all  that  we  can  predict.  But  there  is 
this  important  difference  between  them  in  that  Hume 
ordinarily  says  that  the  causal  principle  is  derived  from 
the  succession  of  separate  experiences.  In  other  words,; 
that  it  is  a  habit  arising  from  experience.  But  Kant  has/ 
shown  that  it  is  essentially  bound  up  with  those  condiJ 
tions  without  which  there  would  be  no  human  experienced 
whatever.  Kant's  position  would  be  that  causation  Pr 
can  not  arise  from  empirical  generalization  for  that! 
arises  from  experience  and  that  in  turn  implies  for  its! 
very  existence  those  connective  principles  which  are) 
supposed  to  have  been  derived  from  it.  In  just  so  far  as^ 
Hume  holds  that  cause  is  derived  through  habit  from  a 
succession  of  separate  experiences,  just  so  far  is  the 
Kantian  position  a  refutation  of  Hume. 

C.  Third  Analogy.  Principle  of  Co-existence, 
According  to  thl:  Law  of  Reciprocity  or  Community: 
All  substances,  so  far  as  they  can  he  perceived  as  co-existent 
in  space,  are  always  affecting  each  other  reciprocally. 

Things  are  co-existent  when,  in  empirical  intuition, 
the  perception  of  the  one  can  follow  upon  the  perception 
of  the  other,  and  vice  versa,  which,  as  was  shown  in  the 
second  principle,  is  impossible  in  the  temporal  succession 
of  phenomena.  Thus  I  may  first  observe  the  moon  and 
afterwards  the  earth,  or,  conversely  also,  first  the  earth 
and  afterwards  the  moon,  and  because  the  perceptions 
of  these  objects  can  follow  each  other  in  both  ways,  I 


126      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

say  that  they  are  co-existent.  Now  co-existence  is  the 
existence  of  the  manifold  in  the  same  time.  Time  itself, 
however,  can  not  be  perceived,  so  that  we  might  learn 
from  the  fact  that  things  exist  in  the  same  time,  that  their 
perceptions  can  follow  each  other  reciprocally.  The 
synthesis  of  imagination  in  apprehension  would,  there- 
fore, give  us  each  of  these  perceptions  as  existing  in  the 
subject,  when  the  other  is  absent,  and  vice  versa:  it  would 
never  tell  us  that  the  objects  are  co-existent,  that  is, 
that  if  one  is  there,  the  other  also  must  be  there  in  the 
same  time,  and  this  by  necessity,  so  that  the  perceptions 
may  follow  each  other  reciprocally.  Hence  we  require 
a  concept  of  understanding  of  the  reciprocal  sequence 
of  determinations  of  things  existing  at  the  same  time, 
but  outside  each  other  in  order  to  be  able  to  say,  that 
the  reciprocal  sequence  of  the  perceptions  is  founded  in 
'the  object,  and  thus  to  represent  their  co-existence  as 
objective.  The  relation  of  substances,  however,  of  which 
the  first  has  determinations,  the  ground  of  which  deter- 
minations is  contained  in  the  other,  is  the  relation  of 
influence,  and  if,  conversely  also,  the  first  contains  the 
ground  of  determinations  in  the  latter,  the  relation  is 
that  of  community  or  reciprocity.  Hence  the  co-existence 
of  substances  in  space  can  not  be  known  in  experience 
otherwise  but  under  the  supposition  of  reciprocal  action: 
and  this  is  therefore  the  condition  also  of  the  possibility 
of  things  themselves  as  objects  of  experience. 

We  have  here  another  example  of  Kant's  transcenden- 
tal proof.  Startingjrom  a  world  of  interrelated  objects, 
he-asks  how  is  surh  q  wprld  p£>ggih1p  In  answer  to  this 
question  Kant  shows  that  the  rafpgnry  of  rpn'pron'ty  is 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  1 27 

necessarily  involved.  Phenomeimcan  not  be  determined 
b}^_5{iace  since  space  is  not  directlyperceived,  and  yet 
they  must  be  determined  in  relation  to  each  other  in 
some  manner.  This  is  only  possible  if  we  look  upon 
sensations  as  qualities  of  substances  which  mutually 
determine  eaclL_o_ther.  Thus  only  can  we  apprehend 
different  objects  as  appearing  to  us  as  unified  into  a 
single  world.  Kant  emphasizes  |this  in  a  note:  For  the 
unity  of  the  world,  the  whole  in  which  all  phenomena 
are  supposed  to  be  combined,  i^xmanifestly  a  mere  con- 
sequence of  the  tacitly  assun^d]  principle  of  the  com- 
munity ofv^U  substances  which  co-exist;  for,  if  they  were 
isolated,  they  would  n9:t^onstuute  parts  of  one  whole; 
and  if  their  connection  (the  reciprocity  of  the  manifold) 
were  not  necessary  as  the  presupposition  of  the  co- 
existence, we  could-ii^ver  argue  from  the  latter,  which 
is  a  merely  ideal  relation,  to  the  former,  which  is  a  real 
relation  of  them.  We  have,  however,  shown  that  com- 
munity is  the  ground  of  the  possibility  of  any  empirical 
knowledge  of  co-existence,  and,  therefore,  we  can  quite 
legitimately  conclude  from  the  latter  to  the  former  as 
its  necessary  precondition. 

IV.  Postulates  of  Empirical  Thought  tj  General 

1.  What  agrees  with  the  formal  conditions  of  expe- 
rience (in  intuition  and  in  concepts)  is  possible. 

2.  What  is  connected  with  the  material  conditions  of 
experience  (sensation)  is  real. 

3.  That  which,  in  its  connection  with  the  real,  is  de- 
termined by  universal  conditions  of  experience,  is  (ex- 
ists as)  necessary. 


t's  critical  philosophy 

The  categories  of  modality  have  this  peculiar  char- 
acter that,  as  determining  an  object,  they  do  not  en- 
large in  the  least  the  concept  to  which  they  are  attached 
as  predicates,  but  express  only  a  relation  to  our  faculty 
of  knowledge.  Even  when  the  concept  of  a  thing  is 
^^  quite  complete^  I  can  still  ask  withreferenre  to  that 
object^wSether  it  is  possible  only,  orreaHalagj^and,  if  the 
latter,  whether  it  is  necessary?  No  new  determinations 
of  the  object  are  thereby  conceived,  but  it  is  only  asked 
in  what  relation  it  (with  all  its  determinations)  stands 
to  the  understanding  and  its  empirical  employment,  to 
the  empirical  faculty  of  judgment,  and  to  reason,  in  its 
'application  to  experience? 

The  principles  of  modality  are  therefore  nothing  but 
explanations  of  the  concepts  of  possibiHty,  reahty,  and 
necessity,  in  their  empirical  employment,  confining  all 
categories  to  an  empirical  employment  only,  and  pro- 
hibiting their  transcendent  use.  For  if  these  categories 
are  not  to  have  a  purely  logical  character,  expressing  the 
forms  of  thought  analytically,  but  are  to  refer  to  things, 
their  possibility,  reality,  or  necessity,  they  must  have 
reference  to  possible  experience  and  its  synthetical  unity, 
in  which  alone  objects  of  knowledge  can  be  given. 

The  principles  of  modality  are  not  objectively  syn- 
thetical, because  the  predicates  of  possibility,  reality, 
and  necessity  do  not  in  the  least  increase  the  concept 
of  which  they  are  predicated,  by  adding  anything  to  its 
representation.  But  as  nevertheless  they  are  synthetical, 
they  are  so  subjectively  only,  that  is,  they  add  to  the 
concept  of  a  (real)  thing,  without  predicating  anything 
new,  the  pecuHar  faculty  of  knowledge  from  which  it 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  1 29 

springs  and  on  which  it  depends,  so  that,  if  in  the  under- 
standing the  concept  is  only  connected  with  the  formal 
conditions  of  experience,  its  object  is  called  possible;  if 
it  is  connected  with  perception  (sensation  as  the  material 
of  the  senses),  and  through  it  determined  by  the  under- 
standing, its  object  is  called  real;  while,  if  it  is  determined 
through  the  connection  of  perceptions,  according  to 
concepts,  its  object  is  called  necessary.  The  principles 
of  modaHty  therefore  predicate  nothing  of  a  concept 
except  the  act  of  the  faculty  of  knowledge  by  which  it 
is  produced.  v 

It  is  possible  to  say  that  the  Principles  sum  up,  in  a 
general  way,  the  preceding  development  of  the  Critique. 
The  progress  has  been  from  the  factual  (the  given  per- 
ceptions) to  a  scientifically  organized  body  of  knowledge 
in  which  reahty  appears  in  all  its  relations  as  neces- 
sarily determined.  The  Postulates  may  be  interpreted  as 
indicating  that  Kant  was  now  seeking  to  break  down 
the  over-accentuated  separation  between  the  different 
faculties  of  knowledge. 

In  general,  these  Principles  show  the  necessary  stages 
through  which  individual  and  race  must  pass  to  come 
to  scientific  knowledge,  and  finally  to  complete  self- 
consciousness.  We  do  not  mean  that  each  Principle 
represents  a  distinct  and  separate  period  though  one  or 
another  of  them  would  fairly  well  characterize  the  grade 
of  knowledge  at  a  particular  stage.  We  mean  to  assert 
that  these  are  logical  moments  in  thought  representing 
a  certain  relation  between  subject  and  objectivity,  or 
nature.    All  of  these  moments  are  present,  to  some  ex- 


130      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

tent,  either  implicitly  or  explicitly  in  the  thinking  at 
all  stages  of  knowledge. 

If  one  takes  the  point  of  view  that  reality  exists  as  an 
'  independent  world  over  against  the  subject,  a  reality 
which  he  can  come  to  know  with  varying  degrees  of 
exactness,  then  one  must  say  of  these  Postulates  that 
they  are  not  ontological,  but  that  they  simply  indicate  a 
progressive  development  which  passes  from  a  bare  knowl- 
edge of  reaHty  to  a  knowledge  of  the  laws  of  the  relations 
of  things.  If,  on  the  contrary,  one_jtake.s,  the  position 
that  reaUty~is~unknowable(and  this  would_seem  to  be 
KantTdominatin^  point  of  view}ithen_from  this  point 
of  view  the  Postulates  indicate  the  relation  between  con- 
sclousnessand~T^^ewdwmaZ^orlJ  SuclTa  phenomenal 
world,  ofcourseT^eed  not  be  subjective,  that  is,  it  may 
be  the  world  which  science  attempts  to  know,  the  world  of 
possible  experience.  The  Postulates,  from  this  stand- 
point, show  a  progressive  deepening  of  the  subject's 
understanding  of  laws  which  he  may  have  unconsciously 
furnished  to  nature,  a  process  culminating  in  explicit 
self-consciousness.  To  some  (Hegelians  and  Neo- 
Hegelians)  it  seems  a  short  and  necessary  step  to  a  denial 
of  the  existence  of  a  realm  of  things  in  themselves.  This 
is  equivalent  to  saying  that  the  world  of  possible  expe- 
rience (the  phenomenal  world  of  Kant)  is  the  real  world. 
This  involves  the  position  that  the  real  world  is  rational. 
At  this  point  the  entire  ontological  problem  changes, 
and  hence  the  significance  of  the  Postulates  also  changes. 

In  the  course  of  his  discussion  of  the  second  Postulate, 
that  of  reality,  Kant  says  that  wherever  perception  and 
its  train  can  reach,  according  to  our  empirical  laws, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  131 

there  our  knowledge  also  of  the  existence  of  things  can 
reach.  But  if  we  do  not  begin  with  experience,  or  do  not 
proceed  according  to  the  laws  of  the  empirical  connection 
of  phenomena,  we  are  only  making  a  vain  display,  as  if 
we  could  guess  and  discover  the  existence  of  anything. 
Here  he  then  places,  in  the  second  edition,  his  Refutation 
of  Idealism.  On  account -(j)f  the  way  in  which  it  throws 
light  on  Kant's  phenomerlaHsm,  it  is  thought  best  to 
give  this  refutation  in  its  entirety. 


^L 


Refutation  of  Idealism 


Idealism  (I  mean  material  ideahsm)  is  the  theory 
which  declares  the  existence  of  objects  in  space,  without 
us,  as  either  doubtful  only  and  not  demonstrable,  or  as 
false  and  impossible.  The  former  is  the  problematical 
idealism  of  Descartes,  who  declares  one  empirical  asser-- 
tion  only  to  be  undoubted,  namely,  that  of  I  am;  the 
latter  is  the  dogmatical  ideaHsm  of  Berkeley,  who  declares 
space  and  all  things  to  which  it  belongs  as  an  inseparable 
condition,  as  something  impossible  in  itself,  and,  there- 
fore, the  things  in  space  as  mere  imaginations.  Dog- 
matic idealism  is  inevitable,  if  we  look  upon  space  as  a 
property  belonging  to  things  in  themselves,  for  in  that 
case  space  and  all  of  which  it  is  a  condition,  would  be  a 
non-entity.  The  ground  on  which  that  ideahsm  rests 
has  been  removed  by  us  in  the  transcendental  ^Esthetic. 
Problematical  idealism,  which  asserts  nothing,  but  only 
pleads  our  inability  of  proving  any  existence  except  our 
own  by  means  of  immediate  experience,  is  reasonable 
and  in  accordance  with  a  sound  philosophical  mode  of 
thought,  which  allows  of  no  decisive  judgment,  before  a 


132      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANt's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

sufficient  proof  has  been  found.  The  required  proof 
will  have  to  demonstrate  that  we  may  have  not  only  an 
imagination,  but  also  an  experience  of  external  things, 
and  this  it  seems  can  hardly  be  effected  in  any  other  way 
except  by  proving  that  even  our  internal  experience, 
/which  Descartes  considers— as  undoubted,  is  possible 
X    oiily  under  the  supposition  of  external  experience. 

Theorem 

The  simple,  but  empirically  determined  Consciousness  0} 
my  own  existence,  proves  the  Existence  of  objects  in  space 
outside  myself. 

Proof 

I  am  conscious  of  my  own  existence  as  determined  in 
time,  and  all  determination  in  time  presupposes  some- 
thing permanent  in  the  perception.  That  permanent, 
however,  can  not  be  an  intuition  within  me,  because  all 
the  causes  which  determine  my  existence,  so  far  as  they 
can  be  found  within  me,  are  representations,  and  as  such 
require  something  permanent,  different  from  them,  in 
reference  to  which  their  change,  and  therefore  my  exist- 
ence in  time  in  which  they  change,  may  be  determined. 
The  perception  of  this  permanent,  therefore,  is  possible 
only  through  a  thing  outside  me,  and  not  through  the 
mere  representation  of  a  thing  outside  me,  and  the  deter- 
mination of  my  existence  in  time  is,  consequently,  pos- 
sible only  by  the  existence  of  real  things,  which  I  per- 
ceive outside  me.  Now,  as  the  consciousness  in  time  is 
necessarily  connected  with  the  consciousness  of  the 
possibihty  of  that  determination  of  time,  it  is  also  nee- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  I33 

essarily  connected  with  the  existence  of  things  outside 
me,  as  the  condition  of  the  determination  of  time.  In 
other  words,  the  consciousness  of  my  own  existence  is, 
at  the  same  time,  an  immediate  consciousness  of  the 
existence  of  other  things. 

Note  I. — It  will  have  been  perceived  that  in  the  fore- 
going proof  the  trick  played  by  idealism  has  been  turned 
against  it,  and  with  greater  justice.  IdeaHsuL^assumed 
that_^e  onlyimmediate  experienceis  the  internal,  and 
that  from  it  we  can  no  more  than  infer  external  things, 
though  in  an  untrustworthy  manner  only,  as  always 
happens  if  from  given  effects  we  infer  definite  causes:  it 
being  quite  possible  that  the  cause  of  the  representations, 
which  are  ascribed  by  us,  it  may  be  wrongly,  to  external 
things,  may  lie  within  ourselves.  We,  however,  have 
proved  that  external  experience  is  really  immediate,* 
and  that  only  by  means  of  it,  though  not  the  conscious- 
ness of  my  own  existence,  yet  its  determination  in  time, 
that  is,  internal  experience,  becomes  possible.    No  doubt 

*Kant's  Footnote.  ThQ  immediate  consciousness  of  the  existence 
jpf  external  things  is  not  simply  assumed  in  the  preceding  theorem, 
but  proved,  whether  we  can  understand  the  possibility  of  this  con- 
sciousness or  not.  The  question  with  regard  to  that  possibility 
would  come  to  this,  whether  we  have  an  internal  sense  only,  and 
no  external  sense,  but  merely  an  external  imagination.  It  is  clear, 
however,  that,  even  in  order  to  imagine  only  something  as  external, 
that  is,  to  represent  it  to  the  senses  in  intuition,  we  must  have  an 
external  sense,  and  thus  distinguish  immediately  the  mere  recep- 
tivity of  an  external  intuition  from  that  spontaneity  which  char- 
acterizes every  act  of  imagination.  For  merely  to  imagine  an 
external  sense  would  really  be  to  destroy  the  faculty  of  in- 
tuition, which  is  to  be  determined  by  the  faculty  of  imagina- 
tion. 


134      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  representation  of  /  am,  which  expresses  the  con- 
sciousness that  can  accompany  all  thought,  is  that  which 
immediately  includes  the  existence  of  a  subject;  but  it 
does  not  yet  include  a  knowledge  of  it,  and  therefore  no 
empirical  knowledge,  that  is,  experience.  For  that  we 
require,  besides  the  thought  of  something  existing,  in- 
tuition also,  and  in  this  case  internal  intuition  in  respect 
to  which,  that  is,  to  time,  the  subject  must  be  deter- 
mined. For  that  purpose  external  objects  are  absolutely 
necessary,  so  that  internal  experience  itself  is  possible, 
mediately  only,  and  through  external  experience. 

Note  2. — This  view  is  fully  confirmed  by  the  empirical 
use  of  our  faculty  of  knowledge,  as  applied  to  the  deter- 
mination of  time.  Not  only  are  we  unable  to  perceive 
any  determination  of  time,  except  through  a  change  in 
external  relations  (motion)  with  reference  to  what  is 
permanent  in  space  (for  instance,  the  movement  of  the 
sun  with  respect  to  terrestrial  objects),  but  we  really 
have  nothing  permanent  to  which  we  could  refer  the 
concept  of  a  substance,  as  an  intuition,  except  matter 
only:  and  even  its  permanence  is  not  derived  from  ex- 
ternal experience,  but  presupposed  a  priori  as  a  necessary 
condition  of  all  determination  of  time,  and  therefore  also 
of  the  determination  of  the  internal  sense  with  respect 
to  our  own  existence  through  the  existence  of  external 
things.  The  consciousness  of  myself,  in  the  representa- 
tion of  the  ego,  is  not  an  intuition,  but  a  merely  intellectual 
representation  of  the  spontaneity  of  a  thinking  subject. 
Hence  that  ego  has  not  the  slightest  predicate  derived 
from  intuition,  which  predicate,  as  permanent,  might 
serve  as  the  correlate  of  the  determination  of  time  in  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  135 

internal  sense:  such  as  is,  for  instance,  impermeability 
in  matter,  as  an  empirical  intuition. 

Note  3. — Because  the  existence  of  external  objects  is 
required  for  the  possibiHty  of  a  definite  consciousness 
of  ourselves,  it  does  not  follow  that  every  intuitional 
representation  of  external  things  involves,  at  the  same 
time,  their  existence;  for  such  a  representation  may 
well  be  the  mere  effect  of  the  faculty  of  imagination  (in 
dreams  as  well  as  in  madness) ;  but  it  can  be  such  an  effect 
only  through  the  reproduction  of  former  external  per- 
ceptions, which,  as  we  have  shown,  is  impossible  without 
the  reality  of  external  objects.  What  we  wanted  to  prove 
here  was  only  that  internal  experience  in  general  is 
possible  only  through  external  experience  in  general. 
Whether  this  or  that  supposed  experience  be  purely 
imaginary,  must  be  settled  according  to  its  own  particu- 
lar determinatxons,  and  through  a  comparison  with  the 
criteria  of  all  real  experience.* 

Before  leaving  the  consideration  of  the  Principles,  it 
may  be  helpful  to  indicate  the  general  aspects  of  the 
problem  with  which  Kant  has  been  concerned.  The 
problem  of  the  schematism  was  to  show  how  the  cat- 
egories apply  to  the  objects  with  which  physical  science 
is  concerned,  and  the  Principles  are  the  actual  carrying 
out  of  the  schematism,  in  so  far  as  they  state  the  a  priori 

*  The  insistence,  in  the  refutation,  upon  the  organic  nature  of 
the  subject-object  relationship  in  knowledge,  may  appear  to  jus- 
tify that  interpretation  of  Kant  made  by  the  objective  idealists. 
But  it  must  be  remembered  that  Kant  is  here  dealing  with  a  world 
of  knowledge — the  phenomenal  world, — which  is  of  course  deter- 
mined as  to  its  form  by  the  unity  of  consciousness. 


136      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANt's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

synthetic  judgments  which  the  categories  enable  us  to 
make  concerning  nature,  that  is,  the  subject-matter  of 
physical  science. 

From  this  may  be  seen  that  Kant's  position  is  not 

,    arrived  at  through  a  combination  of  rationalism  and 

/     empiricism,  but  that  his  philosophy  is  a  real  empiri- 

^*Nof      cism  since  the  principles  of  knowledge  as  well  as  the 

/      content  are  reached  through  an  analysis  of  concrete 

experience,   f^^! '  Pc<kA-L/i^i '  m  f  1:^V;  cAt  ii^  ^  //^  ^,^ ,  a  w, 

This  subject-matter  of  physical  science  appears  in 
consciousness  through  the  process  of  perception,  and 
Kant  has  distinguished  between  the  external  sense,  the 
form  of  which  is  space,  and  the  internal  sense,  the  form 
of  which  is  time.  So  in  his  treatment  of  the  four  Prin- 
ciples he  calls  the  first  two  mathematical,  and  the  last 
two  dynamical. 

In  the  Axioms,  he  points  out  how  the  objects  of  exter- 
nal sense  appear  to  us  by  adding  part  to  part,  that  is, 
as  aggregates,  and  so  are  extensive  magnitudes.  In  this 
way  the  pure  mathematics  based  on  pure  perception 
becomes  valid  for  the  objects  which  fill  space,  and  so 
for  applied  mathematics. 

In  the  Anticipations  we  have  a  situation  which,  at 
first  glance,  seems  to  be  subjective  rather  than  objective, 
for  he  starts  from  the  awareness  of  degrees  of  intensity 
in  our  sensations.  But  upon  reflection,  degrees  of  in- 
tensity involve  quantitative  considerations,  and  so  the 
Anticipations  after  all  belong  to  the  mathematical 
Principles.  The  extensive  magnitude  of  two  objects 
may  be  the  same,  and  yet  the  fact  that  they  have  dif- 
ferent weights  enables  him  to  infer  that  there  is  degree 


TRANSCENDENTAL  ANALYTIC  137 

in  the  intensity  of  space  filling  objects.  This  leads  him 
to  the  d>Tiamical  theory  of  matter. 

So  far  he  has  been  concerned  with  the  external  rela- 
tionships involved  in  extensive  or  intensive  magnitudes. 
Now  another  side  of  nature  engages  his  attention, 
namely,  that  nature  which,  while  it  is  constantly  in  a 
state  of  change,  is  after  all  a  systematized  whole,  and 
the  changes  within  which  whole,  must  be  taken  as  inner 
determinations  of  each  other.  Here  he  has  the  problem 
of  the  dynamical  Principles. 

The  first  of  the  Analogies  is  substance.  Substance  is 
necessitated  as  a  permanent  substratum  without  which 
change  is  uninteUigible.  Creation,  that  is,  change  from 
nothing  into  something  is  phenomenally  impossible. 
The  only  change  which  is  phenomenally  possible  is 
change  of  state  or  alteration.  This  makes  clear  why  the 
principle  of  conservation  of  energy  is  such  a  basic  prin- 
ciple in  physical  science. 

The  second  of  the  Analogies  is  causation.  In  the 
preceding  Analogy  there  was  a  recognition  that  change 
is  always  relative  to  a  permanent.  Here  the  situation 
to  be  considered  arises  out  of  the  realization  that  every 
state  in  a  series  is  necessarily  connected  with  another 
state,  and  that  in  a  time  order.  In  a  series  of  sensations, 
their  order  may  be  entirely  accidental  and  arbitrary;  in  a 
series  of  phenomena  on  the  contrary,  the  order  is  irrevers- 
ible and  necessary.  For  only  through  this  irreversibility 
and  necessity  of  the  order,  do  we  call  the  series  objective, 
and  with  this  comes  the  consequence  that  in  order  to  have 
a  phenomenal  world  of  objects,  we  must  look  upon  each 
event  as  the  necessary  result  of  a  preceding  cause. 


138      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

In  the  third  of  the  Analogies,  reciprocity,  we  have  a 
further  deepening  of  the  insight.  The  mathematical 
Principles  in  treating  of  quantities,  involved  only  ex- 
ternal relationships;  in  substance  an  internal  relationship 
is  expressed;  in  causation  the  internal  feature  is  made 
more  explicit;  whereas  in  reciprocity  or  interaction  we 
reach  a  culmination  of  this  process  so  far  as  mechanical 
relationship  is  concerned,  and  come  to  a  situation  in 
which  nature  is  considered  as  a  whole,  and  its  unity  is 
intelligible  through  the  mutual,  that  is,  reciprocal  inner 
relation  of  the  parts  of  the  whole.  Without  the  principle 
of  reciprocity,  that  is,  an  inner,  mutual  determination 
of  the  organically  related  parts  of  the  whole,  nature  as  a 
unity  would  be  impossible. 

The  Postulates  compose  the  fourth  of  the  Principles. 
Hitherto,  even  though  the  categories  have  been  used, 
nature  was  taken  as  something  external  to  the  knowing 
subject  because  the  subject  has  been  unconscious  of  the 
part  that  he  has  taken  in  determining  the  world  of 
phenomenal  reality.  Now  the  consideration  has  to  do 
with  the  relation  of  the  knowing  subject  to  nature, 
and  the  Postulates  express  an  increasingly  internal 
character  of  this  relation  due  to  the  ever  increasing  self- 
consciousness  in  the  employment  of  the  categories. 
The  knowing  subject  is  now  seen  to  be  a  vitally  deter- 
mining factor  in  the  character  of  the  world  of  phenomena. 
That  which  is  consistent  with  the  forms  of  experience 
is  possible;  that  which  is  connected  with  the  material 
conditions  of  experience  is  real;  and  that  which,  in  its 
connection  with  the  real,  is  determined  by  the  universal 
conditions  of  experience,  is  necessary. 


transcendental  analytic  i39 

Transition  to  the  Transcendental  Dialectic 

We  have  now  not  only  traversed  the  whole  domain 
of  the  pure  understanding,  and  carefully  examined  each 
part  of  it,  but  we  have  also  measured  its  extent,  and 
assigned  to  everything  in  it  its  proper  place.  This 
domain,  however,  is  an  island  and  enclosed  by  nature 
itself  within  limits  that  can  never  be  changed.  It  is  the 
country  of  truth,  but  surrounded  by  a  wide  and  stormy 
ocean,  the  true  home  of  illusion,  where  many  a  fog  bank, 
and  ice  that  soon  melts  away  tempt  us  to  believe  in 
new  lands,  while  constantly  deceiving  the  adventurous 
mariner  with  vain  hopes,  and  involving  him  in  adven- 
tures which  he  can  never  leave,  and  yet  can  never  bring 
to  an  end.  Before  we  venture  ourselves  on  this  sea,  in 
order  to  explore  it  on  every  side,  and  to  find  out  whether 
anything  is  to  be  hoped  for  there,  it  will  be  useful  to 
glance  once  more  at  the  map  of  that  country  which  we 
are  about  to  leave,  and  to  ask  ourselves,  first,  whether 
we  ought  not  be  content  with  what  it  contains,  nay, 
whether  we  must  not  be  content  with  it,  supposing  that 
there  is  no  solid  ground  anywhere  else  on  which  we  could 
settle;  secondly,  by  what  title  we  possess  even  that 
domain,  and  may  consider  ourselves  safe  against  all 
hostile  claims. 

We  have  found  thus  far  in  the  Analytic  that  the  cat- 
egories require,  besides  the  pure  concepts  of  the  under- 
standing, certain  determinations  of  their  application  to 
sensibility  in  general  (schemata).  Without  them,  they 
would  not  be  concepts  by  which  an  object  can  be  known 
and  distinguished  from  other  objects,  but  only  so  many 


140      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANt's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ways  of  thinking  an  object  for  possible  intuitions,  and 
giving  to  it,  according  to  one  of  the  functions  of  the 
understanding,  its  meaning.  Therefore  the  pure  con- 
cepts of  the  understanding  admit  of  empirical  use  only, 
and  can  be  referred  merely,  as  general  conditions  of  a 
possible  experience,  to  objects  of  the  senses,  never  to 
things  in  themselves. 

Appearances  so  far  as  they  are  thought  as  objects 
under  the  unity  of  the  categories  are  called  phenomena. 
But  if  I  admit  things  which  are  objects  of  the  under- 
standing only,  and  nevertheless  can  be  given  as  objects 
of  a  non-sensuous  intuition,  such  things  would  be  called 
noumena. 

If  all  thought  (by  means  of  the  categories)  is  taken 
away  from  empirical  knowledge,  no  knowledge  of  any 
object  remains,  because  nothing  can  be  thought  by  mere 
intuition,  and  the  mere  fact  that  there  is  within  me  an 
affection  of  my  sensibility,  establishes  in  no  way  any  rela- 
tion of  such  a  representation  to  any  object.  If,  on  the 
contrary,  all  intuition  is  taken  away,  there  always  remains 
the  form  of  thought,  that  is,  the  mode  of  determining 
an  object  for  the  manifold  of  a  possible  intuition.  In 
this  sense  the  categories  may  be  said  to  extend  further 
than  sensuous  intuition,  because  they  can  think  objects 
in  general  without  any  regard  to  the  special  mode  of 
sensibility  in  which  they  may  be  given;  but  they  do  not 
thus  prove  a  larger  sphere  of  objects,  because  we  can  not 
admit  that  such  objects  can  be  given,  without  admitting 
the  possibility  of  some  intuition  not  sensuous,  for  which 
we  have  no  right  whatever. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  LOGIC 

Part  II 

TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Transcendental  Logic,  general 
logic  was  said  to  involve  two  parts:  transcendental 
analytic  and  transcendental  dialectic.  It  was  there  said 
(p.  45)  that  in  the  dialectic,  the  understanding  runs  the 
risk  of  making,  through  mere  sophisms,  a  material  use 
of  the  purely  formal  principles  of  the  pure  understanding, 
and  thus  of  judging  indiscriminately  of  objects  which  are 
not  given  to  us,  nay,  perhaps  can  never  be  given.  In 
transcendental  logic,  the  transcendental  dialectic  must 
therefore  form  a  critique  of  that  dialectical  semblance. 

Logical  illusion,  which  consists  in  a  mere  imitation  of 
the  forms  of  reason,  arises  entirely  from  want  of  attention 
to  logical  rules.  It  disappears  at  once,  when  our  atten- 
tion is  roused.  Transcendental  illusion,  on  the  contrary, 
does  not  disappear,  although  it  has  been  exposed,  and 
its  worthlessness  rendered  clear  by  means  of  transcenden- 
tal criticism,  as,  for  instance,  the  illusion  inherent  in  the 
proposition  that  the  world  must  have  a  beginning  in  time. 
The  cause  of  this  is  that  there  exist  in  our  reason  (con- 
sidered subjectively  as  a  faculty  of  human  knowledge) 
principles  and  maxims  of  its  use,  which  have  the  appear- 
ance of  objective  principles,  and  lead  us  to  mistake  the 
subjective  necessity  of  a  certain  connection  of  our  con- 

141 


142      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

cepts  in  favor  of  the  understanding  for  an  objective 
necessity  in  the  determination  of  things  in  themselves. 
This  illusion  is  as  impossible  to  avoid  as  it  is  to  prevent 
the  sea  from  appearing  to  us  higher  at  a  distance  than  on 
the  shore,  because  we  see  it  by  higher  rays  of  light;  or  to 
prevent  the  moon  from  appearing,  even  to  an  astronomer, 
larger  at  its  rising,  although  he  is  not  deceived  by  that 
illusion. 

Transcendental  dialectic  must,  therefore,  be  content 
to  lay  bare  the  illusion  of  transcendental  judgments  and 
guard  against  its  deceptions — but  it  will  never  succeed 
in  removing  the  transcendental  illusion  (like  the  logical), 
and  putting  an  end  to  it  altogether.  For  we  have  here 
to  deal  with  a  natural  and  inevitable  illusion,  which 
itself  rests  upon  subjective  principles,  representing 
them  to  us  as  objective,  while  logical  dialectic,  in  re- 
moving sophisms  has  to  deal  merely  with  the  mistake 
in  applying  the  principles,  or  with  an  artificial  illusion 
produced  by  an  imitation  of  them.  There  exists,  there- 
fore, a  natural  and  inevitable  dialectic  of  pure  reason, 
not  one  in  which  a  mere  bungler  might  get  entangled 
from  want  of  knowledge,  or  which  a  sophist  might 
artificially  devise  to  confuse  rational  people,  but  one 
that  is  inherent  in,  and  inseparable  from  human  reason, 
and  which,  even  after  its  illusion  has  been  exposed,  will 
never  cease  to  fascinate  our  reason,  and  to  precipitate 
it  into  momentary  errors,  such  as  require  to  be  removed 
again  and  again. 

Reason,  in  the  broad  sense,  includes  all  the  faculties  of 
knowledge.  If  the  understanding  is  a  faculty  for  pro- 
ducing unity  among  phenomena,   according   to  rules, 


f^  TRANSCENDENTAL   DIALECTIC  1 43 

reason,  in  the  narrow  sense,  is  the  faculty  for  producing 
unity  among  the  rules  of  the  understanding,  according 
to  principles.  Reason,  in  the  narrow  sense,  never  looks 
directly  to  experience,  or  to  any  object,  but  to  the  under- 
standing, in  order  to  impart  a  priori  through  concepts 
to  its  manifold  kinds  of  knowledge  a  unity  that  may 
be  called  the  unity  of  reason,  and  is  very  different  from 
the  unity  which  can  be  produced  by  the  understand- 
ing. 

The  merely  formal  and  logical  procedure  of  reason  in 
syllogisms  gives  us  sufficient  hints  as  to  the  ground  on 
which  the  transcendental  principle  of  synthetical  knowl- 
edge, by  means  of  pure  reason,  is  likely  to  rest. 

Reason  in  its  logical  employment,  looks  for  the  general 
condition  of  its  judgment  (the  conclusion),  and  the 
syllogism  produced  by  reason  is  itself  nothing  but  a 
judgment  reached  through  subsumption  of  its  condition 
under  a  general  rule  (the  major).  But  as  thi?  rule  is 
again  liable  to  the  same  experiment,  reason  having  to 
seek,  as  long  as  possible,  the  condition  of  a  condition  (by 
means  of  a  pro-syllogism),  it  is  easy  to  see  that  it  is  the 
pecuHar  function  of  reason  (in  its  logical  use)  to  find  for 
every  conditioned  knowledge  of  the  understanding  the 
unconditioned,  whereby  the  unity  of  that  knowledge  may 
be  completed.  The  transcendental  concept  of  reason  is, 
therefore,  nothing  but  the  concept  of  the  totality  of  the 
conditions  of  anything  given  as  conditioned.  As  there- 
fore the  unconditioned  alone  renders  a  totality  of  condi- 
tions possible,  and  as  conversely  the  totahty  of  conditions 
must  always  be  unconditioned,  it  follows  that  a  pure 
concept  of  reason  in  general  may  be  explained  as  a  con- 


144      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT'S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

cept  of  the  unconditioned,  so  far  as  it  contains  a  basis 
for  the  synthesis  of  the  conditioned. 

As  many  kinds  of  relations  as  there  are,  which  the  un- 
derstanding represents  to  itself  by  means  of  the  categories, 
so  many  pure  concepts  of  the  reason  we  shall  find,  that  is, 
first,  the  unconditioned  of  the  categorical  synthesis  in  a 
subject;  secondly,  the  wiconditioned  of  the  hypothetical 
synthesis  of  the  members  of  a  series;  thirdly,  the  uncondi- 
tioned of  the  disjunctive  synthesis  of  the  parts  of  a  system. 

These  concepts  of  the  reason  Kant  calls  transcenden- 
tal ideas.  They  are  concepts  of  pure  reason,  so  far  as 
they  regard  all  empirical  knowledge  as  determined  by 
an  absolute  totality  of  conditions.  They  are  not  mere 
fancies,  but  supplied  to  us  by  the  very  nature  of  reason, 
and  referring  by  necessity  to  the  whole  use  of  the  under- 
standing. They  are,  lastly,  transcendent,  as  over- 
stepping the  limits  of  all  experience  which  can  never 
supply  an  object  adequate  to  the  transcendental  idea. 
Although  we  must  say  that  all  transcendental  concepts 
of  reason  are  ideas  only,  they  are  not  therefore  to  be 
considered  as  superfluous  and  useless.  For  although  we 
can  not  by  them  determine  any  object,  they  may  never- 
theless, even  unobserved,  supply  the  understanding  with 
a  canon  or  rule  of  its  extended  and  consistent  use,  by 
which,  though  no  object  can  be  better  known  than  it 
is  according  to  its  concepts,  yet  the  understanding  may 
be  better  guided  onwards  in  its  knowledge,  not  to  men- 
tion that  they  may  possibly  render  practicable  a  transi- 
tion from  physical  to  practical  concepts,  and  thus  im- 
part to  moral  ideas  a  certain  strength  and  connection 
with  the  speculative  knowledge  of  reason. 


TR.\NSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  145 

We  see  that  the  relation  of  the  representations  of 
wliich  we  can  form  a  concept  or  an  idea  can  only  be 
three-fold:  first,  the  relation  to  a  subject;  secondly,  the 
relation  to  the  manifold  of  the  phenomenal  object; 
thirdly,  the  relation  to  all  things  in  general.  All  pure 
concepts  in  general  aim  at  a  synthetical  unity  of  rep- 
resentations, while  concepts  of  pure  reason  (transcenden- 
tal ideas)  aim  at  an  unconditioned  synthetical  unity  of 
all  conditions.  All  transcendental  ideas,  therefore,  can 
be  arranged  in  three  classes:  The  first  containing  the 
absolute  (unconditioned)  U7iity  of  the  thinking  subject; 
the  second  the  absolute  unity  of  the  series  of  conditions  of 
phenomena;  the  third  the  absolute  unity  of  the  condition 
of  all  objects  of  thought  in  general. 

The  thinking  subject  is  the  object-matter  of  psychology, 
the  system  of  all  phenomena  (the  wo^ld)  the  object- 
matter  of  cosmology,  and  the  being  which  contains  the 
highest  condition  of  the  possibility  of  all  that  can  be 
thought  (the  being  of  all  beings),  the  object-matter  of 
theology.  Thus  it  is  pure  reason  which  supplies  the  idea 
of  a  transcendental  science  of  the  soul,  of  a  transcendental 
science  of  the  world,  and,  lastly,  of  a  transcendental 
science  of  God.  Even  the  mere  plan  of  any  one  of  these 
three  sciences  does  not  come  from  the  understanding, 
even  if  connected  with  the  highest  logical  use  of  reason, 
that  is,  with  all  possible  conclusions,  leading  from  one  of 
its  objects  (phenomenon)  to  all  others,  and  on  to  the 
most  remote  parts  of  any  possible  empirical  synthesis, — 
but  is  altogether  a  pure  and  genuine  product  or  rather 
problem  of  pure  reason. 

What  kinds  of  pure  concepts  of  reason  arc  compre- 


146      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

hended  under  these  three  titles  of  all  transcendental 
ideas  will  be  fully  explained  later.  They  follow  the 
thread  of  the  categories,  for  pure  reason  never  refers 
directly  to  objects,  but  to  the  concepts  of  objects  framed 
by  the  understanding.  Nor  can  it  be  rendered  clear, 
except  hereafter  in  a  detailed  explanation,  how  first, 
reason  simply  by  the  synthetical  use  of  the  same  function 
which  it  employs  for  categorical  syllogisms  is  necessarily 
led  on  to  the  concept  of  the  absolute  unity  of  the  thinking 
subject;  secondly,  how  the  logical  procedure  in  hypothet- 
ical syllogisms  leads  to  the  idea  of  something  absolutely 
unconditioned,  in  a  series  of  given  conditions,  and  how, 
thirdly,  the  mere  form  of  the  disjunctive  syllogism  pro- 
duces necessarily  the  highest  concept  of  reason,  that  of  a 
being  of  all  beings;  a  thought  which,  at  first  sight,  seems 
extremely  paradoxical. 

No  objective  deduction,  like  that  given  of  the  cat- 
egories, is  possible  with  regard  to  these  transcendental 
ideas;  they  are  ideas  only,  and  for  that  very  reason  they 
have  no  relation  to  any  object  corresponding  to  them  in 
experience.  What  has  been  given  in  the  present  discus- 
sion is  the  only  thing  that  could  be  given,  a  subjective 
deduction. 

We  can  easily  perceive  that  pure  reason  has  no  other 
aim  but  the  absolute  totality  of  synthesis  on  the  side  of 
conditions  (whether  of  inherence,  dependence,  or  con- 
currence), and  that  it  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  absolute 
completeness  on  the  part  of  the  conditioned.  It  is  the  for- 
mer only  which  is  required  for  presupposing  the  whole 
series  of  conditions,  and  thus  presenting  it  a  priori  to 
the  understanding.    If  once  we  have  a  given  condition, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  147 

complete  and  unconditioned  itself,  no  concept  of  reason 
is  required  to  continue  the  series,  because  the  understand- 
ing takes  by  itself  every  step  downward  from  the  condi- 
tion to  the  conditioned.  The  transcendental  ideas  there- 
fore serve  only- for  ascending  in  the  series  of  conditions 
till  they  reach  the  unconditioned,  that  is,  the  principles. 
With  regard  to  descending  to  the  conditioned,  there  is  no 
doubt  a  widely  extended  logical  use  which  our  reason 
may  make  of  the  rules  of  the  understanding,  but  no 
transcendental  one;  and  if  we  form  an  idea  of  the  absolute 
totality  of  such  a  synthesis,  as,  for  instance,  of  the  whole 
series  of  all  future  changes  in  the  world,  this  is  only  a 
thought  that  may  be  thought  if  we  like,  but  is  not  pre- 
supposed as  necessary  by  reason.  For  the  possibiHty  of 
the  conditioned,  the  totality  of  its  conditions  only  but 
not  of  its  consequences,  is  presupposed.  Such  a  concept 
therefore  is  not  one  of  the  transcendental  ideas,  with 
which  alone  we  have  to  deal. 

Finally,  we  can  perceive,  that  there  is  among  the 
transcendental  ideas  themselves  a  certain  connection  and 
unity  by  which  pure  reason  brings  all  its  knowledge  into 
one  system.  There  is  in  the  progression  from  our  knowl- 
edge of  ourselves  (the  soul)  to  a  knowledge  of  the  world, 
and  through  it  to  a  knowledge  of  the  supreme  being, 
something  so  natural  that  it  looks  like  the  logical  progres- 
sion of  reason  from  premises  to  a  conclusion.  Whether 
there  exists  here  a  real  though  hidden  relationship,  such 
as  we  saw  before  between  the  logical  and  transcendental 
use  of  reason,  is  also  one  of  the  questions  the  answer  to 
which  can  only  be  given  in  the  progress  of  these  investiga- 
tions.   For  the  present  we  have  achieved  what  we  wish 


148      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

to  achieve,  by  removing  the  transcendental  concepts  of 
reason,  which  in  the  systems  of  other  philosophers  are 
generally  mixed  up  with  other  concepts,  without  being 
distinguished  even  from  the  concepts  of  the  understand- 
ing, out  of  so  equivocal  a  position;  by  being  able  to  deter- 
mine their  origin  and  thereby  at  the  same  time  their 
number,  which  can  never  be  exceeded,  and  by  thus 
bringing  them  into  a  systematic  connection,  marking 
out  and  enclosing  thereby  a  separate  field  for  pure  reason. 

In  view  of  what  has  been  said  before,  one  may  say 
that  the  object  of  a  purely  transcendental  idea  is  some- 
thing of  which  we  have  no  concept,  although  the  idea  is 
produced  with  necessity  according  to  the  original  laws 
of  reason.  Nor  is  it  possible  indeed  to  form  an  object 
that  should  be  adequate  to  the  demands  of  reason,  a 
concept  of  the  understanding,  that  is,  a  concept  which 
could  be  shown  in  any  possible  experience,  and  rendered 
intuitive.  It  would  be  better,  however,  and  less  liable 
to  misunderstandings,  to  say  that  we  can  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  an  object  corresponding  to  an  idea,  but  a  prob- 
lematic concept  only. 

The  transcendental  (subjective)  reality,  at  least  of 
pure  concepts  of  reason,  depends  on  our  being  led  to  such 
ideas  by  a  necessary  syllogism  of  reason.  There  will  be 
syllogisms,  therefore,  which  have  no  empirical  premises, 
and  by  means  of  which  we  conclude  from  something 
which  we  know  to  something  else  of  which  we  have  no 
concept,  and  to  which,  constrained  by  an  inevitable 
illusion,  we  nevertheless  attribute  objective  reality.  As 
regards  their  result,  such  syllogisms  are  rather  to  be 
called   sophistical  than  rational,   although,   as  regards 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 49 

their  origin,  they  may  claim  the  latter  name,  because 
they  are  not  purely  fictitious  or  accidental,  but  products 
of  the  very  nature  of  reason.  They  are  sophistications, 
not  of  men,  but  of  pure  reason  itself,  from  which  even 
the  wisest  of  men  can  not  escape.  All  he  can  do  is,  with 
great  effort,  to  guard  against  error,  though  never  able 
to  rid  himself  completely  of  an  illusion  which  constantly 
torments  and  mocks  him. 

Of  these  dialectical  syllogisms  of  reason  there  are, 
therefore,  three  classes  only,  that  is,  as  many  as  the  ideas 
to  which  their  conclusions  lead.  In  the  syllogism  of  the 
first  class,  I  conclude  from  the  transcendental  concept 
of  the  subject,  which  contains  nothing  manifold,  the 
absolute  unity  of  the  subject  itself,  of  which,  however,  I 
have  no  concept  in  this  regard.  This  dialectical  syllogism 
I  shall  call  the  transcendental  paralogism. 

The  second  class  of  the  so-called  sophistical  syllogisms 
aims  at  the  transcendental  concept  of  an  absolute  totality 
in  the  series  of  conditions  to  any  given  phenomenon; 
and  I  conclude  from  the  fact  that  my  concept  of  the 
unconditioned  synthetical  unity  of  the  series  is  always 
self-contradictory,  on  the  one  side,  to  the  correctness 
of  the  opposite  unity,  of  which  nevertheless  I  have 
no  concept  either.  The  state  of  reason  in  this  class  of 
dialectical  syllogisms,  I  shall  call  the  antinomy  of  pure 
reason. 

Lastly,  according  to  the  tJiird  class  of  sophistical 
syllogisms,  I  conclude  from  the  totahty  of  conditions, 
under  which  objects  in  general,  so  far  as  they  can  be 
given  to  me,  must  be  thought,  the  absolute  synthetical 
unity  of  all  conditions  of  the  possibility  of  things  in 


150      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT'S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

general ;  that  is  to  say  I  conclude  from  things  which  I  do 
not  know  according  to  their  mere  transcendental  concept, 
a  being  of  all  beings,  which  I  can  know  still  less  through 
a  transcendental  concept,  and  of  the  unconditioned  neces- 
sity of  which  I  can  form  no  concept  whatever.  This 
dialectical  syllogism  of  reason  I  shall  call  the  ideal  of 
pure  reason. 

The  Paralogisms  of  Pure  Reason 

In  the  list  of  the  transcendental  concepts  considered 
in  the  Analytic,  there  was  one  concept  involved  in  all 
of  them,  which  was  the  vehicle  of  all  of  them,  and  like- 
wise transcendental.  This  is  the  concept,  or  if  you  will, 
the  judgment  I  think.  I,  as  thinking,  am  an  object  of 
the  internal  sense,  and  am  called  soul.  The  I,  as  a  think- 
ing being,  is  the  object  of  psychology,  which  may  be 
called  the  rational  science  of  the  soul,  supposing  that  we 
want  to  know  nothing  about  the  soul  except  what,  in- 
dependent of  all  experience,  can  be  deduced  from  the 
concept  of  I,  so  far  as  it  is  present  in  every  act  of 
thought. 

We  shall  therefore  follow  the  thread  of  the  categories, 
with  this  difference,  however,  that  as  here  the  first  thing 
which  is  given  is  a  thing,  the  I,  a  thinking  being,  we  must 
begin  with  the  category  of  substance,  by  which  a  thing 
in  itself  is  represented,  and  then  proceed  backwards, 
though  without  changing  the  respective  order  of  the 
categories,  as  given  before  in  our  table.  The  topic  of  the 
rational  science  of  the  soul,  from  which  has  to  be  derived 
whatever  else  that  science  may  contain,  is  therefore  the 
following. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  15I 

I 

The  Soul  is  substance, 

II  III 

As  regards  its  quality,  simple.  As  regards  the  dif- 
ferent times  in  which  it 
exists,  numerically  iden- 
tical, that  is  unity  (not 
plurahty). 

IV 

It  is  in  relation  to  possible  objects  in  space. 

All  concepts  of  pure  psychology  arise  from  these 
elements,  simply  by  way  of  combination,  and  without 
the  admixture  of  any  other  principle.  The  soul,  taken 
as  substance,  taken  simply  as  the  object  of  the  internal 
sense,  gives  us  the  concept  of  immateriality;  and  as  simple 
substance,  that  of  incorruptibility;  its  identity,  as  that 
of  an  intellectual  substance,  gives  us  personality;  and 
all  these  three  together,  spirituality;  its  relation  to  objects 
in  space  gives  us  the  concept  of  intercourse  with  bodies; 
the  pure  psychology  thus  representing  the  thinking  sub- 
stance as  the  principle  of  life  in  matter,  that  is,  as  soul, 
and  as  the  ground  of  afiimality;  which  again,  as  restricted 
by  spirituality,  gives  us  the  concept  of  immortality. 

To  these  concepts  refer  four  paralogisms  of  a  tran- 
scendental psychology,  which  is  falsely  supposed  to  be 
a  science  of  pure  reason,  concerning  the  nature  of  our 
thinking  being.  We  can,  however,  use  as  the  foundation 
of  such  a  science  nothing  but  the  single,  and  in  itself 


152      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

perfectly  empty,  representation  of  the  I,  of  which  we 
can  not  even  say  that  it  is  a  concept,  but  merety  a  con- 
sciousness that  accompanies  all  concepts.  By  this  I, 
which  thinks,  nothing  is  represented  beyond  a  tran- 
scendental subject  of  thoughts  =  x,  which  is  known  only 
through  the  thoughts  that  are  its  predicates,  and  of 
which,  apart  from  them,  we  can  never  have  the  slightest 
concept,  so  that  we  are  really  turning  round  it  in  a  per- 
petual circle,  having  already  to  use  its  representation, 
before  we  can  form  any  judgment  about  it.  And  this 
inconvenience  is  really  inevitable,  because  consciousness 
in  itself  is  not  so  much  a  representation,  distinguishing 
a  particular  object,  but  really  a  form  of  representation  in 
general,  in  so  far  as  it  is  to  be  called  knowledge,  of  which 
alone  I  can  say  that  I  think  something  by  it. 

It  must  seem  strange,  however,  from  the  very  begin- 
ning, that  the  condition  under  which  I  think,  and  which 
therefore  is  a  property  of  my  own  subject  only,  should  be 
valid  at  the  same  time  for  everything  which  thinks,  and 
that,  depending  on  a  proposition  which  seems  to  be 
empirical,  we  should  venture  to  found  the  apodictical 
and  general  judgment,  namely,  that  everything  which 
thinks  is  such  as  the  voice  of  my  own  consciousness 
declares  it  to  be  within  me.  The  reason  of  it  is,  that  we 
are  constrained  to  attribute  a  priori  to  things  all  the 
qualities  which  form  the  conditions,  under  which  alone  we 
are  able  to  think  them.  Now  it  is  impossible  for  me  to 
form  the  least  representation  of  a  thinking  being  by 
any  external  experience,  but  I  can  do  it  through  self- 
consciousness  only.  Such  objects  therefore  are  nothing 
but  a  transference  of  my  own  consciousness  to  other 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 53 

things,  which  thus,  and  thus  only,  can  be  represented  as 
thinking  beings.  The  proposition  /  think  is  used  in  this 
case,  however,  as  problematical  only;  not  so  far  as  it  may 
contain  the  perception  of  an  existence  (the  Cartesian, 
cogito,  ergo  sum),  but  with  regard  to  its  mere  possibility, 
in  order  to  see  what  properties  may  be  deduced  from 
such  a  simple  proposition  with  regard  to  its  subject, 
whether  such  subject  exists  or  not. 

If  our  knowledge  of  thinking  beings  in  general,  so  far 
as  it  is  derived  from  pure  reason,  were  founded  on  more 
than  the  cogito,  and  if  we  made  use,  at  the  same  time,  of 
observations  on  the  play  of  our  thoughts  and  the  natural 
laws  of  the  thinking  self,  derived  from  them,  we  should 
have  before  us  an  empirical  psychology,  which  would 
form  a  kind  of  physiology  of  the  internal  sense,  and  per- 
haps explain  its  manifestations,  but  would  never  help 
us  to  understand  such  properties  as  do  not  fall  under  any 
possible  experience  (as,  for  instance,  simplicity),  or  to 
teach  apodictically  anything  touching  the  nature  of 
thinking  beings  in  general.  It  would  not  therefore  be  a 
rational  psychology. 

As  the  proposition  I  think  (taken  problematicall}-) 
contains  the  form  of  every  possible  judgment  of  the 
understanding,  and  accompanies  all  categories  as  their 
vehicle,  it  must  be  clear  that  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn 
from  it  can  only  contain  a  transcendental  use  of  the 
understanding  which  declines  all  admixture  of  experience, 
and  of  the  achievements  of  which,  after  what  has  been 
said  before,  we  cannot  form  any  very  favorable  anticipa- 
tions. We  shall  therefore  follow  it,  with  a  critical  eye, 
through  all  the  predicaments  of  pure  psychology. 


154      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

I  do  not  know  any  object  by  merely  thinking,  but  only 
by  determining  a  given  intuition  with  respect  to  that 
unity  of  consciousness  in  which  all  thought  consists; 
therefore,  I  do  not  know  myself  by  being  conscious  of 
myself,  as  thinking,  but  only  if  I  am  conscious  of  the 
intuition  of  myself  as  determined  with  respect  to  the 
function  of  thought.  All  modes  of  self-consciousness 
in  thought  are  therefore  by  themselves  not  yet  concepts 
of  understanding  of  objects  (categories),  but  mere  logical 
functions,  which  present  no  object  to  our  thought  to  be 
known,  and  therefore  do  not  present  myself  either  as  an 
object  to  be  known.  It  is  not  a  consciousness  of  the  deter- 
mining,  but  only  that  of  the  determinable  self,  that  is,  of  my 
internal  intuition  (so  far  as  the  manifold  in  it  can  be  con- 
nected in  accordance  with  the  general  condition  of  the 
unity  of  apperception  in  thought)  which  forms  the  object. 

I.  In  all  judgments  I  am  always  the  determining  sub- 
ject only  of  the  relation  which  constitutes  the  judgment. 
That  I,  who  think,  can  be  considered  in  thinking  as 
subject  only,  and  as  something  not  simply  inherent  in  the 
thinking,  as  predicate,  is  an  apodictical  and  even  iden- 
tical proposition;  but  it  does  not  mean  that,  as  an  object, 
I  am  a  self-dependent  being  or  a  substance.  The  latter 
would  be  saying  a  great  deal,  and  requires  for  its  support 
data  which  are  not  found  in  the  thinking,  perhaps  (so  far 
as  I  consider  only  the  thinking  subject  as  such)  more 
than  I  shall  ever  find  in  it. 

Kant  concludes  that  in  the  first  syllogism  of  tran- 
scendental psychology  reason  imposes  upon  us  an  appar- 
ent knowledge  only,  by  representing  the  constant  logical 
subject  of  thought  as  the  knowledge  of  the  real  subject 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 55 

in  which  that  knowledge  inheres.  Of  that  subject,  how- 
ever, we  have  not  and  can  not  have  the  slightest  knowl- 
edge, because  consciousness  is  that  which  alone  changes 
representations  into  thoughts,  and  in  which  therefore,  as 
the  transcendental  subject,  all  our  perceptions  must  be 
found.  Beside  this  logical  meaning  of  the  I,  we  have  no 
knowledge  of  the  subject  in  itself,  which  forms  the  sub- 
stratum and  foundation  of  it  and  of  all  our  thoughts.  It 
signifies  therefore  a  substance  in  idea  only,  and  not  in 
reaHty. 

2.  That  the  Ego  of  apperception,  and  therefore  the  Ego 
in  every  act  of  thought,  is  a  singular  which  can  not  be 
dissolved  into  a  plurality  of  subjects,  and  that  it  there- 
fore signifies  a  logically  simple  subject,  follows  from  the 
very  concept  of  thinking,  and  is  consequently  an  analyt- 
ical proposition.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  a  thinking 
Ego  is  a  simple  substance,  as  rational  psychology  would 
have  us  believe  for  that  would  then  indeed  be  a  s}Tithet- 
ical  proposition.  The  concept  of  substance  always 
relates  to  intuitions  which,  with  me,  can  not  be  other  but 
sensuous,  and  which  therefore  lie  completely  outside 
the  field  of  the  understanding  and  its  thinking,  which 
alone  is  intended  here,  when  we  say  that  the  Ego,  in 
thinking,  is  simple.  It  would  indeed  be  strange,  if  what 
elsewhere  requires  so  great  an  effort,  namely,  to  dis- 
tinguish in  what  is  given  by  intuition  what  is  substance, 
and  still  more,  whether  that  substance  can  be  simple 
(as  in  the  case  of  the  component  parts  of  matter),  should 
in  our  case  be  given  to  us  so  readily  in  what  is  really  the 
poorest  of  all  representations,  and,  as  it  were,  by  an  act 
of  revelation. 


156      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT^S  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

The  nerve  of  the  argument  of  rational  psychology  for 
the  soul  as  a  simple  substance  lies  in  the  proposition  that, 
in  order  to  constitute  a  thought,  the  many  representa- 
tions must  be  comprehended  under  the  absolute  unity 
of  the  thinking  subject.  But  this  proposition  can  neither 
be  proved  from  concepts,  nor  can  it  be  derived  from  ex- 
perience. As  in  the  former  paralogism  therefore,  so  here 
also,  the  formal  proposition  of  apperception,  I  think, 
remains  the  sole  ground  on  which  rational  psychology 
ventures  to  undertake  the  extension  of  its  knowledge. 
That  proposition,  I  think,  however,  is  only  the  form  of 
apperception,  that  is  a  purely  subjective  condition.  The 
simpHcity  of  the  representation  of  a  subject  is  not  there- 
fore a  knowledge  of  the  simplicity  of  the  subject. 

3.  The  proposition  of  the  identity  of  myself  amidst 
the  manifold  of  which  I  am  conscious,  likewise  follows 
from  the  concepts  themselves,  and  is  therefore  analyt- 
ical; but  the  identity  of  the  subject  of  which,  in  all  its 
representations,  I  may  become  conscious,  does  not  refer 
to  the  intuition  by  which  it  is  given  as  an  object,  and 
can  not  therefore  signify  the  identity  of  the  person,  by 
which  is  understood  the  consciousness  of  the  identity  of 
one's  own  substance,  as  a  thinking  being,  in  all  the 
changes  of  circumstances.  In  order  to  prove  this,  the 
mere  analysis  of  the  proposition,  I  think,  would  avail 
nothing:  but  different  synthetical  judgments  would  be 
required,  which  are  based  on  the  given  intuition. 

In  my  own  consciousness,  therefore,  the  identity  of 
person  is  inevitably  present.  But  this  does  not  establish 
the  rationalistic  contention  of  personal  identity.  For  the 
identity  of  my  consciousness  is  merely  a  formal  condition 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 57 

of  my  thoughts  and  their  coherence,  and  proves  in  no 
way  the  numerical  identity  of  my  subject,  in  which,  in 
spite  of  the  logical  identity  of  the  I,  such  a  change  may 
have  passed  as  to  make  it  impossible  that  it  should  retain 
its  identity,  though  we  may  still  attribute  to  it  the  same 
name  of  I,  which  in  every  other  state,  and  even  in  the 
change  of  the  subject,  might  yet  retain  the  thought  of 
the  preceding  and  hand  it  over  to  the  subsequent  sub- 
ject.* 

4.  To  say  that  I  distinguish  my  own  existence,  as  that 
of  a  thinking  being,  from  other  tilings  outside  me  (one 
of  them  being  my  body)  is  Hkewise  an  analytical  proposi- 
tion; for  other  things  are  things  which  I  conceive  as 
different  from  myself.  But,  whether  such  a  conscious- 
ness of  myself  is  even  possible  without  things  outside  me, 
whereby  representations  are  given  to  me,  and  whether 
I  could  exist  merely  as  a  thinking  being  (without  being 
a  man),  I  do  not  know  at  all  by  that  proposition. 

Nothing  therefore  is  gained  by  the  analysis  of  the 

*  Kant's  note.  An  elastic  ball,  which  impinges  on  another  in 
a  straight  line,  communicates  to  the  second  its  whole  motion,  and 
therefore  (if  we  only  consider  the  places  in  space)  its  whole  state. 
If  then,  in  analogy  with  such  bodies,  we  admit  substances  of 
which  the  one  communicates  to  the  other  representations  with 
consciousness,  we  could  imagine  a  whole  series  of  them,  in  which 
the  first  communicates  its  state  and  its  consciousness  to  the  sec- 
ond, the  second  its  own  state  with  that  of  the  first  substance  to  a 
third,  and  this  again  all  these  states  of  the  former,  together  with 
its  own,  and  a  consciousness  of  them,  to  another.  That  last  sub- 
stance would  be  conscious  of  all  the  states  of  the  previously 
changed  substances,  as  of  its  own,  because  all  of  them  had  been 
transferred  to  it  with  the  consciousness  of  them;  but  for  all  that 
it  would  not  have  been  the  same  person  in  all  those  states. 


158      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

consciousness  of  myself,  in  thought  in  general,  towards 
the  knowledge  of  myself  as  an  object.  The  logical  anal- 
ysis of  thinking  in  general  is  simply  mistaken  for  a  meta- 
physical determination  of  the  object. 

It  would  be  a  great,  nay,  even  the  only  objection  to  the 
whole  of  our  critique,  if  there  were  a  possibiHty  of  proving 
a  priori  that  all  thinking  beings  are  in  themselves  simple 
substances,  that  as  such  (as  a  consequence  of  the  same 
argument)  personaHty  is  inseparable  from  them,  and 
that  they  are  conscious  of  their  existence  as  distinct  from 
all  matter.  For  we  should  thus  have  made  a  step  beyond 
the  world  of  sense  and  entered  into  the  field  of  noumena, 
and  after  that  no  one  could  dare  to  question  our  right  of 
advancing  further,  of  settling  in  it,  and,  as  each  of  us  is 
favored  by  luck,  taking  possession  of  it.  The  proposition 
that  every  thinking  being  is,  as  such,  a  simple  substance, 
is  synthetical  a  priori,  because,  first,  it  goes  beyond  the 
concept  on  which  it  rests,  and  adds  to  act  of  thinking  in 
general  the  mode  of  existence;  and  secondly,  because  it 
adds  to  that  concept  a  predicate  (simplicity)  which  can 
not  be  given  in  any  experience.  Hence  synthetical 
propositions  a  priori  would  be  not  only  admissible,  as 
we  maintained,  in  reference  to  objects  of  possible  ex- 
perience, and  then  only  as  principles  of  the  possibility 
of  that  experience,  but  could  be  extended  to  things  in 
general  and  to  things  in  themselves,  a  result  which  would 
put  an  end  to  the  whole  of  our  critique,  and  bid  us  to 
leave  everything  as  we  found  it.  However,  the  danger 
is  not  so  great,  if  only  we  look  more  closely  into  the 
matter. 

In  this  process  of  rational  psychology,  there  lurks  a 


TRANSCENDENTAL   DIALECTIC  1 59 

paralogism,  which  may  be  represented  by  the  following 
syllogism. 

That  which  can  not  be  conceived  otherwise  than  as  a 
subject,  does  not  exist  otherwise  than  as  a  subject,  and 
is  therefore  a  substance. 

A  thinking  being,  considered  as  such,  can  not  be  con- 
ceived otherwise  than  as  a  subject. 

Therefore  it  exists  also  as  such  only,  that  is,  as  a 
substance. 

In  the  major  they  speak  of  a  being  that  can  be  thought 
in  every  respect,  and  therefore  also  as  it  may  be  given  in 
intuition.  In  the  minor,  however,  they  speak  of  it  only 
so  far  as  it  considers  itself,  as  subject,  with  respect  to  the 
thinking  and  the  unity  of  consciousness  only,  but  not 
at  the  same  time  in  respect  to  the  intuition  whereby  this 
unity  is  given  as  an  object  of  thinking.  The  conclusion, 
therefore,  has  been  drawn  by  a  sophism,  and  more 
especially  by  sophisma  figures  dictionis* 

*  Kant's  note.  The  thinking  is  taken  in  each  of  the  two  prem- 
ises in  a  totally  different  meaning: — in  the  major,  as  it  refers 
to  an  object  in  general  (and  therefore  also  as  it  may  be  given 
in  intuition) ,  but  in  the  minor,  only  as  it  exists  in  its  relation  to 
self-consciousness,  where  no  object  is  thought  of,  but  where  we 
only  represent  the  relation  to  the  self  as  the  subject  (as  the  form 
of  thought).  In  the  former,  things  are  spoken  of  that  can  not  be 
conceived  otherwise  than  as  subjects;  while  in  the  second  we  do 
not  speak  of  things,  but  of  the  thinking  (abstraction  being  made 
of  all  objects),  wherein  the  Ego  always  serves  as  the  subject  of 
consciousness.  The  conclusion,  therefore,  ought  not  to  be  that  I 
can  not  exist  otherwise  than  as  a  subject,  but  only,  that  in  thinking 
my  existence  I  can  use  myself  as  the  subject  of  a  judgment  only. 
This  is  an  identical  proposition,  and  teaches  us  nothing  whatever 
as  to  the  mode  of  our  existence. 


l6o      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

That  we  are  perfectly  right  in  thus  resolving  that 
famous  argument  into  a  paralogism,  will  be  clearly  seen 
in  the  light  of  the  contention  that  the  concept  of  a  thing, 
which  can  exist  by  itself  as  a  subject,  and  not  as  a  mere 
predicate,  carries  as  yet  no  objective  reality,  that  is,  that 
we  can  not  know  whether  any  object  at  all  belongs  to  it, 
it  being  impossible  for  us  to  understand  the  possibility 
of  such  a  mode  of  existence.  It  yields  us  therefore  no 
knowledge  at  all.  If  such  a  concept  is  to  indicate,  under 
the  name  of  a  substance,  an  object  that  can  be  given, 
and  thus  become  knowledge,  it  must  be  made  to  rest 
on  a  permanent  intuition,  as  the  indispensable  condition 
of  the  objective  reality  of  a  concept,  that  is,  as  that  by 
which  alone  the  object  can  be  given.  In  internal  intui- 
tion, however,  we  have  nothing  permanent,  for  the  Ego 
is  only  the  consciousness  of  my  thinking;  and  if  we  do 
not  go  beyond  this  thinking,  we  are  without  the  necessary 
condition  for  applying  the  concept  of  substance,  that 
is,  of  an  independent  subject,  to  the  self,  as  a  thinking 
being.  Thus  the  simplicity  of  the  substance  entirely 
disappears  with  the  objective  reality  of  the  concept, 
and  is  changed  into  a  purely  logical  qualitative  unity  of 
self-consciousness  in  thinking  in  general,  whether  the 
subject  be  composite  or  not. 

REFUTATION    OF    MENDELSSOHN's    PROOF    OF    THE    PER- 
MANENCE  OF   THE   SOUL 

This  acute  philosopher  perceived  very  quickly  how  the 
ordinary  argument  that  the  soul  (if  it  is  once  admitted 
to  be  a  simple  being)  can  not  cease  to  exist  by  decomposi- 
tioftj  was  insufficient  to  prove  its  necessary  continuance, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  l6l 

because  it  might  cease  to  exist  by  simply  vanishing.  He 
therefore  tried,  in  his  Phaedon,  to  prove  that  the  soul 
was  not  liable  to  that  kind  of  perishing  which  would  be  a 
real  annihilation,  by  endeavoring  to  show  that  a  simple 
being  can  not  cease  to  exist,  because  as  it  could  not  be 
diminished,  and  thus  gradually  lose  something  of  its 
existence,  and  be  changed,  by  httle  and  little,  into 
nothing  (it  having  no  parts,  and  therefore  no  plurality  in 
itself),  there  could  be  no  time  between  the  one  moment 
in  which  it  exists,  and  the  other  in  which  it  exists  no 
longer;  and  this  would  be  impossible. 

He  did  not  consider,  however,  that,  though  we  might 
allow  to  the  soul  this  simple  nature,  namely,  that  it  con- 
tains nothing  manifold,  nothing  by  the  side  of  each  other, 
and  therefore  no  extensive  quantity,  yet  we  could  not 
deny  to  it,  as  little  as  to  any  other  existing  thing,  in- 
tensive quantity,  that  is  a  degree  of  reality  with  respect 
to  all  its  faculties,  nay,  to  all  which  constitutes  its  exist- 
ence. Such  a  degree  of  reality  might  diminish  by  an 
infinite  number  of  smaller  degrees,  and  thus  the  supposed 
substance  (the  thing,  the  permanence  of  wliich  has  not 
yet  been  established),  might  be  changed  into  nothing, 
not  indeed  through  decomposition,  but  through  a  gradual 
remission  of  its  powers,  or,  if  I  may  say  so,  through 
elanguescence.  For  even  consciousness  has  always  a 
degree,  which  admits  of  being  diminished,*  and  therefore 

*  Kant's  note.  Clearness  is  not,  as  the  logicians  maintain,  the 
consciousness  of  a  representation;  for  a  certain  degree  of  conscious- 
ness, though  insufficient  for  recollection,  must  exist,  even  in  many 
dark  representations,  because  without  all  consciousness  we  should 
make  no  distinction  in  the  connection  of  dark  representations, 


1 62      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

also  the  faculty  of  being  conscious  of  oneself,  as  well  as 
all  other  faculties. 

The  permanence  of  the  soul,  therefore,  considered 
merely  as  an  object  of  the  internal  sense,  remains  un- 
demonstrated  and  undemonstrable,  though  its  per- 
manence in  life,  while  the  thinking  being  (as  man)  is  at 
the  same  time  to  itself  an  object  of  the  external  senses, 
is  clear  by  itself.  But  this  does  not  satisfy  the  rational 
psychologist,  who  undertakes  to  prove,  from  mere  con- 
cepts, the  absolute  permanence  of  the  soul,  even  beyond 
this  Hfe.* 

which  yet  we  are  able  to  do  with  the  notae  of  many  concepts 
(such  as  those  of  right  and  justice,  or  as  a  musician  does  who  in 
improvising  strikes  several  keys  at  once).  A  representation  is 
clear  in  which  the  consciousness  is  sufficient  for  a  consciousness 
of  its  difference  from  the  others.  If  the  consciousness  is  sufficient 
for  distinguishing,  but  not  for  a  consciousness  of  the  difference, 
the  representation  would  still  have  to  be  called  dark.  There  is, 
therefore,  an  infinite  number  of  degrees  of  consciousness,  down 
to  its  complete  vanishing. 

*  Kant's  note.  Those  who,  in  establishing  the  possibility  of  a 
new  theory,  imagine  that  they  have  done  enough  if  they  can  show 
triumphantly  that  no  one  can  show  a  contradiction  in  their  prem- 
ises (as  do  those  who  believe  that  they  understand  the  possibility 
of  thinking,  of  which  they  have  an  example  in  the  empirical  in- 
tuitions of  human  life  only,  even  after  the  cessation  of  life)  can 
be  greatly  embarrassed  by  other  possible  theories,  which  are  not  a 
whit  bolder  than  their  own.  Such  is,  for  instance,  the  possibiHty 
of  a  division  of  simple  substance  into  several,  or  of  the  coalition  of 
several  substances  into  one  simple  substance.  For  although 
divisibility  presupposes  a  composite,  it  does  not  necessarily  re- 
quire a  composite  of  substances,  but  of  degrees  only  (of  the  man- 
ifold faculties)  of  one  and  the  same  substance.  As,  then,  we  may 
conceive  all  powers  and  faculties  of  the  soul,  even  that  of  con- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 63 

If  now  we  take  the  above  propositions  in  synthetical 
connection,  as  indeed  they  must  be  taken,  as  valid  for  all 
thinking  beings,  in  a  system  of  rational  psychology,  and 
proceed  from  the  category  of  relation,  with  the  proposi- 
tion, all  thinking  beings,  as  such,  are  substances,  back- 
wards through  the  series  till  the  circle  is  completed,  we 

sciousness,  as  diminished  by  one-half,  the  substance  still  remaining, 
we  may  also  represent  to  ourselves,  without  any  contradiction, 
that  extinguished  half  as  preserved,  though  not  within  it,  but 
outside  it,  so  that  as  the  whole  of  what  is  real  in  it  and  has  a 
degree,  and  therefore  the  whole  existence  of  it,  without  any  rest, 
has  been  halved,  another  separate  substance  would  arise  apart 
from  it.    For  the  plurality,  which  has  been  divided,  existed  before, 
though  not  as  a  pluraHty  of  substances  yet  of  every  reality  as  a 
quantum  of  existence  in  it,  and  the  unity  of  substance  was  only 
a  mode  of  existence,  which  by  mere  division  has  been  changed  into 
a  plurality  of  substantiality.    In  the  same  manner  several  simple 
substances  might  coalesce  again  into  one,  nothing  being  lost 
thereby,  but  merely  the  plurality  of  substantiality;  so  that  one 
substance  would  contain  in  itself  the  degree  of  reality  of  all  former 
substances  together.    We  might  suppose  that  the  simple  substances 
which  give  us  matter  as  a  phenomenon  (not  indeed  through  a 
mechanical  or  chemical  influence  upon  each  other,  but  yet,  it  may 
be,  by  some  unknown  influence,  of  which  the  former  is  only  a 
manifestation),  produce  by  such  a  dynamical  division  of  parental 
souls,  taken  as  intensive  quantities,  what  may  be  called  child- 
souls,  while  they  themselves  repair  their  loss  again  through  a 
coalition  with  new  matter  of  the  same  kind.    I  am  far  from  allowing 
the  slightest  value  of  vahdity  to  such  vague  speculations,  and  I 
hope  that  the  principles  of  our  Analytic  have  given  a  sufficient 
warning  against  using  the  categories  (as,  for  instance,  that  of 
substance)  for  any  but  empirical  purposes.    But  if  the  rationalist 
is  bold  enough  to  create  an  independent  being  out  of  the  mere 
faculty  of  thought,  without  any  permanent  intuition,  by  which 
an  object  can  be  given,  simply  because  the  unity  of  apperception 


164      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

arrive  in  the  end  at  their  existence,  and  this,  according 
to  that  system,  they  are  not  only  conscious  of,  independ- 
ently of  external  things,  but  are  supposed  to  be  able  to 
determine  it  even  of  themselves  (with  respect  to  that 
permanence  which  necessarily  belongs  to  the  character 
of  substance).  Hence  it  follows,  that  in  this  rational- 
istic system  idealism  is  inevitable,  at  least  problem- 
atical idealism,  because,  if  the  existence  of  external 
things  is  not  required  at  all  for  the  determination 
of  one's  own  existence  in  time,  their  existence  is  really 
a  gratuitous  assumption  of  which  no  proof  can  ever  be 
given. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  we  proceed  analytically,  taking 
the  proposition,  I  think,  which  involves  existence  (ac- 
cording to  the  category  of  modality)  as  given,  and 
analyze  it,  in  order  to  find  out  whether,  and  how,  the 
Ego  determines  its  existence  in  space  and  time  by  it 
alone,  the  propositions  of  rational  psychology  would 
not  start  from  the  concept  of  a  thinking  being,  in 
general,  but  from  a  reahty,  and  the  inference  would 
consist  in  determining  from  the  manner  in  which  that 
reality  is  thought,  after  everything  that  is  empirical 
in  it  has  been  removed,  what  belongs  to  a  thinking 
being  in  general.  This  may  be  shown  by  the  following 
table: 

in  thought  does  not  allow  him  to  explain  it  as  something  com- 
posite, instead  of  simply  confessing  that  he  cannot  explain  the 
possibility  of  a  thinking  nature,  why  should  not  a  materialisl, 
though  he  can  as  little  appeal  to  experience  in  support  of  his 
theories,  be  entitled  to  use  the  same  boldness,  and  use  his  prin- 
ciple for  the  opposite  purpose,  though  retaining  the  formal  unity 
on  which  his  opponent  relied? 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 65 

I 

I  think, 
2  3 

as  Subject,  as  simple  Subject, 

4 

as  identical  Subject,  in  every  state  of  my  thought. 

As  it  has  not  been  determined  in  the  second  proposition, 
whether  I  can  exist  and  be  conceived  to  exist  as  a  subject 
only,  and  not  also  as  a  predicate  of  something  else,  the 
concept  of  subject  is  here  taken  as  logical  only,  and  it 
remains  undetermined  whether  we  are  to  understand  by 
it  a  substance  or  not.    In  the  third  proposition,  however, 
the  absolute  unity  of  apperception,  the  simple  I,  being 
the  representation  to  which  all  connection  or  separation 
(which  constitute  thought)  relate,  assumes  its  own  im- 
portance, although  nothing  is  determined  as  yet  with 
regard  to  the  nature  of  the  subject,  or  its  subsistence. 
The  apperception  is  something  real,  and  it  is  only  pos- 
sible, if  it  is  simple.    In  space,  however,  there  is  nothing 
real  that  is  simple,  for  points  (the  only  simple  in  space) 
are  limits  only,  and  not  themselves  something  which,  as  a 
part,  serves  to  constitute  space.    From  this  follows  the 
impossibility  of  explaining  the  nature  of  myself,  as  merely 
a  thinking  subject,  from  the  materialistic  point  of  view. 
As,  however,  in  the  first  proposition,  my  existence  is 
taken  for  granted,  for  it  is  not  said  in  it  that  every  think- 
ing being  exists  (this  would  predicate  too  much,  namely, 
absolute  necessity  of  them),  but  only,  /  exist,  as  thinking, 
the  proposition  itself  is  empirical,  and  contains  only  the 


1 66      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

determinability  of  my  existence,  in  reference  to  my  rep- 
resentations in  time.  But  as  for  that  purpose  again  I 
require,  first  of  all,  something  permanent,  such  as  is 
not  given  to  me  at  all  in  internal  intuition,  so  far  as  I 
think  myself,  it  is  really  impossible  by  that  simple  self- 
consciousness  to  determine  the  manner  in  which  I  exist, 
whether  as  a  substance  or  as  an  accident.  Thus,  if 
materialism  was  inadequate  to  explain  my  existence, 
spiritualism  is  equally  insufficient  for  that  purpose,  and 
the  conclusion  is,  that,  in  no  way  whatsoever  can  we 
know  anything  of  the  nature  of  our  soul,  so  far  as  the 
possibiHty  of  its  separate  existence  is  concerned. 

And  how  indeed  should  it  be  possible  by  means  of  that 
unity  of  consciousness  which  we  only  know  because  it  is 
indispensable  to  us  for  the  very  possibiHty  of  experience, 
to  get  beyond  experience  (our  existence  in  Hfe),  and  even 
to  extend  our  knowledge  to  the  nature  of  all  thinking 
beings  in  general,  by  the  empirical,  but,  with  reference 
to  every  kind  of  intuition,  undetermined  proposition, 
I  think. 

There  is,  therefore,  no  rational  psychology,  as  a 
doctrine,  furnishing  any  addition  to  our  self-knowledge, 
but  only  as  a  discipline,  fixing  unpassable  Hmits  to  spec- 
ulative reason  in  this  field,  partly  to  keep  us  from  throw- 
ing ourselves  into  the  arms  of  a  soulless  materialism, 
partly  to  warn  us  against  losing  ourselves  in  a  vague,  and, 
with  regard  to  practical  Hfe,  baseless  spiritualism.  It 
reminds  us  at  the  same  time  to  look  upon  this  refusal  of 
our  reason  to  give  a  satisfactory  answer  to  such  curi- 
ous questions,  which  reach  beyond  the  Kmits  of  this  life, 
as  a  hint  to  turn  our  self-knowledge  away  from  fruit- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  167 

less  speculations  to  a  fruitful  practical  use — a  use  which, 
though  directed  always  to  objects  of  experience  only, 
derives  its  principle  from  a  higher  source,  and  so  regulates 
our  conduct,  as  if  our  destination  reached  far  beyond 
experience,  and  therefore  far  beyond  this  life. 

We  see  from  all  this,  that  rational  psychology  owes 
its  origin  to  a  mere  misunderstanding.  The  unity  of 
consciousness,  on  which  the  categories  are  founded,  is 
mistaken  for  an  intuition  of  the  subject  as  object,  and 
the  category  of  substance  applied  to  it.  But  that  unity 
is  only  the  unity  in  thought,  by  which  alone  no  object  is 
given,  and  to  which,  therefore,  the  category  of  substance, 
which  always  presupposes  a  given  intuition ,  can  not  be 
applied,  and  therefore  the  subject  can  not  be  known. 
The  subject  of  the  categories,  therefore,  can  not,  by 
thinking  them,  receive  a  concept  of  itself,  as  an  object  of 
the  categories;  for  in  order  to  think  the  categories,  it 
must  presuppose  its  pure  self-consciousness,  the  very 
thing  that  had  to  be  explained.  In  like  manner  the  sub- 
ject, in  which  the  representation  of  time  has  its  original 
source,  can  not  determine  by  it  its  own  existence  in  time; 
and  if  the  latter  is  impossible,  the  former,  as  a  deter- 
mination of  one's  self  (as  of  a  thinking  being  in  general) 
by  means  of  the  categories,  is  equally  so.* 

*  Kant's  note.  The  I  think  is,  as  has  been  stated,  an  empirical 
proposition,  and  contains  within  itself  the  proposition,  I  exist.  I 
can  not  say,  however,  everything  which  thinks  exists;  for  in  that 
case  the  property  of  thinking  would  make  all  beings  which  possess 
it  necessary  beings.  Therefore,  my  existence  can  not,  as  Descartes 
supposed,  be  considered  as  derived  from  the  proposition,  I  think 
(for  in  that  case  the  major,  everything  that  thinks  exists,  ought 
to  have  preceded),  but  is  identical  with  it.     It  expresses  an  in- 


1 68      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

Thus  vanishes,  as  an  idle  dream,  that  knowledge 
which  was  to  go  beyond  the  limits  of  possible  experience, 
and  was  connected  no  doubt  with  the  highest  interests 
of  humanity,  so  far  at  least  as  speculative  philosophy  was 
to  supply  it.  Yet  no  unimportant  service  has  thus  been 
rendered  to  reason  by  the  severity  of  our  criticism,  in 
proving,  at  the  same  time,  the  impossibility  of  settling 
anything  dogmatically  with  reference  to  an  object  of 
experience,  beyond  the  limits  of  experience,  and  thus 
securing  it  against  all  possible  assertions  to  the  contrary. 
This  can  only  be  done  in  two  ways,  either  by  proving 
one's  own  proposition  apodictically,  or,  if  that  does  not 
succeed,  by  trying  to  discover  the  causes  of  that  failure, 

definite  empirical  intuition,  that  is,  a  perception  (and  proves, 
therefore,  that  this  proposition,  asserting  existence,  is  itself  based 
on  sensation,  which  belongs  to  sensibility),  but  it  precedes  ex- 
perience, which  is  meant  to  determine  the  object  of  perception 
through  the  categories  in  respect  to  time.  Existence,  therefore,  is 
here  not  yet  a  category,  which  never  refers  to  an  indefinitely  given 
object,  but  only  to  one  of  which  we  have  a  concept,  and  of  which 
we  wish  to  know  whether  it  exists  also  apart  from  that  conception 
or  no.  An  indefinite  perception  signifies  here  something  real  only 
that  has  been  given  merely  for  thinking  in  general,  not  therefore 
as  a  phenomenon,  nor  as  a  thing  in  itself  (noumenon),  but  as 
something  that  really  exists  and  is  designated  as  such  in  the  prop- 
osition, I  think.  For  it  must  be  observed,  that  if  I  have  called  the 
proposition,  I  think,  an  empirical  proposition,  I  did  not  mean  to 
say  thereby,  that  the  ego  in  that  proposition  is  an  empirical  rep- 
resentation; it  is  rather  purely  intellectual,  because  it  belongs  to 
thought  in  general.  Without  some  empirical  representation,  how- 
ever, which  suppHes  the  matter  for  thought,  the  act,  I  think, 
would  not  take  place,  and  the  empirical  is  only  the  condi- 
tion of  the  application  or  of  the  use  of  the  pure  intellectual 
faculty. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 69 

which,  if  they  lie  in  the  necessary  limits  of  our  reason, 
must  force  every  opponent  to  submit  to  exactly  the  same 
law  of  renunciation  with  reference  to  any  claims  to 
dogmatic  assertion. 

Nothing  is  lost,  however,  by  this  with  regard  to  the 
right,  nay,  the  necessity  of  admitting  a  future  Ufe,  accord- 
ing to  the  principles  of  practical,  as  connected  with  the 
speculative  employment  of  reason.  It  is  known  besides, 
that  a  purely  speculative  proof  has  never  been  able  to 
exercise  any  influence  on  the  ordinary  reason  of  men. 
It  stands  so  entirely  upon  the  point  of  a  hair,  that  even 
the  schools  can  only  keep  it  from  falling  so  long  as  they 
keep  it  constantly  spinning  round  Hke  a  top,  so  that,  even 
in  their  own  eyes,  it  3delds  no  permanent  foundation 
upon  which  anything  could  be  built.  The  proofs  which 
are  useful  for  the  world  at  large  retain  their  value  un- 
diminished, nay,  they  gain  in  clearness  and  natural 
power,  by  the  surrender  of  those  dogmatical  pretensions, 
placing  reason  in  its  own  peculiar  domain,  namely,  the 
system  of  ends,  which  is,  however,  at  the  same  time  the 
system  of  nature;  so  that  reason,  as  a  practical  faculty 
by  itself,  without  being  Hmited  by  the  conditions  of 
nature,  becomes  justified  in  extending  the  system  of  ends, 
and  with  it,  our  own  existence,  beyond  the  limits  of 
experience  and  of  Hfe.  According  to  the  analogy  with 
tlie  nature  of  li\dng  beings  in  this  world,  in  which  reason 
must  necessarily  admit  the  principle  that  no  organ,  no 
faculty,  no  impulse,  can  be  found,  as  being  either  super- 
fluous or  disproportionate  to  its  use,  and  therefore  pur- 
poseless, but  that  everything  is  adequate  to  its  destina- 
tion in  Hfe,  man,  who  alone  can  contain  in  himself  the 


1 70      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

highest  end  of  all  this,  would  be  the  only  creature  ex- 
cepted from  it.  For,  his  natural  dispositions,  not  only 
so  far  as  he  uses  them  according  to  his  talents  and  im- 
pulses, but  more  especially  the  moral  law  within  him, 
go  so  far  beyond  all  that  is  useful  and  advantageous  in 
this  life,  that  he  is  taught  thereby,  in  the  absence  of  all 
advantages,  even  of  the  shadowy  hope  of  posthumous 
fame,  to  esteem  the  mere  consciousness  of  righteous- 
ness beyond  everything  else,  feeling  an  inner  call,  by  his 
conduct  in  this  world  and  a  surrender  of  many  advan- 
tages, to  render  himself  fit  to  become  the  citizen  of  a 
better  world,  which  exists  in  his  idea  only.  This  powerful 
and  incontrovertible  proof,  accompanied  by  our  con- 
stantly increasing  recognition  of  a  design  pervading  all 
that  we  see  around  us,  and  by  a  contemplation  of  the 
immensity  of  creation,  and  therefore  also  by  the  con- 
sciousness of  an  unHmited  possibility  in  the  extension 
of  our  knowledge,  and  a  desire  commensurate  therewith, 
all  this  remains  and  always  will  remain,  although  we 
must  surrender  the  hope  of  ever  being  able  to  understand, 
from  the  mere  theoretical  knowledge  of  ourselves,  the 
necessary  continuance  of  our  existence. 

CONCLUSION    OF   THE    SOLUTION  OF   THE   PSYCHOLOGICAL 

PARALOGISM 

The  dialectical  illusion  in  rational  psychology  arises 
from  our  confounding  an  idea  of  reason  (that  of  a  pure 
intelligence)  with  the  altogether  indefinite  concept  of  a 
thinking  being  in  general.  What  we  are  doing  is,  that 
we  conceive  ourselves  for  the  sake  of  a  possible  experience, 
taking  no  account,  as  yet,  of  any  real  experience,  and 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  17I 

thence  conclude  that  we  are  able  to  become  conscious 
of  our  existence,  independently  of  experience  and  of  its 
empirical  conditions.  We  are,  therefore,  confounding 
the  possible  ahstraciion  of  our  own  empirically  deter- 
mined existence  with  the  imagined  consciousness  of  a 
possible  separate  existence  of  our  thinking  self,  and  we 
bring  ourselves  to  believe  that  we  know  the  substantial 
within  us  as  the  transcendental  subject,  while  what  we 
have  in  our  thoughts  is  only  the  unity  of  consciousness, 
on  which,  as  on  the  mere  form  of  knowledge,  all  deter- 
mination is  based. 

The  task  of  explaining  the  community  of  the  soul  with 
the  body  does  not  properly  fall  within  the  province  of 
that  psychology  of  which  we  are  here  speaking,  because 
that  psychology  tries  to  prove  the  personaHty  of  the  soul, 
apart  also  from  that  community  (after  death),  being 
therefore  transcendent,  in  the  proper  sense  of  that  word, 
inasmuch  as,  though  dealing  with  an  object  of  experience, 
it  deals  with  it  only  so  far  as  it  has  ceased  to  be  an  object 
of  experience.     According  to  our  doctrine,  however,  a 
sufficient  answer  might  be  returned  to  that  question  also. 
The  difficulty  of  the  task  consists,  as  is  well  known,  in  the 
assumed  heterogeneousness  of  the  object  of  the  internal 
sense  (the  soul),  and  the  objects  of  the  external  senses,  the 
formal  condition  of  the  intuition  with  regard  to  the 
former  being  time  only,  with  regard  to  the  latter,  time 
and  space.  If  we  consider,  however,  that  both  kinds  of  ob- 
jects thus  differ  from  each  other,  not  internally,  but  so  far 
only  as  the  one  appears  externally  to  the  other,  and  that 
possibly  what  is  at  the  bottom  of  phenomenal  matter, 
as  a  thing  in  itself,  may  not  be  so  heterogeneous  after  all 


172      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

as  we  imagine,  that  difficulty  vanishes,  and  there  re- 
mains that  one  difficulty  only,  how  a  community  of  sub- 
stances is  possible  at  all;  a  difficulty  which  it  is  not  the 
business  of  psychology  to  solve,  and  which,  as  the  reader 
will  easily  understand,  after  what  has  been  said  in  the 
Analytic  of  fundamental  powers  and  faculties,  lies  un- 
doubtedly beyond  the  limits  of  all  human  knowledge. 

GENERAL    NOTE    ON    THE    TRANSITION    FROM    RATIONAL 
PSYCHOLOGY  TO  COSMOLOGY 

The  proposition,  I  think,  or,  I  exist  thinking,  is  an 
empirical  proposition.  Such  a  proposition  is  based  on  an 
empirical  intuition,  and  its  object  is  phenomenal:  so  that 
it  might  seem  as  if,  according  to  our  theory,  the  soul  was 
changed  altogether,  even  in  thinking,  into  something 
phenomenal,  and  our  consciousness  itself,  as  merely 
phenomenal,  would  thus  indeed  refer  to  nothing. 

Thinking,  taken  by  itself,  is  a  logical  function  only, 
and  therefore  pure  spontaneity,  in  connecting  the  mani- 
fold of  a  merely  possible  intuition.  It  does  not  rep- 
resent the  subject  of  consciousness,  as  phenomenal,  for 
the  simple  reason,  that  it  takes  no  account  whatsoever 
of  the  manner  of  intuition,  whether  it  be  sensuous  or 
intellectual.  I  do  not  thereby  represent  myself  to  my- 
self, either  as  I  am,  or  as  I  appear  to  myself,  but  I  only 
conceive  of  myself,  as  of  any  other  object,  without 
taking  account  of  the  manner  of  intuition.  If  thereby 
I  represent  myself  as  the  subject  of  my  thoughts,  or  as 
the  ground  of  thinking,  these  modes  of  representation  are 
not  the  categories  of  substance  or  cause,  because  these 
are  functions  of  thought  (judgment)  as  apphed  already 


TRANSCENDENTAL   DIALECTIC  [73 

to  our  sensuous  intuition,  such  sensuous  intuition  being 
necessary,  if  I  wish  to  know  myself.  But  I  only  wish  to 
become  conscious  of  myself  as  thinking,  and  as  I  take 
no  account  of  what  my  own  self  may  be  as  a  phenomenon, 
it  is  quite  possible  that  it  might  be  a  phenomenon  only 
to  me,  who  thinks,  but  not  to  me,  so  far  as  I  am  thinking. 
In  the  consciousness  of  myself  in  mere  thinking  I  am  the 
substance  itself ,  but  of  that  substance  nothing  is  thus 
given  me  for  thinking. 

The  proposition,  I  think,  if  it  means,  7  exist  thinking, 
is  not  merely  logical  function,  but  determines  the  subject 
(which  then  is  at  the  same  time  object)  with  reference  to 
its  existence,  and  is  impossible  without  the  internal  sense, 
the  intuition  of  which  always  supphes  the  object,  not  as  a 
thing  in  itself,  but  as  phenomenal  only.  Here,  therefore, 
we  have  no  longer  mere  spontaneity  of  thinking,  but  also 
receptivity  of  intuition,  that  is,  the  thinking  of  myself 
applied  to  the  empirical  intuition  of  the  same  subject. 
In  that  empirical  intuition  the  thinking  self  would  have 
to  look  for  the  conditions  under  which  its  logical  func- 
tions can  be  employed  as  categories  of  substance,  cause, 
etc.,  in  order  not  only  to  distinguish  itself  as  an  object 
by  itself,  through  the  Ego,  but  to  determine  the  mode  of 
its  existence  also,  that  is,  to  know  itself  as  a  noumenon. 
This,  as  we  know,  is  impossible,  because  the  internal 
empirical  intuition  is  sensuous,  and  supplies  us  with 
phenomenal  data  only,  which  furnish  nothing  to  the 
object  of  the  pure  consciousness  for  the  knowledge  of  its 
own  separate  existence,  but  can  serve  the  purpose  of 
experience  only. 

Supposing,  however,  that  we  should  hereafter  discover, 


174      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

not  indeed  in  experience,  but  in  certain  (not  only  logical 
rules,  but)  a  priori  established  laws  of  pure  reason,  con- 
cerning our  existence,  some  ground  for  admitting  our- 
selves, entirely  a  priori,  as  determining  and  ruling  our 
own  existence,  there  would  then  be  a  spontaneity  by 
which  our  reality  would  be  determinable  without  the 
conditions  of  empirical  intuition,  and  we  should  then 
perceive  that  in  the  consciousness  of  our  existing  there 
is  contained  a  priori  something  which  may  serve  to  deter- 
mine with  respect  to  some  inner  faculty,  our  existence, 
which  otherwise  can  be  determined  sensuously  only  with 
reference  to  an  intelligible,  though,  of  course,  an  ideal 
world  only. 

This,  however,  would  not  in  the  least  benefit  the 
attempts  of  rational  psychology.  For  though  through 
that  wonderful  faculty,  which  becomes  first  revealed  to 
myself  by  the  consciousness  of  a  moral  law,  I  should  have 
a  principle,  purely  intellectual,  for  a  determination  of  my 
existence,  what  would  be  its  determining  predicates? 
No  other  but  those  which  must  be  given  to  me  in  sen- 
suous intuition;  and  I  should  therefore  find  myself  again 
in  the  same  situation  where  I  was  before  in  rational 
psychology,  requiring  sensuous  intuitions  in  order  to 
give  significance  to  the  concepts  of  my  understanding, 
such  as  substance,  cause,  etc.,  by  which  alone  I  can  gain 
a  knowledge  of  myself;  and  these  intuitions  can  never 
carry  me  beyond  the  field  of  experience.  Nevertheless, 
for  practical  purposes,  which  always  concern  objects  of 
experience,  I  should  be  justified  in  applying  these  con- 
cepts, in  analogy  with  their  theoretical  employment,  to 
liberty  also  and  to  the  subject  of  liberty,  by  taking  them 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 75 

only  as  logical  functions  of  subject  and  predicate,  of 
cause  and  effect.  According  to  them,  acts  or  effects,  as 
following  those  (moral)  laws,  would  be  so  determined 
that  they  may  together  with  the  laws  of  nature  be  ex- 
plained in  accordance  with  the  categories  of  substance 
and  cause;  though  arising  in  reality  from  a  totally  dif- 
ferent principle.  All  this  is  only  meant  to  prevent  a 
misunderstanding  to  which  our  doctrine,  which  repre- 
sents self-intuition  as  purely  phenomenal,  might  easily 
be  exposed. 

The  Paralogisms  of  Rational  Psychology  are  so  clearly 
stated  by  Kant  that  a  resume  here  is  unnecessary.  They 
constitute  one  of  the  most  important  parts  of  the  Critique 
since  they  throw  much  light  on  the  Deduction  of  the 
Categories  and  the  Principles  of  the  Pure  Understanding. 
They  also  supplement  those  sections  in  so  far  that  there 
the  meaning  of  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception 
was  not  so  clearly  stated.  The  Paralogisms  bring  out 
more  clearly  than  does  his  Refutation  of  IdeaKsm, 
Kant's  general  attitude. 

The  sections  just  considered  clearly  show  that  Kant 
believes  the  transcendental  unity  of  apperception  to  be 
merely  logical.  He  insists  that  there  is  no  conscious- 
ness of  self  without  external  perceptions.  This  makes  it 
impossible  to  admit  a  substantial  self  which  precedes 
experience,  and  which  renders  experience  possible.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  Critique,  it  is  true,  Kant  seemed  to 
hold  such  a  substantial  view  of  the  self.  But  a  substantial 
view  can  not  do  justice  to  the  organic  nature  of  expe- 
rience; and   this  organic  inter-dcpcndcnce  is  strongly 


176      INTRODUCTION   TO    KANT's   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

emphasized  later  in  Kant,  and  is  one  of  the  most  valuable 
results  of  the  Critique.  Hume,  like  the  later  Kant, 
opposed  the  same  substantial  view  of  the  self,  but  his 
atomic  view  of  experience  prevented  him  from  making  a 
satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem. 

Another  phase  of  the  significance  of  the  Paralogisms 
is  indicated  when  Kant  holds  that  the  reality  which  lies 
at  the  basis  of  internal  intuition  as  well  as  of  external 
phenomena,  can  not  be  known  to  be  either  matter  or 
thinking  being  in  itself;  but  that  it  is  merely  a  basis  of 
phenomena,  unknown  to  us,  which  gives  rise  to  the  em- 
pirical experience  of  both.  Of  course,  as  to  the  ultimate 
basis  of  all  phenomenal  reality,  we  can  not  know  at  all 
what  it  is,  and  idealism  and  materialism  seem  equally 
unsatisfactory. 

It  is  obvious  that  for  Kant  the  unity  of  the  pure  ego 
as  the  highest  principle  of  all  knowledge  represents 
merely  an  ideal.  Kant  is  not  referring  to  any  actual 
transcendental  ego  either  human  or  divine.  The  tran- 
scendental ego  represents,  in  his  system,  no  more  than 
the  logical  correlative  of  a  completely  unified  world. 
Consciousness  in  general,  furthermore,  is  not  a  universal 
consciousness.  These  terms  are  valuable  as  principles 
of  explanation  but  theoretical  knowledge  is  unable  to 
prove  that  they  exist  as  actual  facts.* 

Furthermore,  the  Paralogisms  emphasize  the  impos- 
sibility of  applying  the  doctrine  of  the  substantiality  of 
the  self  in  an  argument  for  the  immortality  of  the  soul. 

*  Cf .  pp.  215  ff.  Andrew  Seth,  Hegelianism  and  Personality, 
pp.  27  ff.  J.  E.  Creighton,  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  VI,  No.  2, 
pp.  162-69. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 77 

For  since  self-consciousness  is  merely  a  logical  relation,  is 
merely  a  functional  unity  involved  in  the  forms  of  knowl- 
edge,— the  categories, — it  is  the  emptiest  of  all  concep- 
tions, and  so  in  no  wise  enables  us  to  assert  immortality. 

The  Antinomy  of  Pure  Reason 

As  ihe  paralogisms  of  pure  reason  form  the  foundation 
for  a  dialectical  psychology,  the  antinomy  of  pure  reason 
will  place  before  our  eyes  the  transcendental  principles 
of  a  pretended  pure  (rational)  cosmology,  not  in  order 
to  show  that  it  is  valid  and  can  be  accepted,  but,  as  may 
be  guessed  from  the  very  name  of  the  antinomy  of  reason, 
in  order  to  expose  it  as  an  idea  surrounded  by  deceptive 
and  false  appearances,  and  utterly  irreconcilable  with 
phenomena. 

A  dialectical  proposition  of  pure  reason  must  have 
this  characteristic  to  distinguish  it  from  all  purely  so- 
phistical propositions,  firsts  that  it  does  not  refer  to  a 
gratuitous  question,  but  to  one  which  human  reason  in 
its  natural  progress  must  necessarily  encounter,  and, 
secondly,  that  it,  as  well  as  its  opposite,  carries  with 
itself  not  a  merely  artificial  illusion,  which  when  once 
seen  through  disappears,  but  a  natural  and  inevitable 
illusion,  which,  even  when  it  deceives  us  no  longer,  al- 
ways remains,  and  though  rendered  harmless,  can  not  be 
annihilated. 

This  dialectical  doctrine  will  not  refer  to  the  unity  of 
the  understanding  in  concepts  of  experience,  but  to  the 
unity  of  reason  in  mere  ideas,  the  condition  of  which,  as 
it  is  meant  to  agree,  as  a  synthesis  according  to  rules, 
with  the  understanding,  and  yet  at  the  same  time,  as  the 


178     INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

absolute  unity  of  that  synthesis,  with  reason,  must 
either,  if  it  is  adequate  to  the  unity  of  reason,  be  too 
great  for  the  understanding,  or,  if  adequate  to  the  under- 
standing, too  small  for  reason.  Hence  a  conflict  must 
arise,  which  can  not  be  avoided,  do  what  we  will. 

FIRST  ANTINOMY 

Thesis 

The  world  has  a  beginning  in  time,  and 
is  limited  also  with  regard  to  space. 

Proof 

For  if  we  assumed  that  the  world  had  no  beginning  in 
time,  then  an  eternity  must  have  elapsed  up  to  every 
given  point  of  time,  and  therefore  an  infinite  series  of 
successive  states  of  things  must  have  passed  in  the  world. 
The  infinity  of  a  series,  however,  consists  in  this,  that  it 
never  can  be  completed  by  means  of  a  successive  syn- 
thesis. Hence  an  infinite  past  series  of  worlds  is  impos- 
sible, and  the  beginning  of  the  world  a  necessary  condi- 
tion of  its  existence.  This  was  what  had  to  be  proved 
first. 

With  regard  to  the  second,  let  us  assume  again  the 
opposite.  In  that  case  the  world  would  be  given  as  an 
infinite  whole  of  co-existing  things.  Now  we  can  not  con- 
ceive in  any  way  the  extension  of  a  quantum,  which  is 
not  given  within  certain  limits  to  every  intuition,  except 
through  the  synthesis  of  its  parts,  nor  the  totahty  of 
such  a  quantum  in  any  way,  except  through  a  completed 
synthesis,  or  by  the  repeated  addition  of  unity  to  itself. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 79 

In  order  therefore  to  conceive  the  world,  which  fills  all 
space,  as  a  whole,  the  successive  synthesis  of  the  parts 
of  an  infinite  world  would  have  to  be  looked  upon  as 
completed;  that  is,  an  infinite  time  would  have  to  be 
looked  upon  as  elapsed,  during  the  enumeration  of  all 
co-existing  things.  This  is  impossible.  Hence  an  infinite 
aggregate  of  real  things  can  not  be  regarded  as  a  given 
whole,  nor,  therefore,  as  given  at  the  same  time.  Hence 
it  follows  that  the  world  is  not  infinite,  as  regards  exten- 
sion in  space,  but  enclosed  in  limits.  This  was  the  second 
that  had  to  be  proved. 

Antithesis 

The  world  has  no  beginning  and  no  limits 
in  space,  but  is  infinite,  in  respect  both 
to  time  and  space. 

Proof 

For  let  us  assume  that  it  has  a  beginning.  Then,  as 
beginning  is  an  existence  which  is  preceded  by  a  time  in 
which  the  thing  is  not,  it  would  follow  that  antecedently 
there  was  a  time  in  which  the  world  was  not,  that  is,  an 
empty  time.  In  an  empty  time,  however,  it  is  impossible 
that  anything  should  take  its  beginning,  because  of  such 
a  time  no  part  possesses  any  condition  as  to  existence 
rather  than  non-existence,  which  condition  could  dis- 
tinguish that  part  from  any  other  (whether  produced  by 
itself  or  through  another  cause).  Hence,  though  many  a 
series  of  things  may  take  its  beginning  in  the  world,  the 
world  itself  can  have  no  beginning,  and  in  reference  to 
time  past  is  infinite. 


l8o      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

With  regard  to  the  second,  let  us  assume  again  the 
opposite,  namely,  that  the  world  is  finite  and  limited  in 
space.  In  that  case  the  world  would  exist  in  an  empty 
space  without  limits.  We  should  therefore  have  not  only 
a  relation  of  things  in  space,  but  also  of  things  to  space. 
As  however  the  world  is  an  absolute  whole,  outside  of 
which  no  object  of  intuition,  and  therefore  no  correlate 
of  the  world  can  be  found,  the  relation  of  the  world  to 
empty  space  would  be  a  relation  to  no  object.  Such  a 
relation,  and  with  it  the  limitation  of  the  world  by  empty 
space,  is  nothing,  and  therefore  the  world  is  not  limited 
with  regard  to  space,  that  is,  it  is  infinite  in  extension. 

SECOND  ANTINOMY 

Thesis 

Every  compound  substance  in  the  world 
consists  of  simple  parts,  and  nothing 
exists  anywhere  but  the  simple,  or 
what  is  composed  of  it. 

Proof 

For  let  us  assume  that  compound  substances  did  not 
consist  of  simple  parts,  then,  if  all  composition  is  removed 
in  thought,  there  would  be  no  compound  part,  and  (as 
no  simple  parts  are  admitted)  no  simple  part  either,  that 
is,  there  would  remain  nothing,  and  there  would  therefore 
be  no  substance  at  all.  Either,  therefore,  it  is  impossible 
to  remove  all  composition  in  thought,  or,  after  its  re- 
moval, there  must  remain  something  that  exists  without 
composition,  that  is  the  simple.    In  the  former  case  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  l8l 

compound  could  not  itself  consist  of  substances  (because 
with  them  composition  is  only  an  accidental  relation  of 
substances,  which  substances,  as  permanent  beings  must 
subsist  without  it).  As  this  contradicts  the  supposition, 
there  remains  only  the  second  view,  namely,  that  the 
substantial  compounds  in  the  world  consist  of  simple 
parts. 

It  follows  as  an  immediate  consequence  that  all  the 
things  in  the  world  are  simple  beings,  that  their  com- 
position is  only  an  external  condition,  and  that,  though 
we  are  unable  to  remove  these  elementary  substances 
from  their  state  of  composition  and  isolate  them,  reason 
must  conceive  them  as  the  first  subjects  of  all  com- 
position, and  therefore,  antecedently  to  it,  as  simple 
beings. 

Antithesis 

No  compound  thing  in  the  world  consists 
of  simple  parts,  and  there  exists  no- 
where in  the  world  anything  simple. 

Proof 

Assume  that  a  compound  thing,  a  substance,  consists 
of  simple  parts.  Then  as  all  external  relation,  and  there- 
fore all  composition  of  substances  also,  is  possible  in  space 
only,  it  follows  that  space  must  consist  of  as  many  parts 
as  the  parts  of  the  compound  that  occupies  the  space. 
Space,  however,  does  not  consist  of  simple  parts,  but  of 
spaces.  Every  part  of  a  compound,  therefore,  must 
occupy  a  space.  Now  the  absolutely  primary  parts  of 
every  compound  are  simple.     It  follows  therefore  that 


l82      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  simple  occupies  a  space.  But  as  everything  real, 
which  occupies  a  space,  contains  a  manifold,  the  parts 
of  which  are  by  the  side  of  each  other,  and  which  there- 
fore is  compounded,  and,  as  a  real  compound,  com- 
pounded not  of  accidents  (for  these  could  not  exist  by 
the  side  of  each  other,  without  a  substance),  but  of  sub- 
stances, it  would  follow  that  the  simple  is  a  substantial 
compound,  which  is  self-contradictory. 

The  second  proposition  of  the  antithesis,  that  there 
exists  nowhere  in  the  world  anything  simple,  is  not  in- 
tended to  mean  more  than  that  the  existence  of  the 
absolutely  simple  can  not  be  proved  from  any  experience 
or  perception,  whether  external  or  internal,  and  that  the 
absolutely  simple  is  a  mere  idea,  the  objective  reality  of 
which  can  never  be  shown  in  any  possible  experience,  so 
that  in  the  explanation  of  phenomena  it  is  without  any 
application  or  object.  For,  if  we  assumed  that  an  object 
of  this  transcendental  idea  might  be  found  in  experience, 
the  empirical  intuition  of  some  one  object  would  have 
to  be  such  as  to  contain  absolutely  nothing  manifold  by 
the  side  of  each  other,  and  combined  to  a  unity.  But  as, 
from  our  not  being  conscious  of  such  a  manifold,  we  can 
not  form  any  valid  conclusion  as  to  the  entire  impos- 
sibility of  it  in  any  objective  intuition,  and  as  without 
this  no  absolute  simplicity  can  be  established,  it  follows 
that  such  simplicity  can  not  be  inferred  from  any  per- 
ception whatsoever.  As,  therefore,  an  absolutely  simple 
object  can  never  be  given  in  any  possible  experience, 
while  the  world  of  sense  must  be  looked  upon  as  the  sum 
total  of  all  possible  experience,  it  follows  that  nothing 
simple  exists  in  it. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 83 

This  second  part  of  the  antithesis  goes  far  beyond  the 
first,  which  only  banished  the  simple  from  the  intuition 
of  the  composite,  while  the  second  drives  it  out  of  the 
whole  of  nature.  Hence  we  could  not  attempt  to  prove 
it  out  of  the  concept  of  any  given  object  of  external 
intuition  (of  the  compound),  but  from  its  relation  to  a 
possible  experience  in  general. 

THIRD  ANTINOMY 

Thesis 

Causality,  according  to  the  laws  of  nature,  is 
not  the  only  causality  from  which  all  the 
phenomena  of  the  world  can  be  deduced.  In 
order  to  account  for  these  phenomena  it  is 
necessary  also  to  admit  another  causality, 
that  of  freedom. 

Proof 

Let  us  assume  that  there  is  no  other  causality  but  that 
according  to  the  laws  of  nature.  In  that  case  everything 
that  takes  place,  presupposes  an  anterior  state,  on  which 
it  follows  inevitably  according  to  a  rule.  But  that  ante- 
rior state  must  itself  be  something  which  has  taken  place 
(which  has  come  to  be  in  time,  and  did  not  exist  before), 
because,  if  it  had  always  existed,  its  effect  too  would  not 
have  only  just  arisen,  but  have  existed  always.  The 
causality,  therefore,  of  a  cause,  through  which  something 
takes  place,  is  itself  an  event,  which  again,  according 
to  the  law  of  nature,  presupposes  an  anterior  state  and 
its  causality,  and  this  again  an  anterior  state,  and  so  on. 


184      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT^S  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

If,  therefore,  everything  takes  place  according  to  mere 
laws  of  nature,  there  will  always  be  a  secondary  only, 
but  never  a  primary  beginning,  and  therefore  no  com- 
pleteness of  the  series,  on  the  side  of  successive  causes. 
But  the  law  of  nature  consists  in  this,  that  nothing 
takes  place  without  a  cause  sufficiently  determined 
a  priori.  Therefore  the  proposition,  that  all  causahty 
is  possible  according  to  the  laws  of  nature  only,  con- 
tradicts itself,  if  taken  in  unlimited  generahty,  and  it  is 
impossible,  therefore,  to  admit  that  causality  as  the 
only  one. 

We  must  therefore  admit  another  causality,  through 
which  something  takes  place,  without  its  cause  being 
further  determined  according  to  necessary  laws  by  a 
preceding  cause,  that  is,  an  absolute  spontaneity  of  causes, 
by  which  a  series  of  phenomena,  proceeding  according 
to  natural  laws,  begins  by  itself;  we  must  consequently 
admit  transcendental  freedom,  without  which,  even  in  the 
course  of  nature,  the  series  of  phenomena  on  the  side  of 
causes,  can  never  be  perfect. 

Antithesis 

There  is  no  freedom,  but  everything 
in  the  world  takes  place  entirely 
according  to  the  laws  of  nature. 

Proof 

If  we  admit  that  there  is  freedom,  in  the  transcenden- 
tal sense,  as  a  particular  kind  of  causality,  according  to 
which  the  events  in  the  world  could  take  place,  that  is  a 
faculty  of  absolutely  originating  a  state,  and  with  it  a 


TRANSCENDENTAL   DIALECTIC  1 85 

series  of  consequences,  it  would  follow  that  not  only  a 
series  would  have  its  absolute  beginning  through  this 
spontaneity,  but  the  determination  of  that  spontaneity 
itself  to  produce  the  series,  that  is,  the  causahty,  would 
have  an  absolute  beginning,  nothing  preceding  it  by 
which  this  act  is  determined  according  to  permanent 
laws.  Every  beginning  of  an  act,  however,  presupposes 
a  state  in  which  the  cause  is  not  yet  active,  and  a  dynam- 
ically primary  beginning  of  an  act  presupposes  a  state 
which  has  no  causal  connection  with  the  preceding  state 
of  that  cause,  that  is,  in  no  wise  follows  from  it.  Trans- 
cendental freedom  is  therefore  opposed  to  the  law  of 
causahty,  and  represents  such  a  connection  of  successive 
states  of  effective  causes,  that  no  unity  of  experience  is 
possible  with  it.  It  is  therefore  an  empty  fiction  of  the 
mind,  and  not  to  be  met  with  in  any  experience. 

We  have,  therefore,  nothing  but  nature,  in  which  we 
must  try  to  find  the  connection  and  order  of  cosmical 
events.  Freedom  (independence)  from  the  laws  of  nature 
is  no  doubt  a  deliverance  from  restraint,  but  also  from  the 
guidance  of  all  rules.  For  we  can  not  say  that,  instead 
of  the  laws  of  nature,  laws  of  freedom  may  enter  into 
the  causality  of  the  course  of  the  world,  because,  if  deter- 
mined by  laws,  it  would  not  be  freedom,  but  nothing 
else  but  nature.  Nature,  therefore,  and  transcendental 
freedom  differ  from  each  other  Hke  legaHty  and  lawless- 
ness. The  former,  no  doubt,  imposes  upon  the  under- 
standing the  difficult  task  of  looking  higher  and  higher 
for  the  origin  of  events  in  the  series  of  causes,  because 
their  causality  is  always  conditioned.  In  return  for 
this,  however,  it  promises  a  complete  and  well-ordered 


1 86      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

unity  of  experience;  while,  on  the  other  side,  the  fiction 
of  freedom  promises,  no  doubt,  to  the  inquiring  mind, 
rest  in  the  chain  of  causes,  leading  him  up  to  an  un- 
conditioned causaKty,  which  begins  to  act  by  itself,  but 
which,  as  it  is  bHnd  itself,  tears  the  thread  of  rules  by 
which  alone  a  complete  and  coherent  experience  is 
possible. 

FOURTH  ANTINOMY 

Thesis 

There  exists  an  absolutely  necessary 
being  belonging  to  the  world,  either 
as  a  part  or  as  a  cause  of  it. 

Proof 

The  world  of  sense,  as  the  sum  total  of  all  phenomena, 
contains  a  series  of  changes  without  which  even  the 
representation  of  a  series  of  time,  which  forms  the  condi- 
tion of  the  possibiHty  of  the  world  of  sense,  would  not 
be  given  us.  But  every  change  has  its  condition  which 
precedes  it  in  time,  and  renders  it  necessary.  Now,  every- 
thing that  is  given  as  conditional  presupposes,  with 
regard  to  its  existence,  a  complete  series  of  conditions, 
leading  up  to  that  which  is  entirely  unconditioned,  and 
alone  absolutely  necessary.  Something  absolutely  nec- 
essary therefore  must  exist,  if  there  exists  a  change  as 
its  consequence.  And  this  absolutely  necessary  belongs 
itself  to  the  world  of  sense.  For  if  we  supposed  that  it 
existed  outsfde  that  world,  then  the  series  of  changes  in 
the  world  would  derive  its  origin  from  it,  while  the  nee- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 87 

essary  cause  itself  would  not  belong  to  the  world  of 
sense.  But  this  is  impossible.  For  as  the  beginning  of  a 
temporal  series  can  be  determined  only  by  that  which 
precedes  it  in  time,  it  follows  that  the  highest  condition 
of  the  beginning  of  a  series  of  changes  must  exist  in  the 
time  when  that  series  was  not  yet  (because  the  beginning 
is  an  existence,  preceded  by  a  time  in  which  the  thing 
which  begins  was  not  yet).  Hence  the  causahty  of  the 
necessary  cause  of  changes  and  that  cause  itself  belong 
to  time  and  therefore  to  phenomena  (in  which  alone 
time,  as  their  form,  is  possible),  and  it  can  not  therefore 
be  conceived  as  separated  from  the  world  of  sense,  as 
the  sum  total  of  all  phenomena.  It  follows,  therefore, 
that  something  absolutely  necessary  is  contained  in  the 
world,  whether  it  be  the  whole  cosmical  series  itself,  or 
only  a  part  of  it. 

Antithesis 

There  nowhere  exists  an  absolutely 
necessary  being,  either  within  or 
without  the  world,  as  the  cause 
of  it. 

Proof 

If  we  supposed  that  the  world  itself  is  a  necessary 
being,  or  that  a  necessary  being  exists  in  it,  there  would 
then  be  in  the  series  of  changes  either  a  beginning,  un- 
conditionally necessary,  and  therefore  without  a  cause, 
which  contradicts  the  dynamical  law  of  the  determina- 
tion of  all  phenomena  in  time;  or  the  series  itself  would 
be  without  any  beginning,  and  though  contingent  and 


1 88     INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT^S  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

conditioned  in  all  its  parts,  yet  entirely  necessary  and  un- 
conditioned as  a  whole.  This  would  be  self-contradictory, 
because  the  existence  of  a  multitude  can  not  be  necessary, 
if  no  single  part  of  it  possesses  necessary  existence. 

If  we  supposed,  on  the  contrary,  that  there  exists  an 
absolutely  necessary  cause  of  the  world,  outside  the 
world,  then  that  cause,  as  the  highest  member  in  the 
series  of  causes  of  cosmical  changes,  would  begin  the 
existence  of  the  latter  and  their  series.  In  that  case, 
however,  that  cause  would  have  to  begin  to  act,  and  its 
causaHty  would  belong  to  time,  and  therefore  to  the  sum 
total  of  phenomena.  It  would  belong  to  the  world,  and 
would  therefore  not  be  outside  the  world,  which  is  con- 
trary to  our  supposition.  Therefore,  neither  in  the  world, 
nor  outside  the  world  (yet  in  causal  connection  with  it),  / 
does  there  exist  anywhere  an  absolutely  necessary  being^ 

Rational  cosmology  deals  with  the  idea  of  the  world 
of  phenomena  determined  in  space  and  time.  But  since 
phenomena  are  determined  under  space  and  time  rela- 
tions, that  determination  brings  out  their  dependence 
upon  each  other,  but  at  the  same  time  prevents  a  com- 
plete determination  of  phenomena  as  a  whole. 

We  are  thus  led  into  a  series  of  dilemmas,  in  which 
starting  with  phenomena  we  try  to  get  the  complete  con- 
ditions which  make  them  possible.  This  is  done  by  trying 
to  reach  either  an  unconditioned  beginning  or  else  a 
complete  series  which  is  infinite.  Kant  holds  that  in  the 
latter  situation,  we  get  an  infinite  series,  but  one  that 
is  only  potentially  infinite  in  so  far  that  it  is  reached  by  a 
regress  which  is  never  completed.  In  the  former  case, 
the  first  in  space,  is  a  world-limit,  a  first  in  time,  a  world- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 89 

beginning;  or  again,  in  terms  of  divisibility,  we  get  to  a 
simple;  or  in  a  series  of  causes  to  an  originally  free  activ- 
ity; or  so  far  as  existence  is  concerned,  to  a  necessary 
being. 

For  the  sake  of  clearness  it  may  be  desirable  to  sum- 
marize the  antinomies  in  the  light  of  the  foregoing 
statement. 

In  the  first  antinomy  let  us  start  with  the  first  alter- 
native: the  world  is  limited  in  time  and  space.  We  must 
immediately  ask  what  is  the  limit,  that  is,  the  boundary. 
This  must  be  filled  time  and  space,  for  if  it  were  empty 
time  or  space,  the  world  would  be  bounded  by  nothing. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  bounded  by  filled  space  and 
time,  it  is  bounded  by  reaHty,  and  then  what  has  been 
taken  as  the  whole  world,  turns  out  to  be  only  a  portion 
of  the  world.  Let  us  suppose  the  other  alternative  and 
say  that  the  world  is  not  limited  in  time  or  space,  that  is, 
it  has  no  beginning  in  time  and  no  limits  in  space.  Then 
it  follows  that  there  must  have  been  an  infinity  of  elapsed 
time  prior  to  the  present  moment,  and  an  infinity  of 
spaces  from  the  space  here,  and  so  we  again  end  in  con- 
fusion. In  other  words,  his  proof  of  each  of  the  alter- 
natives consists  in  showing  the  impossibility  of  the 
opposite. 

The  second  antinomy  is  the  dilemma  reached  in  the 
consideration  of  the  divisibility  of  matter.  Its  thesis 
holds  that  every  composite  substance  consists  of  simple 
parts.  Composition  always  may  be  annihilated  without 
annihilating  the  substances  so  compounded.  To  say 
that  the  opposite  of  the  thesis  is  true,  namely,  that  there 


I  go      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's    CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

is  infinite  divisibility,  that  is,  composition  which  does 
not  consist  of  simple  parts,  is  to  deny  any  substantiality 
beneath  their  accidental  combinations,  and  so  is  an 
absurdity.  Therefore,  the  opposite  of  the  thesis  is  false, 
and  the  thesis  is  proved.  The  other  alternative  is  that 
in  the  world  there  is  no  simple  substance,  and  its  proof 
again  consists  in  showing  the  impossibility  of  the  oppo- 
site. Space  is  never  composed  of  simple  parts,  for  those 
apparently  simple  spaces  are  always  again  composed 
of  spaces.  What  is  true  of  the  infinite  divisibility  of 
space  is  true  of  objects  in  space.  /The  paralogisms  also 
showed  that  the  Ego  as  a  simple  object  is  impossible. 
Therefore,  in  the  world  there  is  no  simple  substance. 

In  the  third  antinomy,  the  dilemma  concerns  the 
finiteness  or  infinity  of  the  causal  series.  The  first  alter- 
native asserts  that  in  addition  to,  and  in  order  to  explain 
the  orderly  sequence  of  phenomena  in  nature,  there  is  a 
causality  of  freedom.  The  principle  of  causation  de- 
mands that  every  phenomenon  in  nature  must  have  its 
antecedent  change  which  produces  it,  and  so  on.  But 
each  member  of  the  series  is  not  the  real  cause  of  the 
succeeding  member,  and  so  there  is  no  real  causality  in 
the  whole  series  unless  we  assert  a  spontaneity,  a  causal- 
ity of  freedom,  that  is,  without  the  causaHty  of  freedom, 
the  law  of  causality  is  contradicted.  The  other  alter- 
native asserts  that  everything  happens  entirely  according 
to  the  laws  of  nature,  and  there  is  no  causality  of  freedom. 
For,  if  a  free  cause  exists  at  the  beginning  of  the  series, 
unless  we  contradict  the  law  of  causality,  this  free  cause 
must  itself  be  the  result  of  a  prior  cause,  and  that,  in 
turn,  of  another  and  prior  cause,  and  so  on  ad  infinitum. 


TRANSCENDENTAL   DIALECTIC  IQI 

In  other  words,  if  there  were  a  free  cause,  it  would  itself 
be  uncaused  and  so  contradict  the  law  of  causality. 

In  the  fourth  antinomy,  the  dilemma  concerns  the 
relation  of  contingency  to  necessity,  and  is  nothing  more 
than  the  logical  continuation  of  the  third  antinomy. 
The  first  alternative  of  the  dilemma,  and  the  thesis  of 
this  antinomy,  asserts  the  existence  either  in  the  world 
or  beyond  it,  of  a  necessary  being,  an  absolute  cause  of 
the  universe.  The  proof  for  it  is  practically  a  repetition 
of  the  proof  for  the  thesis  of  the  third  antinomy,  with 
this  modification,  that  for  the  causality  of  freedom  is 
substituted  its  logical  consequence — an  absolutely  nec- 
essary being.  The  other  alternative  asserts  that  there 
nowhere  exists  an  absolutely  necessary  being,  either 
within  or  without  the  world,  as  a  cause  of  it.  A  necessary 
being  as  in  the  world,  and  a  part  of  it,  can  be  taken  in 
two  ways,  as  existing  at  the  beginning  of  the  world,  or, 
as  itself  constituting  the  series  of  phenomena  as  a  whole. 
Taking  the  former,  since  every  beginning  is  a  moment 
in  time,  an  absolute  beginning  would  be  one  that  is  with- 
out a  preceding  moment.  But  since  time  admits  of  no 
limits,  this  is  inconceivably  Consequently  this  possibil- 
ity of  conceiving  the  necessary  being  at  the  beginning  of 
the  world  falls.  The  other  possibility,  namely,  that  the 
necessary  being  constitutes  and  is  constituted  by  the 
whole  series  of  phenomena  is  no  better.  For  no  summa- 
tion of  relative  and  contingent  phenomena  will  ever  be 
an  absolute  and  necessary  being.  The  conclusion  is  then 
that  there  is  no  necessary  being  m  the  world.  But  may 
such  necessary  being  be  beyond  the  world?  Tf  it  is,  it 
exists  outside  time  and  space.    But  it  is  supposed  to  be 


192      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT'S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

the  source  and  beginning  of  things,  and  as  all  beginning 
is  in  a  moment  of  time,  this  relation  is  also  impossible, 
for  by  hypothesis  it  is  outside  of  time. 

Kant,  in  his  solution  of  the  antinomies,  distinguishes 
between  the  first  two,  or  mathematical,  antinomies,  and 
the  third  and  fourth,  or  dynamical  antinomies.  The 
mathematical  antinomies,  by  reason  of  their  dealing 
with  the  composition  and  division  of  quantitative  mag- 
nitudes, are  stated  so  that  the  conditions  and  the  condi- 
tioned are  homogeneous,  whereas  in  the  dynamical 
antinomies,  condition  and  conditioned  need  not  be  and 
are  not  homogeneous. 

In  the  mathematical  antinomies  the  thesis  and  an- 
tithesis are  both  false  because  they  both  rest  on  the  false 
assumption  that  the  world,  as  a  body  of  phenomena 
which  is  complete,  is  given;  whereas,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  totality  is  merely  demanded  by  reason,  but  can  not 
be  given  in  experience.  Our  knowledge  does  not  give  us 
the  world  in  itself,  but  merely  an  incomplete  phenomenal 
representation  based  upon  an  empirical  regress  which 
can  never  be  completed.  Consequently  we  are  not 
justified  in  saying  that  the  world  as  a  whole  is  either 
finite  or  infinite,  or,  that  either  it  is  composed  of  simple 
parts,  or  is  infinitely  divisible. 

In  the  dynamical  antinomies  we  face  a  different 
situation,  namely,  that  both  thesis  and  antithesis  in  each 
antinomy  may  be  true.  For  the  thesis  may  be  true  if  it 
refers  to  things  in  themselves,  while  the  antithesis  may 
be  true  if  it  refers  to  phenomena.  Taking  the  antithesis 
first,  we  can  say  that  in  the  world  of  nature,  that  is, 
phenomena,  there  is  no  break  in  the  causal  series,  and 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 93 

no  necessity  or  place  for  either  a  free  cause  or  a  necessary 
being.  There  is  now  no  conflict  if  we  say  that  on  the 
other  hand  in  the  world  of  things  in  themselves,  beyond 
the  world  of  sense,  there  may  he  that  free,  necessary  cause, 
which  the  reason  demands  as  ground  of  the  phenomenal 
regress.  In  this  way,  Kant  believes,  the  way  is  opened 
for  faith,  for,  had  such  a  solution  of  these  antinomies 
been  impossible,  either  experiential  knowledge  on  the  one 
side,  or  the  basis  of  ethics  and  rehgion  on  the  other, 
would  have  been  impossible. 

Kant  beKeves  that  the  third  of  the  antinomies  seems 
particularly  significant  on  this  account,  for  in  its  solution 
one  can  point  out  that  the  antithesis  does  at  least  not 
disprove  the  possibility  of  the  thesis.  In  other  words, 
that  while  the  possibility  of  freedom  can  not  be  proved, 
yet  it  can  be  proved  that  freedom  is  not  impossible. 

The  law  of  nature,  that  everything  which  happens  has 
a  cause, — that  the  causality  of  that  cause,  that  is,  its 
activity  (as  it  is  anterior  in  time,  and,  with  regard  to  an 
effect  which  has  arisen^  can  not  itself  have  always 
existed,  but  must  have  happened  at  some  time),  must 
have  its  cause  among  the  phenomena  by  which  it  is 
determined,  and  that  therefore  all  events  in  the  order 
of  nature  are  empirically  determined.  This  law,  through 
which  alone  phenomena  become  nature  and  objects  of 
experience,  is  a  law  of  the  understanding,  which  can  on 
no  account  be  surrendered,  and  from  which  no  single 
phenomenon  can  be  exempted;  because  in  doing  this 
we  should  place  it  outside  all  possible  experience,  sep- 
arate from  all  objects  of  possible  experience,  and  change 
it  into  a  mere  fiction  of  the  mind  or  a  cobweb  of  the  brain. 


194      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

We  require  the  principle  of  the  causality  of  phenomena 
among  themselves,  in  order  to  be  able  to  look  for  and 
to  produce  natural  conditions,  that  is,  phenomenal  causes 
of  natural  events.  If  this  is  admitted  and  not  weakened 
by  any  exceptions,  the  understanding,  which  in  its 
empirical  emplo3anent  recognizes  in  all  events  nothing 
but  nature,  and  is  quite  justified  in  doing  so,  has  really 
all  that  it  can  demand,  and  the  explanations  of  phys- 
ical phenomena  may  proceed  without  let  or  hindrance. 
The  understanding  would  not  be  wronged  in  the  least, 
if  we  Assumed,  though  it  be  a  mere  fiction,  that  some 
among  the  natural  causes  have  a  faculty  which  is  in- 
telHgible  only,  and  whose  determination  to  activity  does 
not  rest  on  empirical  conditions,  but  on  mere  grounds 
of  the  intellect,  if  only  the  phenomenal  activity  of  that 
cause  is  in  accordance  with  all  the  laws  of  empirical 
causality. 

Our  problem  is  then  whether  freedom  is  really  contra- 
dictory to  natural  necessity. 

Man,  so  far  as  he  is  considered  as  a  phenomenal  being, 
is  subject  to  the  laws  of  nature,  the  same  as  other  objects 
of  nature.  In  lifeless  or  merely  animal  nature  there 
is  no  ground  for  taking  exception  to  complete  deter- 
mination by  natural  causes.  But  man  is  not  merely 
an  object,  he  is  a  being  through  the  principles  of  whose 
mind,  objects  become  possible  for  him.  Furthermore, 
the  fact  of  his  being  the  possessor  of  moral  obhgation 
shows  that  his  nature  includes  more  than  the  merely 
theoretical  principles  of  phenomenal  possibihty,  and 
that  he  has  also  noumenal  significance.  The  ought 
expresses  a  kind  of  necessity  and  connection  with  causes, 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 95 

which  we  do  not  find  elsewhere  in  the  whole  of  nature. 
The  understanding  can  know  in  nature  only  what  is 
present,  past,  or  future.  If  we  look  at  the  course  of 
nature  as  a  causally  connected  whole,  the  ought  has  no 
significance  because  everything  is  necessarily  determined 
by  mechanical  causation. 

A  man's  actions  as  empirical  phenomena  are  necessarily 
determined  as  such.  But  if  we  consider  the  same  actions 
with  reference  to  reason,  not  speculative  reason,  but  the 
practical  reason,  it  is  conceivable  that  there  may  be  a 
rule  and  order  entirely  different  from  the  order  of  nature. 
And  we  may  find  that  the  ideas  of  reason  have  really 
proved  their  causality  with  reference  to  human  actions 
as  phenomena,  and  that  these  actions  have  taken  place, 
not  because  they  were  determined  by  empirical  causes, 
but  by  the  causes  of  reason.  The  causality  of  reason 
in  its  intelligible  character  does  7iot  arise  or  begin  at  a 
certain  time  in  order  to  produce  an  effect;  for  in  that  case 
it  would  be  subject  to  the  natural  law  of  phenomena, 
and  its  causality  would  be  nature  and  not  freedom. 
What  we  could  say  is  that  reason  is  a  faculty  through 
which  the  sensuous  condition  of  an  empirical  series  first 
begins.  For  the  condition  that  lies  in  reason  would  not 
be  sensuous  and  therefore  would  itself  not  begin.  Thus 
we  would  get  what  we  missed  in  all  empirical  series, 
namely,  that  the  condition  of  a  successive  series  of 
events  should  itself  be  empirically  unconditioned. 

Reason  would  be  the  constant  condition  of  all  free 
actions  by  which  man  takes  his  place  in  the  phenomenal 
world.  Every  one  of  them  would  be  determined  before- 
hand in  his  empirical  character,  before  it  becomes  actual. 


196      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT  S   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

With  regard  to  the  intelligible  character,  however,  of 
which  the  empirical  is  only  a  sensuous  schema,  there 
wou}d  be  neither  before  nor  after;  and  every  action, 
\Yithout  regard  to  the  temporal  relation  which  connects 
it  with  other  phenomena,  would  be  the  immediate  effect 
of  the  intelligible  character  of  pure  reason. 

While  the  preceding  argument  does  not  prove  the 
existence  of  a  causality  of  freedom,  it  shows  us  that  free- 
^-dom  is  not  necessarily  precluded  by  natural  causality. 
(   Kaijt  has   constantly  insisted   that  natural   causality 
I    holds  good  of  phenomena  only,  and  not  of  things  in 
^themselves. '  Therefore,  if  considerations  of  a  moral  or 
religious  character  furnish  practical  reasons  for  behef  in 
freedom,  rational  faith  finds  no  vaHd  grounds  miHtating 
against  such  belief.     To  change  the  natural  course  of 
events  in  accord  with  moral  ideals,  is  the  imperative 
which  Kant  finds  present  in  us  all.    It  is  man's  duty  to 
rise   superior   to   natural   impulses,   and   so   overcome 
natural  necessity.    But  an  ought  implies  that  the  action  is 
possible  and  this  in  turn  implies  freedom.    An  adequate 
treatment  of  this  problem  is  not  attempted  here  where  the 
sole  purpose  is  to  show  that  freedom  is  not  unthinkable. 
In  this  manner,  Kant  has  prepared  the  way  for  his  doc- 
trine of  morals. 


URE  Reason 


In  the  analytic  the  problem  was  to  find  pure  concepts 
of  the  understanding  whereby  the  material  of  phenom- 
enal knowledge  could  be  unified  and  such  knowledge 
made  possible.  In  the  dialectic  the  problem  has  been  to 
find  a  unity  of  the  categories  in  terms  of  ideas  of  reason. 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 97 

These  ideas  contain  a  certain  completeness  unattainable 
in  any  possible  empirical  knowledge,  and  reason  aims  in 
them  at  a  systematical  unity  only,  to  which  the  empir- 
ically possible  unity  is  to  approximate,  without  ever 
fully  reaching  it.  Still  further  removed  from  objective 
reality  is  what  Kant  calls  the  Ideal,  by  which  he  means 
the  idea,  not  only  m  concreto,  but  in  individuo,  that  is,  an 
individual  thing  determinable  or  even  determined  by 
the  idea  alone.  What  is  to  us  an  ideal,  was  in  Plato's 
language  an  Idea  of  a  divine  mind,  an  individual  object 
present  to  its  pure  intuition,  the  most  perfect  of  every 
kind  of  possible  being,  and  the  archetype  of  all  phenom- 
enal copies.  These  ideals,  though  they  cannot  claim  ob- 
jective reality  (existence),  are  not  therefore  to  be  con- 
sidered as  mere  chimeras,  but  supply  reason  with  an 
indispensable  standard,  because  it  requires  the  concept 
of  that  which  is  perfect  of  its  kind,  in  order  to  estimate 
and  measure  by  it  the  degree  and  the  number  of  the 
defects  in  the  imperfect.  In  its  ideal,  reason  aims  at  a 
perfect  determination,  according  to  rules  a  priori,  and  it 
conceives  an  object  throughout  determinable  according 
to  principles,  though  without  sufficient  conditions  of 
experience,  so  that  the  concept  itself  is  transcendent. 
Such  an  ideal,  in  short,  is  the  idea  of  God. 

The  ideas  of  reason  have  been  found  in  the  dialectic 
to  lead  to  a  series  of  illusory  syllogisms — in  the  ra- 
tional psychology,  a  categorical  syllogism ;  in  the  rational 
cosmology,  an  hypothetical  syllogism,  and  in  the  rational 
theology,  a  disjunctive  syllogjism.  The  way  in  which 
the  relation  of  the  rational  theology  to  the  disjunctive 
syllogism  is  worked  out,  will  appear  in  what  follows. 


gS      INTROPUCTION  TO  KAKrV-GRiTlCAL  PHILOSOPHY 


Everything  is  subject,  in  its  possibility,  to  the  principle 
of  complete  determination,  according  to  which  one  of  all 
the  possible  predicates  of  things,  as  compared  with  their 
opposites,  must  be  applicable  to  it.  This  does  not  rest 
only  on  the  principle  of  contradiction,  for  it  regards  every- 
thing, not  only  in  relation  to  two  contradictory  pred- 
icates, but  in  relation  to  the  wJiole  possibility,  that  is, 
to  the  whole  of  all  predicates  of  things,  and,  presupposing 
these  as  a  condition  a  priori,  it  represents  everything 
as  deriving  its  own  possibility  from  the  share  which  it 
possesses  in  that  whole  possibility.  This  principle  of 
complete  determination  relates  therefore  to  the  content, 
and  not  only  to  the  logical  form.  It  is  the  principle  of 
the  synthesis  of  all  predicates  which  are  meant  to  form 
the  complete  concept  of  a  thing,  and  not  the  principle  of 
analytical  representation  only,  by  means  of  one  of  two 
contradictory  predicates;  and  it  contains  a  transcendental 
presupposition,  namely,  that  of  the  material  for  all 
possibility  which  is  supposed  to  contain  a  priori  the  data 
for  the  particular  possibility  of  everything. 

Now  although  this  idea  of  the  sum  total  of  all  possibility j 
so  far  as  it  forms  the  condition  of  the  complete  deter- 
mination of  everything,  is  itself  still  undetermined  with 
regard  to  its  predicates,  and  is  conceived  by  us  merely 
as  a  sum  total  of  all  possible  predicates,  we  find  never- 
theless on  closer  examination  that  this  idea,  as  a  funda- 
mental concept,  excludes  a  number  of  predicates  which, 
being  derivative,  are  given  by  others,  or  can  not  stand 
one  by  the  side  of  the  other,  and  that  it  is  raised  to  a 
completely  a  priori  determined  concept,  thus  becoming 
the  concept  of  an  individual  object  which  is  completely 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  1 99 

determined  by  the  mere  idea,  and  must  therefore  be 
called  an  ideal  of  pure  reason. 

By  this  complete  possession  of  all  reality  we  represent 
the  concept  of  a  thing  in  itself  as  completely  determined, 
and  the  concept  of  an  ens  realissimum  is  the  concept  of 
individual  being,  because  of  all  possible  opposite  pred- 
icates one,  namely,  that  which  absolutely  belongs  to 
being,  is  found  in  its  determination.  It  is  therefore  a 
transcendental  ideal  which  forms  the  foundation  of  the 
complete  determination  which  is  necessary  for  all  that 
exists,  and  which  constitutes  at  the  same  time  the 
highest  and  complete  condition  of  its  possibihty,  to  which 
all  thought  of  objects,  with  regard  to  their  content,, 
must  be  traced  back.  It  is  at  the  same  time  the  only 
true  ideal  of  which  human  reason  is  capable,  because  it 
is  in  this  case  alone  that  a  concept  of  a  thing,  which  in  ^ 
itself  is  general,  is  completely  determined  by  itself,  and 
recognized  as  the  representation  of  an  individual. 

The  logical  determination  of  a  concept  by  reason  is 
based  upon  a  disjunctive  syllogism  in  which  the  major 
contains  a  logical  division  (the  division  of  the  sphere  of  a 
general  concept),  while  the  minor  Kmits  that  sphere  tO|  a 
certain  part,  and  the  conclusion  determines  the  concebt 
by  that  part.  The  general  concept  of  a  reality  in  general  / 
can  not  be  divided  a  priori,  because  without  experience 
we  know  no  definite  kinds  of  reality  contained  under  that 
genus.  Hence  the  transcendental  major  of  the  complete 
determination  of  all  things  is  nothing  but  a  representation 
of  the  sum  total  of  all  reality,  and  not  only  a  concept 
which  comprehends  all  predicates,  according  to  their 
transcendental  content,  under  itself,  but  within  itself; 


200      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

and  the  complete  determination  of  everything  depends 
on  the  limitation  of  this  total  of  xeahty,  of  which  some 
part  is  ascribjedrto  the  thing,  .while  the^re^  is  excluded 
from  itj^a^rcTcedure  which  agrees  with  the  ^/  aut  of  a 
disjunctive^  major,  and  with  thfe  determinatibn  of  the 
object  through  one  of  the  mernters  of  that  division  in 
the  niinor.  Thus  the  procedure  of  reason  fiy^hich  the 
transcWideiital  ideal  becionl^  the  basis-efthe  determina- 
tion of\ll  possible' thingSj^i^_..anak>goiistar  that  which 
reason  follows- -in-di§junctive  syllogisms^  proposition 
on  which  I  tried  to  base  the  systematical  division  of  all 
transcendental  ideas,  and  according  to  which  they^re 
produced,  as  corresponding  to  the  three  kinds  of  the 
syllogisms  of  reason. 

The  derivation  of  all  other  possibility  from  that 
original  being  can  not,  if  we  speak  accurately,  be  con- 
sidered as  a  limitation  of  its  highest  reality,  and,  as  it 
were,  a  division  of  it — for  in  that  case  the  original  being 
would  become  to  us  a  mere  aggregate  of  derivative  beings, 
which  is  impossible,  though  we  represented  it  so  in  our 
first  rough  sketch.  On  the  contrary,  the  highest  reality 
would  form  the  basis  of  the  possibility  of  all  things  as  a 
cause,  and  not  as  a  sum  total.  The  manifoldness  of  things 
would  not  depend  on  the  limitation  of  the  original  being, 
but  on  its  complete  effect,  and  to  this  also  would  belong 
all  our  sensibiHty,  together  with  all  reaHty  in  phenomenal 
appearance,  which  could  not,  as  an  ingredient,  belong 
to  the  idea  of  a  supreme  being. 

If  we  follow  up  this  idea  of  ours  and  hypostasize  it, 
we  shall  be  able  to  determine  the  original  being  by  means 
of  the  concept  of  the  highest  reality  as  one,  simple,  all- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  20I 

sufficient,  eternal,  etc.,  in  one  word,  determine  it  in  its 
unconditioned  completeness  through  all  predicaments. 
The  concept  of  such  a  being  is  the  concept  of  God  in  its 
''transcendental  sense,  and  thus,  as  Kant  indicated  above, 
the  ideal  of  pure  reaspn  is  the  object  of  a  traja^cendental 
theology. 


CRITICISM    Ot  THE    ONTOLO^ICAJ,  --I^OOF    FOR    THE 
EXISTENCETIOF  GOD     . 

The  concept  oi^n  absolutelj  necessa4*y  being  is  a  con- 
cept of  pure  Wason,<tliat^^a  mere  /dea,  the  objective 
reahty  of  which  is  not  proved  by  >he  fact  that  it  is  re- 
quired by  reason.  "That  Jdear- does  no  more  than  point 
to  a  certain  but  unattainable  completeness,  and  serves 
rather  to  limit  the  understanding,  than  to  extend  its 
sphere. 

People,  in  all  their  talk  concerning  an  absolutely  nec- 
essary being,  have  tried  not  so  much  to  understand 
whether  and  how  a  thing  of  that  kind  could  even  be 
conceived,  as  to  prove  its  existence.  It  has  not  been 
made  clear  why  the  non-existence  of  such  a  being  is 
inconceivable,  and  we  are  not  sure  whether  any  object 
corresponds  to  the  concept  unconditioned.  Furthermore, 
the  examples  used  to  explain  the  concept  have  been  taken 
from  judgments  only,  not  from  things,  and  their  exist- 
ence. Now  the  unconditioned  necessity  of  judgments  is 
not  the  same  thing  as  an  absolute  necessity  of  things. 
The  proposition  that  a  triangle  has  three  angles,  does 
not  say  that  these  angles  exist,  but  only  that  if  the  tri- 
angle exists,  it  must  have  three  angles.  Nevertheless, 
this  pure  logical  necessity  has  exerted  so  powerful  an 


202      INTRODUCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

illusion,  that,  after  having  formed  of  a  thing  a  concept 
a  priori  so  constituted  that  it  seemed  to  include  existence 
in  its  sphere,  people  thought  they  could  conclude  with 
certainty  that,  because  existence  necessarily  belongs  to 
the  object  of  that  concept,  provided  always  that  I  accept 
the  thing  as  given,  its  existence  also  must  necessarily 
be  accepted,  and  that  the  being  therefore  must  itself  be 
absolutely  necessary,  because  its  existence  is  implied  in  a 
concept,  which  is  accepted  voluntarily  only,  and  always 
under  the  condition  that  I  accept  the  object  of  it  as  given. 

If  in  an  identical  judgment  the  predicate  is  rejected 
and  the  subject  retained,  there  arises  a  contradiction. 
But  if  both  subject  and  predicate  are  rejected,  there  is  no 
contradiction.  To  accept  a  triangle  and  yet  to  reject  its 
three  angles  is  contradictory,  but  there  is  no  contradic- 
tion in  admitting  the  non-existence  of  the  triangle  and 
of  its  three  angles.  The  same  applies  to  the  concept  of 
an  absolutely  necessary  being.  Remove  its  existence, 
and  you  remove  the  thing  itself  with  all  its  predicates, 
so  that  a  contradiction  becomes  impossible.  If  you  say, 
God  is  almighty,  that  is  a  necessary  judgment,  because 
almightiness  can  not  be  removed,  if  you  accept  a  deity. 
But  if  you  say,  God  is  not,  then  neither  his  almightiness, 
nor  any  other  of  his  predicates  is  given;  they  are  all, 
together  with  the  subject,  removed  out  of  existence,  and 
there  is  no  contradiction. 

The  only  way  of  evading  the  above  conclusion  would 
be  to  say  that  there  are  subjects  which  can  not  be  re- 
moved. But  this  would  be  to  assert  the  existence  of 
absolutely  necessary  subjects,  and  that  is  the  very  thing 
to  be  proved.    Kant  holds  it  impossible  to  form  any  con- 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  203 

cept  of  a  thing  which  if  removed  together  with  its  pred- 
icates will  involve  any  contradiction.  Despite  all  these 
arguments,  however,  it  is  asserted  that  there  is  one  and 
only  one  concept  in  which  the  removal  of  its  object 
would  be  self-contradictory,  namely,  the  concept  of  the 
most  real  being.  It  is  said  that  it  possesses  all  reahty, 
and  one  is  no  doubt  justified  in  accepting  such  a  being 
as  possible*  Now  reahty  comprehends  existence,  and 
therefore  existence  is  contained  in  the  concept  of  a 
thing  possible.  If  that  thing  is  removed,  the  internal 
possibiHty  of  the  thing  would  be  removed,  and  this  is 
self-contradictory. 

Kant,  on  the  other  hand,  asserts  that  by  introducing 
into  the  concept  of  a  thing,  which  you  wish  to  think  in  its 
possibility  only,  the  concept  of  existence,  you  have  been 
guilty  of  a  fallacy.  You  can  draw  out  no  more  than 
you  have  yourself  included  in  the  concept,  and  this  is 
mere  tautology.  All  judgments  concerning  existence  are 
synthetical  propositions;  hence  we  can  not  demonstrate 
the  existence  of  God  from  the  concept  of  God. 

Existence  is  not  a  real  predicate,  or  a  concept  of  some- 
thing that  can  be  added  to  the  concept  of  a  thing.  It  is 
merely  the  admission  of  a  thing,  and  of  certain  determina- 

*  But  Kant  warns  us  that  the  absence  of  self-contradictorincss 
in  a  concept  is  far  from  proving  the  possibility  of  its  object.  A 
concept  is  always  possible,  if  it  is  not  self-contradictory.  But  it 
may  nevertheless  be  an  empty  concept,  unless  the  objective  reality 
of  the  synthesis,  by  which  the  concept  is  generated,  has  been  dis- 
tinctly shown.  This,  however,  must  rest  upon  principles  of  pos- 
sible experience,  and  not  on  the  principle  of  contradiction.  This 
is  a  warning  against  inferring  at  once  from  the  logical  possibility 
the  possibihty  of  real  things. 


204     INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT^S  CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

tions  in  it.  Logically,  it  is  merely  the  copula  of  a  judg- 
ment. The  proposition,  God  is  almighty,  contains  two 
concepts,  each  having  its  object,  namely,  God  and 
almightiness.  The  small  word  is,  is  not  an  additional 
predicate,  but  only  serves  to  put  the  predicate  in  relation 
to  the  subject.  If,  then,  I  take  the  subject  God  with  all 
its  predicates,  and  say,  God  is,  or  there  is  a  God,  I  add  no 
predicate  to  the  concept  of  God,  but  only  put  the  subject 
with  all  its  predicates,  in  relation  to  my  concept,  as  its 
object.  Both  must  contain  exactly  the  same  kind  of 
thing,  and  nothing  can  have  been  added  to  the  concept, 
which  expresses  possibility  only,  by  my  thinking  its 
object  as  simply  given  and  saying,  it  is.  And  thus  the 
real  does  not  contain  more  than  the  possible.  A  hundred 
real  dollars  do  not  contain  a  penny  more  than  a  hundred 
possible  dollars. 

If,  then,  I  try  to  conceive  a  being,  as  the  highest 
reality  (without  any  defect),  the  question  still  remains, 
whether  it  exists  or  not.  For  though  in  my  concept  there 
may  be  wanting  nothing  of  the  possible  real  content  of  a 
thing  in  general,  something  is  wanting  in  its  relation  to 
my  whole  state  of  thinking,  namely,  that  the  knowledge 
of  that  object  should  be  possible  a  posteriori  also,  and 
here  we  perceive  the  cause  of  our  difficulty. 

Kant's  criticism  of  the  ontological  argument  calls 
attention  to  two  fallacies,  i.  Mere  absence  of  contra- 
diction proves  no  more  than  the  logical  possibiHty  of  a 
concept;  it  does  not  estabHsh  the  real  possibiHty  of  a 
thing.  2.  It  is  impossible  to  derive  the  existence  of  a 
thing  by  analysis  of  a  concept;  all  existential  judgments 
are  synthetical.    Existence  is  not  something  included  in 


TRANSCENDENTAL   DIALECTIC  205 

the  concept  of  a  thing,  the  existence  of  a  thing  can  not 
be  determined  without  experience.* 

CRITICISM    OF    THE    COSMOLOGICAL    PROOF    FOR    THE 
EXISTENCE   OF  GOD 

The  cosmological  proof,  which  Leibniz  calls  also  the 
proof  a  contingentia  mundi,  runs  as  follows:  If  there 
exists  anything,  there  must  exist  an  absolutely  necessary 
being  also.  Now  I,  at  least,  exist;  therefore  there  exists 
an  absolutely  necessary  being.  This  proof  begins  with 
experience,  and  is  not  entirely  a  priori,  or  ontological; 
and,  as  the  object  of  all  possible  experience  is  called  the 
world,  this  proof  is  called  the  cosmological  proof.  The 
proof  then  goes  on  as  follows:  The  necessary  being  can 
be  determined  in  one  way  only,  that  is,  by  one  only  of  all 
possible  opposite  predicates;  it  must  therefore  be  deter- 
mined completely  by  its  own  concept.  Now,  there  is 
only  one  concept  of  a  thing  possible,  which  a  priori  com- 
pletely determines  it,  namely,  that  of  the  ens  realissimum. 
It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  concept  of  the  ens  realis- 
simum is  the  only  one  by  which  a  necessary  being  can 
be  thought,  and  therefore  it  is  concluded  that  a  highest 
being  exists  by  necessity. 

There  are  so  many  sophistical  propositions  in  this 
cosmological  argument,  that  it  really  seems  as  if  spec- 
ulative reason  had  spent  all  her  dialectical  skill  in  order 
to  produce  the  greatest  possible  transcendental  illusion. 
We  see  that  there  is  here  put  forward  an  old  argument 
disguised  as  a  new  one,  in  order  to  appeal  to  the  agree- 

*  The  entire  question  of  the  validity  of  Kant's  criticism  of  this 
argument  hinges  on  the  relation  between  thought  and  reahty. 


2o6      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ment  of  two  witnesses,  one  supplied  by  pure  reason,  the 
other  by  experience,  while  in  reaHty  there  is  only  one, 
namely,  the  first,  who  changes  his  dress  and  voice  in 
order  to  be  taken  for  a  second.  In  order  to  have  a  secure 
foundation,  this  proof  takes  its  stand  on  experience,  and 
pretends  to  be  different  from  the  ontological  proof, 
which  places  its  whole  confidence  in  pure  concepts 
a  priori  only.  The  cosmological  proof,  however,  uses 
that  experience  only  in  order  to  make  one  step,  namely, 
to  the  existence  of  a  necessary  being  in  general.  What 
properties  that  being  may  have,  can  never  be  learnt  from 
the  empirical  argument,  and  for  that  purpose  reason 
takes  leave  of  it  altogether,  and  tries  to  find  out,  from 
among  concepts  only,  what  properties  an  absolutely 
necessary  being  ought  to  possess,  that  is,  which  among 
all  possible  things  contains  in  itself  the  requisite  condi- 
tions of  absolute  necessity.  This  requisite  is  beheved  by 
reason  to  exist  in  the  concept  of  an  ens  realissimum  only, 
and  reason  concludes  at  once  that  this  must  be  the 
absolutely  necessary  being.  In  this  conclusion  it  is 
simply  assumed  that  the  concept  of  a  being  of  the  highest 
reality  is  perfectly  adequate  to  the  concept  of  absolute 
necessity  in  existence;  so  that  the  latter  might  be  con- 
cluded from  the  former.  This  is  the  same  proposition 
as  that  maintained  in  the  ontological  argument,  and  is 
simply  taken  over  into  the  cosmological  proof,  nay,  made 
its  foundation,  although  the  intention  was  to  avoid  it. 
For  it  is  clear  that  absolute  necessity  is  an  existence 
from  mere  concepts.  If,  then,  I  say  that  the  concept  of 
the  ens  realissimum  is  such  a  concept,  and  is  the  only 
concept  adequate  to  necessary  existence,  I  am  bound  to 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  207 

admit  that  the  latter  may  be  deduced  from  the  former. 
The  whole  conclusive  strength  of  the  so-called  cosmo- 
logical  proof  rests  therefore  in  reality  on  the  ontological 
proof  from  mere  concepts,  while  the  appeal  to  experience 
is  quite  superfluous,  and,  though  it  may  lead  us  on  to  the 
concept  of  absolute  necessity,  it  cannot  demonstrate  it 
with  any  definite  object. 

Another  of  the  sophisms  of  the  cosmological  argument 
may  now  be  shown.  If  the  proposition  is  right,  that  every 
absolutely  necessary  being  is,  at  the  same  time,  the  most 
real  being  (and  this  is  the  nervus  prohandi  of  the  cosmo- 
logical proof),  it  must  Hke  all  afiirmative  judgments,  be 
capable  of  conversion,  at  least  per  accidens.  This  would 
give  us  the  proposition  that  some  entia  realissima  are  at 
the  same  time  absolutely  necessary  beings.  One  ens 
realissimum,  however,  does  not  differ  from  any  other  on 
any  point,  and  what  applies  to  one,  appHes  also  to  all. 
In  this  case,  therefore,  I  may  employ  absolute  conversion, 
and  say,  that  every  ens  realissimum  is  a  necessary  being. 
As  this  proposition  is  determined  by  its  concepts  a  priori 
only,  it  follows  that  the  mere  concept  of  the  ens  realis- 
simum must  carry  with  it  its  absolute  necessity;  and  this, 
which  was  maintained  by  the  ontological  proof,  and  not 
recognized  by  the  cosmological,  forms  really  the  founda- 
tion of  the  conclusions  of  the  latter,  though  in  a  dis- 
guised form. 

It  may  be  allowable  to  admit  the  existence  of  a  being 
entirely  sufficient  to  serve  as  the  cause  of  all  possible 
effects,  simply  in  order  to  assist  reason  in  her  search  for 
unity  of  causes.  But  to  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  such  a 
being  exists  necessarily j  is  no  longer  the  modest  language 


208      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

of  an  admissible  hypothesis,  but  the  bold  assurance  of 
apodictic  certainty;  for  the  knowledge  of  that  which  is 
absolutely  necessary  must  itself  possess  absolute  neces- 
sity. 

The  whole  problem  of  the  transcendental  ideal  is  this, 
either  to  find  a  concept  compatible  with  absolute  neces- 
sity, or  to  find  the  absolute  necessity  compatible  with 
the  concept  of  anything.  If  the  one  is  possible,  the  other 
must  be  so  also,  for  reason  recognizes  that  only  as  ab- 
solutely necessary  which  is  necessary  according  to  its 
concept.  Both  these  tasks  baffle  our  attempts  at  satisfy- 
ing  our  understanding  on  this  point,  and  likewise  our 
endeavors  to  comfort  it  with  regard  to  its  impotence. 

CRITICISM    OF    THE    PHYSICO-THEOLOGICAL    PROOF    FOR 
THE  EXISTENCE   OF   GOD 

If,  then,  neither  the  concept  of  things  in  general,  nor 
the  experience  of  any  existence  in  general,  can  satisfy  our 
demands,  there  still  remains  one  way  open,  namely,  to 
try  whether  any  definite  experience,  and  consequently 
that  of  things  in  the  world  as  it  is,  their  constitution  and 
disposition,  may  not  supply  a  proof  which  could  give  us 
the  certain  conviction  of  the  existence  of  a  supreme  being. 
Such  a  proof  we  should  call  physico-theological.  If  that, 
however,  should  prove  impossible  too,  then  it  is  clear  that 
no  satisfactory  proof  whatever,  from  merely  speculative 
reason,  is  possible,  in  support  of  the  existence  of  a  being, 
corresponding  to  our  transcendental  idea. 

This  proof  will  always  deserve  to  be  treated  with  re- 
spect. It  is  the  oldest,  the  clearest,  and  most  in  conform- 
ity with  human  reason.     Its  principal  points  are  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  209 

following.  First,  there  are  everywhere  in  the  world  clear 
indications  of  an  intentional  arrangement  carried  out 
with  great  wisdom,  and  forming  a  whole  indescribably 
varied  in  its  contents  and  infinite  in  extent.  Secondly, 
the  fitness  of  this  arrangement  is  entirely  foreign  to  the 
things  existing  in  the  world,  and  belongs  to  them  con- 
tingently only;  that  is,  the  nature  of  different  things 
could  never  spontaneously,  by  the  combination  of  so 
many  means,  co-operate  towards  definite  aims,  if  these 
means  had  not  been  selected  and  arranged  on  purpose 
by  a  rational  disposing  principle,  according  to  certain 
fundamental  ideas.  Thirdly,  there  exists,  therefore,  a 
subHme  and  wise  cause  (or  many),  which  must  be  the 
cause  of  the  world,  not  only  as  a  blind  and  all-powerful 
nature,  by  means  of  unconscious  fecundity ,  but  as  an 
intelligence,  by  freedom.  Fourthly,  the  unity  of  that 
cause  may  be  inferred  with  certainty  from  the  unity  of 
the  reciprocal  relation  of  the  parts  of  the  world,  as  por- 
tions of  a  skillful  edifice,  so  far  as  our  experience  reaches, 
and  beyond  it,  with  plausibility,  according  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  analogy. 

According  to  this  argument,  the  fitness  and  harmony 
existing  in  so  many  works  of  nature  might  prove  the  con- 
tingency of  the  form,  but  not  of  the  matter,  that  is,  the 
substance  of  the  world,  because,  for  the  latter  purpose, 
it  would  be  necessary  to  prove  in  addition,  that  the  things 
of  the  world  were  in  themselves  incapable  of  such  order 
and  harmony,  according  to  general  laws,  unless  there 
existed,  even  in  their  substance,  the  product  of  a  supreme 
wisdom.  For  this  purpose,  very  different  arguments 
would  be  required  from  those  derived  from  the  analogy 


2IO      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

of  human  art.  The  utmost,  therefore,  that  could  be 
established  by  such  a  proof  would  be  an  architect  of  the 
world,  always  very  much  hampered  by  the  quality  of  the 
material  with  which  he  has  to  work,  not  a  creator,  to 
whose  idea  everything  is  subject.  This  would  by  no 
means  suffice  for  the  purposed  aim  of  proving  an  all- 
sufficient  original  being.  If  we  wish  to  prove  the  con- 
tingency of  matter  itself,  we  must  have  recourse  to  a 
transcendental  argument,  and  this  is  the  very  thing 
which  was  to  be  avoided. 

The  step  leading  to  absolute  totality  is  entirely  im- 
possible on  the  empirical  road.  Nevertheless,  that  step 
is  taken  in  the  physico-theological  proof.  How  then  has 
this  broad  abyss  been  bridged  over? 

The  fact  is  that,  after  having  reached  the  stage  of 
admiration  of  the  greatness,  the  wisdom,  the  power,  etc., 
of  the  Author  of  the  world,  and  seeing  no  further  ad- 
vance possible,  one  suddenly  leaves  the  argument  carried 
on  by  empirical  proofs,  and  lays  hold  of  that  contingency 
which,  from  the  very  first,  was  inferred  from  the  order 
and  design  of  the  world.  The  next  step  from  that  con- 
tingency leads,  by  means  of  transcendental  concepts 
only,  to  the  existence  of  something  absolutely  necessary, 
and  another  step  from  the  absolute  necessity  of  the  first 
cause  to  its  completely  determined  or  determining  con- 
cept, namely,  that  of  an  all-embracing  reality.  Thus  we 
see  that  the  physico-theological  proof,  baffled  in  its  own 
undertaking,  takes  suddenly  refuge  in  the  cosmological 
proof,  and  as  this  is  only  the  ontological  proof  in  disguise, 
it  really  carries  out  its  original  intention  by  means  of 
pure  reason  only;  though  it  so  strongly  disclaimed  in  the 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  211 

beginning  all  connection  with  it,  and  professed  to  base 
everything  on  clear  proofs  from  experience. 

Those  who  adopt  the  physico-theological  argument 
have  no  reason  to  be  so  very  coy  towards  the  transcenden- 
tal mode  of  argument,  and  with  the  conceit  of  enlightened 
observers  of  nature  to  look  down  upon  it  as  the  cob- 
webs of  dark  speculators.  If  they  would  only  examine 
themselves,  they  would  find  that,  after  they  had  ad- 
vanced a  good  way  on  the  soil  of  nature  and  experience, 
and  found  themselves  nevertheless  as  far  removed  as 
ever  from  the  object  revealed  to  their  reason,  they 
suddenly  leave  that  soil,  to  enter  into  the  realm  of  pure 
possibilities,  where  on  the  wings  of  ideas  they  hope  to 
reach  that  which  had  withdrawn  itself  from  all  their 
empirical  investigations.  Imagining  themselves  to  be 
on  firm  ground  after  that  desperate  leap,  they  now  pro- 
ceed to  expand  the  definite  concept  which  they  have 
acquired,  they  do  not  know  how,  over  the  whole  field 
of  creation;  and  they  explain  the  ideal,  which  was  merely 
a  product  of  pure  reason,  by  experience,  though  in  a  very 
poor  way,  and  totally  beneath  the  dignity  of  the  object, 
refusing  all  the  while  to  admit  that  they  have  arrived 
at  that  knowledge  or  supposition  by  a  very  different 
road  from  that  of  experience. 

Thus  we  have  seen  that  the  physico-theological  proof 
rests  on  the  cosmological,  and  the  cosmological  on  the 
ontological  proof  of  the  existence  of  one  original  being 
as  the  supreme  being;  and,  as  besides  these  three,  there 
is  no  other  path  open  to  speculative  reason,  the  ontolog- 
ical proof,  based  exclusively  on  pure  concepts  of  reason, 
is  the  only  possible  one,  always  supposing  that  any  proof 


212      INTRODUCTION   TO   KANT's   CRITICAL   PHILOSOPHY 

of  a  proposition,  so  far  transcending  the  empirical  use  of 
the  understanding,  is  possible  at  all. 

THE  REGULATIVE  USE   OF  THE  IDEAS 

The  dialectic,  Kant  thinks,  confirms  the  view  that  all 
attempts  to  pass  beyond  the  limits  of  possible  experience 
are  vain  and  lead  to  nothing  but  error.    Furthermore,  it 
has  shown  that  reason  has  a  natural  inclination  to  over- 
step these  limits,  and  that  transcendental  ideas  are  as 
natural  to  it  as  categories  to  the  understanding. 
Despite  their  tendency  to  lead  us  into  illusion,  the 
/-^deas  of  reason  have  a  use  which  depends  upon  the  rela- 
/  tion  between  reason  and  understanding.    Reason  seems 
/  to  be  related  to  understanding  in  much  the  same  way  as 
1  understanding  is  related  to  sensibility.    It  is  the  proper 
^busineiss  of  reason  to  render  the  unity  of  all  possible 
empirical  acts  of  the  understanding  systematical,  in 
^fie  same  manner  as  the  understanding  connects  the 
— Manifold  of  phenomena  by  concepts,  and  brings  it  under 
empirical  laws.    Thus  the  ideas  of  reason  furnish  a  rule 
or  principle  for  the  systematical  unity  of  the  whole  use 
of  the  understanding.    But  this  rule  or  principle  does  not 
"^of  itself  determine  anything,  it  merely  indicates  the  pro- 
cedure by  which  the  empirical  and  definite  use  of  the 
understanding  may  remain  in  harmony  with  itself. 

Kant  holds  that  the  ideas  of  reason  ought  never  to  be 
employed  as  constitutive  principles.  Reason  never  refers 
immediately  to  an  object,  but  to  the  understanding  only, 
and  through  it  to  its  own  empirical  use.  Therefore,  it 
'does  not  form,  concepts  of  objects,  but  arranges  them 
only,  and  imparts  to  them  that  unity  which  they  can  have 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  213 

in  their  greatest  possible  extension,  that  is,  with  reference 
to  the  totality  of  different  series;  while  the  understanding 
does  not  concern  itself  with  this  totahty,  but  only  with 
that  connection  through  which  such  series  of  conditions 
become  possible  according  to  concepts.  Reason  has 
therefore  for  its  object  the  understanding  only  and  the 
fittest  employment  of  that  understanding;  and  as  the 
understanding  brings  unity  into  the  manifold  of  the 
objects  by  means  of  concepts,  reason  brings  unity  into 
the  manifold  of  concepts  by  means  of  ideas,  making  a 
certain  collective  unity  the  aim  of  the  operations  of  the 
understanding,  which  otherwise  is  occupied  with  dis- 
tributive unity  only. 

From  what  has  been  said  it  will  appear  that  the  ideas 
though  not  constitutive  have  a  most  admirable  and  in- 
dispensably necessary  regulative  use  in  directing  the 
understanding  to  a  certain  aim.  If  we  review  the  entire 
extent  of  our  knowledge  supplied  by  the  understanding, 
we  shall  find  that  it  is  the  systematizing  of  that  knowledge, 
that  is,  its  coherence  according  to  one  principle,  which 
forms  the  proper  province  of  reason.  This  unity  of  rea-" 
son  always  pr^upposes  an  idea,  namely,  that  of  the  form 
of  a  whole  of  our  knowledge,  preceding  the  definite  knowl- 
edge of  its  parts,  and  containing  the  conditions  according 
to  which  we  are  to  determine  a  priori  the  place  of  every 
part  and  its  relation  to  the  rest.  Such  an  idea,  accord- 
ingly, demands  the  complete  unity  of  the  knowledge  of 
our  understanding,  by  which  that  knowledge  becomes  not 
a  mere  aggregate  but  a  system,  connected  according  to 
necessary  laws.  Such  concepts  of  reason  are  not  derived 
from  nature,  but  we  only  interrogate  nature,  according  to 


UCTION  TO   KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 


these  ideas,  and  consider  our  knowledge  defective  so  long 
as  it  is  not  adequate  to  them.  This  use  is  only  hypothet- 
ical or  regulative  because  the  general  idea  is  merely 
assumed  and  never  really  given  or  reached.  The  matter 
will  become  clearer  if  we  consider  the  different  ways  in 
which  this  idea  appears. 

1.  In  all  our  investigations  we  seek  for  unity  back  of 
the  differences.  In  all  fields,  reason  compels  us  to  seek 
for  some  concept  capable  of  explaining  the  difference 
between  things  and  the  multipHcity  of  their  changes. 
The  logical  principle  of  genera  presupposes  a  transcenden- 
tal principle  in  order  that  the  former  may  be  applied  to 
nature.  According  to  it,  in  the  manifoldness  of  a  pos- 
sible experience,  some  homogeneousness  is  necessarily 
supposed^  because  without  it,  no  empirical  concepts,  and 
consequently  no  experience,  would  be  possible. 

2.  The  logical  principle  of  generahzation  is  balanced 
by  another  principle,  namely,  that  of  species,  which 
requires  manifoldness  and  diversity  in  things,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  they  belong  to  the  same  genus.  This 
principle  depending  on  the  faculty  of  distinction,  checks 
the  generalizing  flights  of  fancy  which  have  a  tendency 
to  overlook  the  differences  between  things.  The  trans- 
cendental principle  of  specification  is  not  constitutive 
but  is  merely  regulative.  It  does  not  involve  an  actual 
infinity  of  difference  in  the  objects  of  our  knowledge; 
it  simply  prescribes  a  task  to  the  understanding.  As 
the  principle  of  homogeneity  prompts  us  to  look  for 
uniformity,  so  the  principle  of  specification  prompts  us 
to  note  differences. 

3.  The  principle  of  continuity  counsels  us  to  avoid 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  215 

all  violent  leaps  either  in  generalization  or  in  specification. 
This  again  is  only  a  regulative  principle. 

The  first  law  keeps  us  from  admitting  an  extrava- 
gant variety  of  different  original  genera,  and  recom- 
mends attention  to  homogeneousness.  The  second,  on 
the  contrary,  checks  that  tendency  to  unity,  and  pre- 
scribes distinction  of  sub-species  before  applying  any  gen- 
eral concept  to  individuals.  The  third  unites  both,  by 
prescribing,  even  with  the  utmost  variety,  homogeneous- 
ness, through  the  gradual  transition  from  one  species  to 
another:  thus  indicating  a  kind  of  relationship  of  the 
different  branches,  as  all  having  sprung  from  the  same 

These  principles  can  not  be  realized  in  experience  but 
they  are  necessary,  organizing  factors,  since  without  an 
effort  to  realize  them  no  experience  could  exist.  Hence 
they  must  be  considered  as  regulative  only,  and  if  they 
are  referred  to  objects,  we  must  remember  that  such 
objects  are  ideal  not  real. 

Reason,  by  means  of  its  ideas,  has  been  supposed  to  be 
able  to  deal  with  the  soul,  the  world,  and  God,  as  objects. 
The  futility  of  any  such  procedure  has  already  been 
shown.  We  can  not  determine  any  real  object  by  means 
of  the  transcendental  ideas.  But  this  does  not  prove  that 
these  ideas  and  their  ideal  objects  are  without  value. 
True,  we  can  not  determine  the  soul  as  a  unity,  but  still 
it  is  necessary  to  connect  all  the  phenomena,  all  the 
actions  and  feelings,  presented  to  us  in  inner  experience, 
as  if  the  soul  were  a  simple  substance.  In  doing  this,  the 
object  is  merely  to  find  principles  of  systematical  unity 
for  the  explanation  of  the  phenomena  of  the  soul.    Noth- 


•^ 


2l6      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

ing  but  good  can  spring  from  such  an  idea,  used  in  this 
way,  provided  we  do  not  take  it  for  more  than  an  idea. 
It  is  impossible  for  us  to  determine  the  world  of  expe- 
rience as  an  infinite  totality;  but  we  nevertheless  find  it 
necessary,  in  order  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  expe- 
rience, to  pass  from  event  to  event  as  if  all  belonged  to  an 
infinite  series.  We  have  no  ground  for  asserting  a  perfect 
God,  but  reason  requires  us  to  consider  all  connection  in 
the  world  according  to  the  principles  of  a  systematical 
unity,  and,  therefore,  as  if  the  whole  of  it  had  sprung  from 
a  single  all-embracing  being,  as  its  highest  and  all- 
sufficient  cause.  But  we  must  remember  that  in  all  these 
cases  reason  can  have  no  object  except  its  own  formal 
rule  in  the  extension  of  its  empirical  use.  It  can  not 
legitimately  aim  at  extension  beyond  all  limits  of  em- 
pirical application. 

The  highest  formal  unity,  which  is  based  on  concepts 
of  reason  alone,  is  the  unity  of  purpose;  and  the  specula- 
tive interest  of  reason  forces  us  to  regard  the  order  in  the 
world  as  being  designed  by  God.  This  principle  opens 
new  views  to  reason  and  invites  it  to  unite  all  things 
according  to  teleological  laws.  The  admission  of  God 
as  the  only  cause  of  the  universe,  if  used  merely  as  a 
regulative  principle  can  produce  nothing  but  good./Vlf, 
however,  we  look  upon  this  idea  as  constitutive  we  com- 
mit serious  errors.  Thus  we  may  indolently  cease  looking 
for  natural  causes  and  refer  everything  directly  to  the 
will  of  God.  Or  again,  we  may  determine  God  an- 
thropomorphically  and  then  suppose  His  aims  as  dic- 
tatorially  and  violently  imposed  on  nature.  In  this  way 
we  avoid  the  labor  of  looking  for  explanations  by  means 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  217 

of  natural  causes.  Toi^istake  the  regulative  principle 
of  the  unity  of  nature  for  a  constitutive  principle,  and 
thus  to  use  it  in  this  manner,  is  simply  to  confound 
reason. 

Kant  puts  the  general  discussion  concerning  God  and 
the  world  in  a  concrete  form,  near  the  end  of  the  Dialec- 
tic, by  means  of  questions  and  answers. 

If  it  be  asked.  Whether  there  is  something  different 
from  the  world,  containing  the  ground  of  the  order  of  the 
world  and  of  its  connection  according  to  general  laws? 
The  answer  is:  certainly  there  is.  For  the  world  is  a  sum 
of  phenomena,  and  there  must,  therefore,  be  some 
transcendental  ground  of  it,  that  is,  a  ground  to  be 
thought  by  the  pure  understanding  only.  If  it  is  asked. 
Whether  that  being  is  a  substance  of  the  greatest  reality, 
necessary,  etc.?  The  answer  is,  that  such  a  question  has  no 
meaning.  For  the  categories  have  no  meaning  unless  they 
are  applied  to  the  world  of  sense.  Outside  that  field 
they  are  mere  titles  of  concepts,  which  we  may  admit, 
but  by  which  we  can  understand  nothing.  If  the  ques- 
tion is  asked,  Whether  we  may  not  at  least  conceive  this 
being,  which  is  different  from  the  world,  in  analogy  with 
the  objects  of  experience?  Our  answer  is,  certainly  we 
may  J  but  only  as  an  object  in  the  idea  and  not  in  the 
reahty,  that  is,  in  so  far  only  as  it  remains  a  substratum, 
unknown  to  us,  of  the  systematic  unity,  order,  and  design 
of  the  world,  which  reason  is  obliged  to  adopt  as  a  regula- 
tive principle  in  the  investigation  of  nature.  It  was  not 
intended  that  by  it  we  should  try  to  form  a  conception 
of  what  that  original  cause  of  the  unity  of  the  world  may 
be  by  itself;  it  was  only  meant  to  teach  us  how  to  use  it, 


^ 


2l8      INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

or  rather  its  idea,  with  reference  to  the  systematical  use 
of  reason,  applied  to  the  things  of  the  world. 

But,  surely,  people  will  proceed  to  ask.  We  may, 
according  to  this,  admit  a  wise  and  omnipotent  Author 
of  the  world?  Certainly,  we  answer,  not  only  we  may,  but 
we  must.  Do  not  we  thus  extend  our  knowledge  beyond 
the  field  of  possible  experience?  By  no  means.  For  we 
have  only  presupposed  a  something  of  which  we  have  no 
conception  whatever  as  to  what  it  is  in  itself.  We  have 
only,  with  reference  to  the  systematical  and  well-designed 
order  of  the  world,  which  we  must  presuppose,  if  we  are 
to  study  nature  at  all,  presented  to  ourselves  that  un- 
known being  in  analogy  with  what  is  an  empirical  con- 
cept, namely,  an  intelligence;  that  is,  we  have,  with 
reference  to  the  purposes  and  the  perfection  which 
depend  upon  it,  attributed  to  it  those  very  quahties  on 
which,  according  to  the  conditions  of  our  reason,  such 
a  systematical  unity  may  depend.  That  idea,  therefore, 
is  entirely  founded  on  the  employment  of  our  reason  in  the 
world,  and  if  we  were  to  attribute  to  it  absolute  and 
objective  validity,  we  should  be  forgetting  that  it  is  only 
a  being  in  the  idea  which  we  think:  and  as  we  should 
then  be  taking  our  start  from  a  cause,  that  can  not  be 
determined  by  mundane  considerations,  we  should  no 
longer  be  able  to  employ  that  principle  in  accordance 
with  the  empirical  use  of  reason. 

If,  finally,  it  is  asked.  May  we  not  use  the  concept  of 
a  supreme  being  in  our  investigations  of  nature?  The 
answer  is,  we  may  and  should  because  that  is  the  purpose 
of  the  idea.  But  in  considering  natural  things  as  due  to 
the  design  of  a  supreme  being  one  should  never  forget 


TRANSCENDENTAL  DIALECTIC  219 

that  the  idea  is  merely  regulative.  We  are  using  analogies 
only  and  must  beware  of  taking  them  for  things  in  them- 
selves.* 

Thus  we  find  that  pure  reason,  which  at  first  seemed  to 
promise  nothing  less  than  extension  of  our  knowledge 
beyond  all  limits  of  experience,  contains,  if  properly 
understood,  nothing  but  regulative  principles,  which 
indeed  postulate  greater  unity  than  the  empirical  use 
of  the  understanding  can  ever  achieve.  But  these 
principles,  by  the  very  fact  that  they  place  the  goal 
which  has  to  be  reached  at  so  great  a  distance,  carry  the 
agreement  of  the  understanding  with  itself  by  means  of 
systematical  unity  to  the  highest  possible  degree;  while, 
if  they  are  misunderstood  and  mistaken  for  constitutive 
principles  of  transcendent  knowledge,  they  produce,  by  a 
brilHant  but  deceptive  illusion  constant  contradictions 
and  disputes. 

Thus  all  human  knowledge  begins  with  intuitions,  ad- 
vances to  concepts,  and  ends  with  ideas.  Although  with 
reference  to  each  of  these  three  elements,  it  possesses 
a  priori  sources  of  knowledge,  which  at  first  sight  seem 
to  despise  the  limits  of  all  experience,  criticism  soon 

*  From  Kant's  note  in  reference  to  the  psychological  idea,  it  is 
easy  to  see  how  he  would  have  treated  the  concept  of  self.  It 
would  have  been  pointed  out  that  we  are  at  liberty  to- use  this 
conception  in  our  interpretation  of  phenomena — as  indeed  Kant 
himself  has  done — but  we  must  beware  of  taking  our  conception 
of  it  as  anything  more  than  an  analogy  which  is  put  in  place  of 
something  unknown.  This  point  has  an  important  bearing  on  the 
interpretation  of  Kant's  philosophy  and  deserves  more  considera- 
tion than  is  usually  given  to  it.  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  trans- 
lated by  Mueller,  p.  558. 


2  20     INTRODUCTION  TO  KANT's   CRITICAL  PHILOSOPHY 

convinces  us,  that  reason,  in  its  speculative  use,  can  never 
get,  with  these  elements,  beyond  the  field  of  possible 
experience,  and  that  it  is  the  true  destination  of  that 
highest  faculty  of  knowledge  to  use  all  methods  and 
principles  of  reason  with  one  object  only,  namely,  to 
follow  up  nature  into  her  deepest  recesses,  according  to 
every  principle  of  unity,  the  unity  of  design  being  the 
most  important,  but  never  to  soar  above  its  limits,  out- 
side of  which  there  is  for  us  nothing. 


INDEX 


A  posteriori,  meaning  of,  20;  Judg- 
ments, 20 

A  priori,  meaning  of,  20  f.;  the  pure 
a  priori,  20;  mathematical  judg- 
ments, 22 

Esthetic,  transcendental,  26; 
meaning  of  term,  26;  Kant's 
general  observations  on,  33  ff.; 
authors'  observations  on,  37  ff. 

Analogies  of  experience,  impor- 
tance of,  106;  detailed  treatment 
of,  107  ff.;  first  analogy,  107; 
second  analogy,  no;  third  anal- 
ogy, 125 

Analysis,  presupposes  synthesis, 
50,  64;  brings  different  rep- 
resentations under  one  concept, 

SI 

Analytic,  transcendental,  46;  parts 
of,  46;  meaning  of,  46;  meaning 
of  analytic  of  concepts,  47 

Anticipations  of  perception,  104  f. 

Antinomy  of  pure  reason,  177  ff.; 
first  antinomy,  178  ff.;  second 
antinomy,  180  ff.;  third  antin- 
omy, 183  ff.;  fourth  antinomy, 
186  ff.;  solution  of  the  mathe- 
matical antinomies,  192;  solution 
of  the  dynamical  antinomies, 
192  f.;  summary  of,  189  ff.; 
nature  of,  149 

Apodictic,  meaning  of,  29 

Apperception,  unity  of,  65  ff., 
175  f.;  pure  apperception,  65;  all 


representations  must  conform  to 

it,  66  ff. 
Apprehension,  synthesis  of,  57  f. 
Aristotle,  52 
Axioms  of  intuition,  102  f. 

Berkeley,  7  ff. 

Caird,  E.,  90  note 

Categories,  meaning  of,  52  f.,  71; 
as  laws  of  nature,  85  ff.;  table  of, 
52  f.;  metaphysical  deduction 
of,  52  ff.;  transcendental  deduc- 
tion of,  54  ff.;  hmits  of,  74  ff., 
139;  objective  vaHdity  of,  56;  as 
basis  of  knowledge  a  priori, 82  ff.; 
as  grounds  of  experience,  88  ff.; 
as  schematized,  loi;  categories 
have  no  meaning  unless  applied 
to  the  world  of  sense,  217;  obser- 
vations on  the  various  deduc- 
tions of,  53  f.,  62  f.,  89  ff. 

Causality,  as  an  ontological  prin- 
ciple, 5;  as  self-evident,  9; 
Hume's  analysis  of^  12  ff.;  the 
category  of,  52,  85;  its  schema, 
loi;  in  the  analogies,  no  ff.; 
observations  on  Kant's  views  of, 
120  ff.;  of  freedom,  183  ff.,  193 
ff.;  causahty  of  God,  216  ff.;  its 
necessity  not  subjective,  88  f. 

Community,   category  of,   52;   its 
schema,  loi;  proof  of  the  prin- 
ciple, 125  ff. 
221 


222 


INDEX 


Concept,  no  knowledge  possible 
without  it,  6 1 

Conception,  its  relation  to  intui- 
tion, 43  £. 

Conscious  self  as  substantial  entity, 
30  note,  37  iff.,  150  ff.,  175  f.; 
Hume's  criticism  of,  16 

Consciousness,  relation  to  mind, 
37  ff.;  of  self,  36,  78  ff.,  150  flf.; 
its  subject-object  form,  30  note, 
92  flf. 

Constitutive  principles,  causality 
a  constitutive  principle,  16; 
ideas  of  reason  not  constitutive, 
212  flf. 

Copernican  revolution  in  Kant's 
philosophy,  19  f. 

Cosmological  proof,  criticism  of, 
205  flf. 

Cosmology,  rational,  meaning  of, 
177;  antinomies  of,  177;  first 
antinomy  of,  178  flf.;  second  an- 
tinomy of,  180  ff.;  third  antin- 
omy of,  183  flf.;  fourth  antinomy 
of,  186  flf. 

Creighton,  J.  E.,  19  note,  176 
note. 

Descartes,  i 

Dialectic,  its  material  use  of  for- 
mal principles,  45;  transcen- 
dental dialectic  is  a  critique  of 
dialectical  semblance,  45 

Dialectical  proposition,  meaning 
of,  177 

Divine,  understanding,  72;  mind, 
197 

Empiricism,  its  conception  of  the 
nature    of    knowledge,    3    flf.; 


Kant's  philosophy  as  empiri- 
cism, 136 

Essence,  scholastic  doctrine  of,  2 

Existence,  category  of,  53;  its 
schema,  loi 

Experience,  all  knowledge  fur- 
nished by,  3;  all  knowledge  be- 
gins with,  19  f. 

Exposition,  meaning  of,  27;  meta* 
physical  exposition  of  space, 
27  flf.;  transcendental  exposition 
of  space,  29  f.;  metaphysical 
exposition  of  time,  31  f.;  tran- 
scendental exposition  of  time,  32 

Freedom,  causality  of.  183  flf.,  193 
flf.;  not  incompatible  with  nat- 
ural causality,  194  flf.;  its  rela- 
tion to  morality,  196 

Function,  meaning  of,  47 

God,  Locke's  proof  of  God's  ex- 
istence, 6;  as  cause  in  Berkeley's 
system,  8;  ontological  proof  of, 
201  flf.;  cosmological  proof  of, 
205  £[.;  as  cause  of  the  universe, 
216  flf.;  physico-theological  proof 
of,  208  flf. 

Hume,  David,  9  flf. 

Ideal  of  pure  reason,  meaning  of, 
149  f.,  196  flf. 

Idealism,  refutation  of,  131  flf. 

Ideas,  of  sensation  and  reflection, 
4;  innate,  i;  transcendental,  144; 
three  classes  of  transcendental, 
145;  objective  deduction  not  pos- 
sible in  case  of  the  transcen- 
dental ideas,  146;  transcendental 


INDEX 


223 


ideas  unable  to  determine  any 
real  object,  215 

Imagination,  meaning  of,  77  f.; 
transcendental  synthesis  of,  59  f. 

Immortality,  refutation  of  Men- 
delssohn's proof  of,  160;  can  not 
be  proved,  162,  168  f.;  practical 
reason  renders  belief  in  future 
life  possible,  169 

Innate  ideas,  assumed  as  self- 
evident  by  the  rationalists,  i; 
Locke's  criticism  of,  2  f. 

Intuition,  Kant's  meaning  of,  26 
note;  relation  to  conception,  43 
f.;  axioms  of,  102  f. 

Judgments,  of  analysis,  21  flf.;  of 
synthesis,  21  fif.;  as  functions  of 
unity,  47;  table  of,  48  ff.;  a 
priori,  20;  a  posteriori,  20;  math- 
ematical, 22;  function  of,  70; 
schematism  of,  100;  the  syn- 
thetical a  priori  judgments  which 
the  principles  render  possible, 
103  ff. 

Knowledge,  rationalistic  concep- 
tion of,  I  f.;  Locke's  view  of,  3  f.; 
a  priori,  20  f.;  a  posteriori,  20; 
how  related  to  thought,  73  flF., 
154  f.;  arises  from  two  funda- 
mental sources,  43;  transcen- 
dental, 44  f,;  does  not  extend 
beyond  the  objects  of  possible 
experience,  87 

Leibniz,  i,  17 

Locke,  2  ff. 

Logic,  meaning  of,  44;  meaning  of 
transcendental  logic,  45;  uni- 
versal  and   particular   logic,   44 


Material  world,  assumed  by  Locke, 

5 

Mathematics,  dominant  science 
in  age  of  Descartes  and  Leibniz, 
i;  its  judgments  synthetical,  22; 
how  possible,  30 

Matter,     dynamical     theory     of, 

105 

Mendelssohn's  proof  of  the  per- 
manence of  the  soul,  refutation 
of,  160  ff. 

Metaphysic,  its  methods  have 
been  inadequate,  18 

Metaphysical  deduction  of  the 
categories,  48  ff.;  observations 
on  the  metaphysical  deduction, 

53  f.     ^ 

Metaphysical  exposition,  mean- 
ing of,  27 

Metaphysical  exposition  of  space, 
27  ff. 

Metaphysical  exposition  of  time, 

31  f.  ^ 

Mind,    relation    to    consciousness, 

37   ff.;   Locke's   view   of,   3    f.; 

divine,  197;  relation  of  mind  and 

body,  171  f. 
Modality,   its   categories,   53;   e.x- 

presses    degree    of    knowledge, 

128;  its  judgments,  48 

Necessary  connection,  Hume's  view 

of,  13  f. 
Necessity,  basis  of,  61;  its  cate- 
gory >    53;    its    schema,    loi;    a 
postulate  of  empirical  thought, 
127 
Negation,  category  of,  52 
Non-existence,  category  of,  53 
Noumena,  158,  168  note,  173 


224 


INDEX 


Objective  deduction  of  the  cate- 
gories, 63  ff.;  observations  on, 
90  ff. 

Ontological  proof,  criticism  of, 
201  ff.;  validity  of,  205  note 

Paralogisms  of  rational  psychol- 
ogy,  150  ff.;  meaning  of,  149, 

151  f. 

Phenomena,  meaning  of  term,  33 
ff.,  140;  relative  independence 
of,  41  f.;  selves  as,  35  f.;  the 
world  a  sum  of  phenomena,  217 

Physico-theological  proof,  criti- 
cism of,  208  ff. 

Plurality,  category  of,  52 

Possibility,  category  of,  53;  its 
schema,  loi;  a  postulate  of  em- 
pirical thought,  127 

Postulates  of  empirical  thought, 
127  ff.;  observations  on,  129  ff. 

Principles  of  the  pure  understand- 
ing, 1 01  ff.;  observations  on,  129 
ff.,  135  ff.;  mathematical  and 
dynamical,  136 

Purpose  the  highest  form  of  imity, 
216 

Quality,    its    categories,    52;  its 

schema,  loi;  of  judgments,  48 

Quantity,    its   categories,    52;  its 

schema,  loi;  of  judgments,  48 

Rational  psychology,  paralogisms 
of,  150  ff.;  does  not  prove  the 
existence  of  the  self  as  a  sub- 
stance, 154  f.;  does  not  prove 
the  simplicity  of  the  self,  155  f.; 
does  not  prove  the  personal 
identity  of  self,  156  f.;  the  analy- 


sis of  consciousness  of  self  gives 
no  knowledge  of  the  self  as 
object,  157  f.;  it  furnishes  no 
knowledge  of  the  self,  166  f.; 
proves  nothing  concerning  im- 
mortality, 166  ff.;  observations 
on,  175  ff. 

Rational  theology,  criticism  of, 
196  ff. 

Rationalism,  its  ideal  of  true 
knowledge,  i;  relation  to  math- 
ematics, I  f. 

Reality,  category  of,  52;  its  schema, 

lOI 

Reason,  two  meanings  of,  142  f.; 
logical  employment  of,  143; 
paralogisms  of,  150  ff.;  antin- 
omies of,  177  ff.;  ideal  of,  196 
ff.;  its  relation  to  understand- 
ing, 212  ff.;  its  speculative  use 
confined  to  possible  experience, 
219  ff.;  in  its  speculative  use 
unable  to  prove  immortality, 
168  f.;  in  its  practical  employ- 
ment reason  renders  belief  in  a 
future  life  possible,  169 

Reciprocity,  importance  of,  125  f.; 
its  category,  52;  its  schema,  loi; 
proof  of  the  principle,  125  ff. 

Recognition,  synthesis  of,  60  ff. 

Refutation  of  idealism,  131  ff. 

Regulative  principles,  ideas  of 
reason  merely  regulative,  212  ff.; 
to  mistake  them  for  constitutive 
principles  is  to  confound  reason, 
217 

Relation,  categories  of,  52;  schema 
of,  loi;  judgments  of,  48 

Representative  perception,  5,  8 

Reproduction,  synthesis  of,  58  ff. 


INDEX 


225 


Schematism  of  the  categories,  100 

f.,  135  f. 

Self,  as  substance  in  Berkeley's 
philosophy,  9;  Hume's  treat- 
ment of,  16;  as  an  entity  which 
precedes  experience,  30  note, 
37  ff.;  noumenal  conditions  of 
self  unknown,  62;  its  numerical 
identity  can  not  be  established, 
156  flf.;  its  immortality  can  not 
be  proved,  162 

Self-consciousness,  transcendental 
unity  of,  65  ff.;  must  be  possible 
to  bring  all  representations 
under  one  self-consciousness,  66 
ff.;  perfectly  empty  representa- 
tion, 152,  155;  implies  connected 
consciousness  of  objects,  65  ff.; 
89;  a  logical  relation,  175  ff. 

SensibiHty,  meaning  of,  43;  science 
of,  44 

Seth,  Andrew,  17  note,  62  note, 
176  note 

Smith,  Norman  Kemp,  17  note, 
19  note,  63  note 

Soul,  the  object  of  rational  psy- 
chology, 150  f. 

Space,  the  self  furnishes  the  re- 
lations of,  6;  Hume's  treatment 
of,  II  f.;  metaphysical  exposition 
of,  27  ff.;  transcendental  ex- 
position of,  29  f. 

Stephen,  Leslie,  17  note 

Subjective  deduction  of  the  cate- 
gories, 56  ff. 

Substance,  Locke's  view  of,  4; 
self  as  substance  in  Berkeley's 
philosophy,  9;  permanence  of, 
107  ff.;  category  of,  52;  its 
schema,  loi;  proof  of  the  prin- 


ciple, 107  ff.;  soul  as  substance, 

151  ff. 
Synthesis,  meaning  of,  50;  result 
of  a  blind  function  of  the  soul, 
50;  of  apprehension,  57  f.;  of  re- 
production, 58  ff,;  of  recognition, 
60  ff.;  basis  of,  62  f.;  not  given 
by  senses,  64;  presupposed  by 
analysis,  50,  64 

Thing-in-itself,  meaning  of,  34  f.; 
no  knowledge  of,  ^^ 

Time,  the  self  furnishes  the  rela- 
tions of,  6;  Hume's  treatment 
of,  II  f.;  metaphysical  exposi- 
tion of,  31  f.;  transcendental 
exposition  of,  32 

Totality,  category  of,  52 

Transcendental  deduction,  mean- 
ing of,  55;  of  the  categories,  54 
ff.;  its  relation  to  empirical  de- 
duction, 55;  observations  on, 
62  f.,  89  ff. 

Transcendental  exposition,  mean- 
ing of,  29 

Transcendental  exposition  of  space, 
29  f. 

Transcendental  exposition  of  time, 
32  f. 

Transcendental  ideas,  meaning  of, 
144;  three  classes  of,  145;  ob- 
jective deduction  not  possible, 
146;  as  a  guide  to  the  under- 
standing, 144;  no  knowledge  of 
objects  corresponding  to  these 
ideas,  148 

Transcendental  illusion,  meaning 
of,  141,  149,  177 

Transcendental  knowledge,  mean- 
ing of,  44  f.,  77.;  does  not  extend 


226  INDEX 

beyond  the  objects  of  possible  Unconditioned,  dififerent  kinds  of, 

experience,  87  144  fif. 

Transcendental  logic,  meaning  of,  Understanding,  meaning  of,  43  fif., 

26,  45;  parts  of,  45  67,    142;   relation   to   synthesis, 

Transcendental  philosophy,  mean-        64;  relation  to  reason,  212  ff. 

ing  of,  24  Unity,  category  of,  52;  object  of  all 
Transcendental     unity     of     self-        investigation,  214 

consciousness,    65    £f.,    174    ff,; 

an  ideal,  175  ff.  Vaihinger,  H.,  94  note 


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Cloth,  i2tno,  $i.go  net. 

This  book  makes  provision  for  the  needs  both  of  beginners  and  of  ad- 
vanced students.  The  body  of  the  book  contains  a  brief  exposition  of 
the  essentials  of  psychology.  This  is  clearly  written,  methodically  or- 
dered, and  rich  in  illustration.  Terms  are  carefully  defined,  and  are  very 
scrupulously  used  with  their  assigned  meanings.  These  features  of  the 
book  constitute  its  appeal  to  untrained  readers.  But  the  students  who 
have  used  this  "First  Book  in  Psychology"  need  not  lay  it  aside  when 
they  have  reached  the  more  advanced  stages  of  their  study.  For  the 
book  contains  not  only  page-by-page  references  to  four  manuals  of  ex- 
perimental psychology  but  also  an  appendix  (of  140  pages)  which  includes 
(i)  expositions  and  discussions  of  disputed  topics  in  psychology;  (2) 
careful  accounts  of  experimental  investigations;  and  (3)  bibliographies, 
enlarged  by  two  supplements.  The  book  is,  therefore,  of  more  than 
temporary  value. 

"An  introductory  treatise  which  sets  forth  theories  about  mental  life  in 
the  perfect  style  of  an  essay,  with  the  first  hand  vividness  of  a  human  doc- 
ument and  yet  true  to  the  essentials  of  consciousness.  Miss  Calkins  orders 
her  topics  admirably.  She  winnows  the  obstruse  and  the  problematic  out 
from  the  mass  of  simple  certainties  and  settles  them,  together  with  physio- 
logical excerpts  and  a  rich  store  of  bibliographical  notes,  in  an  appendix. 
The  beginner  thus  encounters  only  a  sketch  of  the  main  currents  of 
psychic  activity,  and  he  finds  it  rich  with  historical  allusion,  Hterary 
glimpses  and  personal  confessions." — New  York  Nation. 

"The  self-psychology  will  have  a  fair  trial  in  this  book  which  is  lucid, 
systematic,  and  pithy  in  language  and  treatment  and  has  a  wholesome 
scientific,  artistic,  and  philosophical  setting." — Professor  C.  E.  Seashore 
in  The  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Psychology  and  Scientific  Method. 

"The  book  is  in  fact  exceedingly  well  adapted  to  the  application  of  the 
concentric  method  of  studying  or  teaching." — The  Journal  of  Education. 

"We  know  no  better  book  for  those  who  are  seriously  entering  upon 
the  study." — The  School  World,  England. 


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Essentials  of  Psychology 

By  W.  B.  PILLSBURY 

Professor  of  Psychology,  University  of  Michigan 

Cloih,  i2mo,  $i.2j  nei 

"  The  present  work  is  a  simple,  straightforward  presentation 
of  the  accepted  data  of  psychology,  intended  for  introductory 
college  classes.  Approximately  loo  pages  are  devoted  to  the 
physical  aspects  of  mental  life,  as  the  nervous  system,  behavior 
and  sensation.  There  are  concluding  chapters  on  work,  fatigue, 
sleep,  and  disturbances  of  the  self." — Journal  of  Educational 
Psychology. 

"  In  Professor  Pillsbury's  '  Essentials  of  Psychology '  we  have 
an  admirable  psychological  text-book,  which  combines  readable- 
ness  and  clearness  of  presentation  with  a  general  arrangement 
that  is  novel  ...  a  text-book  that  will  confirm  Professor  Pills- 
bury's high  position  as  an  exponent  of  up-to-date  psychology." 
—  The  Westminster  Revieiv. 

"  The  essential  results  of  psychological  investigation  are  here 
presented  in  a  simple  and  very  usable  form.  .  .  .  This  book 
will  undoubtedly  be  very  useful  as  an  introductory  text.  Teach- 
ers will  find  a  very  satisfactory  statement  of  the  most  recent  re- 
sults on  which  to  base  educational  applications." —  University 
of  Chicago  Press. 

"  Professor  Pillsbury  has  written  an  exceptionally  useful  and 
effective  book  for  which  one  can  safely  predict  a  high  degree  of 
popularity  among  students."  —  Nature. 


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A  Brief  History  of  Modern  Philosophy 

By  Dr.   HARALD  HOFFDING 

Professor  in  the  University  of  Copenhagen 

Translated  with  the  author's  permission  by  C.  F.  Sanders 
Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Pennsylvania  College 

Clothy  i2mo,  $/.Jo  net 

In  a  concise  and  interesting  manner  the  author  discusses 
the  following  subjects,  which  constitute  the  parts  or  books 
into  which  the  volume  is  divided :  The  Philosophy  of  the 
Renaissance,  The  Great  Systems,  English  Empirical  Phi- 
losophy, Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment  in  France  and 
Germany,  Emanuel  Kant  and  Critical  Philosophy,  The  Phi- 
losophy of  Romanticism,  Positivism,  New  Theories  of  the 
Problem  of  Being  upon  a  Realistic  Basis,  New  Theories  of 
the  Problems  of  Knowledge  and  of  Theories. 

The  New  Realism 

BY   PROFESSORS 

E.  B.  Holt  (Harvard)  R.  B.  Perry  (Harvard) 

W.  T.  Marvin  (Rutgers)  W.  B.  Pitkin  (Columbia) 

W.  P.  Montague  (Columbia)  E.  G.  Spaulding  (Princeton) 

Clothj  8vo,  $2.jo  net 

This  volume  is  unique  in  the  history  of  philosophy  in  that 
it  is  strictly  a  cooperative  work,  for  the  writers  have  been 
conferring  in  regard  to  the  subject  matter  of  the  book  for 
two  years.  It  brings  philosophy  into  harmony  with  the  natu- 
ral sciences  of  to-day  by  the  use  of  exact  language,  by  care- 
ful division  of  questions  and  by  analysis.  The  authors  believe 
that  philosophy  must  now  build  on  the  sober  facts  of  mathe- 
matics, physics,  physiology,  psycholog}^  and  biolog}^  and 
must  follow  these  sciences  rather  than  to  pretend  to  lead 
them.  Hence,  the  book  meets  the  needs  of  the  student  or 
general  reader  who  wishes  to  know  what  New  Realism  is  and 
how  it  makes  good  its  claims  against  Idealism  and  Pragmatism. 


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Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  York 


The  Persistent    Problems  of  Philosophy 

BY   MARY  WHITON    CALKINS 
Professor  of  Philosophy   and  Psychology    in  Wellesley    College 

AN  INTRODUCTION  TO  PHILOSOPHY  THROUGH 
A   STUDY   OF   MODERN   SYSTEMS 

Cloth,  octavo,  575  pages,  $2.50  net.     First  Edition,  igoy;  Second^ 
Revised  Edition,  igo8;   Third,  Revised  Edition,  igi2 

"To  expound  the  metaphysics  of  modern  Europe  is  no  light  task, 
but  Professor  Calkins  has  accomplished  it  for  the  most  part  in  a 
clear  and  scholarly  manner.  Beginners  may  read  her  'Introduc- 
tion' with  understanding;  and  even  those  who  are  weary  with  the 
confusion  of  metaphysical  tongues  will  be  interested  in  the  freshness 
of  her  comment  and  criticism.  The  chapters  on  Descartes  and 
Leibnitz  are  good  examples  of  the  way  in  which  the  history  of 
philosophy  should  be  written  and  the  criticism  of  philosophy  per- 
formed. .  .  .  The  exposition  of  Fichte  is  undertaken  in  such  sym- 
pathy with  that  philosopher,  that  it  is  almost  dramatic.  No  author 
writing  in  English  has  surpassed  Professor  Calkins  in  giving  a  clear* 
and  simple  interpretation  of  Hegel,  free  from  the  uncouth  language 
which  disfigures  most  Hegelian  commentaries. 

4:  4c  *  *  *  4:  4: 

"Professor  Calkins  not  only  criticises,  but  constructs,  and  sets 
forth  her  own  doctrine  with  such  ability  that  she  should  have  a  dis- 
tinguished place  among  contemporary  Hegelian^" — From  The 
Nation,  New  York. 

"The  historical  and  critical  portions  of  the  volume  are  written 
with  a  facile  pen.  Few  recent  treatises  on  philosophy  have  com- 
bined so  constant  reference  to  the  sources  with  so  readable  an  ex- 
pository style.  The  writer  exhibits  a  comprehensive  acquaintance 
with  the  history  of  modern  thinking,  at  the  same  time  that  she 
exercises  independent  historical  judgment.  .  .  .  Unstinted  com- 
mendation must  be  given  to  the  spirit  of  Miss  Calkins's  work. 
Never  has  there  been  a  fairer  attempt  to  solve  the  difficult  problem 
of  evolving  doctrine  from  historical  analysis." — Professor  A.  C. 
Armstrong,  in  The  Journal  of  Philosophy. 

"  It  is  exceptional  in  lucidity,  candor,  and  the  freshness  with  which 
it  surveys  well-worn  doctrines.  More  than  any  Introduction  to 
Philosophy  with  which  I  am  acquainted,  it  will  induce  its  reader  to 
turn  to  the  original  sources,  and  to  find  pleasure  in  seeing  Philosophy 
as  it  rises  in  the  minds  of  the  great  thinkers.  While  the  book  is 
unusually  attractive  in  style,  and  well  fitted  for  popular  use,  it  is  the 
work  of  an  original  and  critical  scholar.  The  temper  with  which 
the  history  of  philosophy  should  be  studied  finds  here  admirable 
expression." — Professor  George  H.  Palmer,  Department  of  Phi- 
losophy, Harvard  University. 

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Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue,  New  York 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROVETD 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below, 
or  on  the  date  to  which  renewed.  Renewals  only: 

Tel.  No.  642-3405 
Renewals  may  be  made  4  days  ^rior  to  date  due. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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